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“[I]mmediate global action to curb future [global] warming is essential to secure a future for 
coral reefs” – 46 scientists (Hughes et al., 2015: 373). 
“The likely climate impacts from the opening of the Galilee Basin are both significant and are 
currently unaccounted for in Australia’s assessment and approval process…It’s enough to 
make you question our governments’ commitment to cutting global emissions” (Duus, 2012). 
“Green criminology must continue to consider the ways in which environmental harms, 
regardless of their origin, stem from and are permitted by particular relations of power and 
selective criminalisation” (Brisman 2010: 62). 
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Introduction 
This thesis provides a substantive case study of the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project 
(‘Carmichael Project’). The study is an exegesis of Adani’s proposed mega coal mine in 
Queensland, including the intricacies of political decision-making, and how this case informs, 
critiques and develops global discourses in ecocide. It adopts an expedition in archaeological 
and contemporary knowledge and explores the background, politics and reasoning of the 
Australian governments’ multiple decisions to approve and support what will be the world’s 
largest-ever coal mine. It examines processes of political decision-making during a period of 
global economic coal down-turn, amidst an unprecedented period of coal industry bankruptcy 
and redundancy, and at a time when continued coal production is predicted to cause devastating 
green-house gas emissions and climate change.  This thesis, as discussed later in Chapter Two, 
draws on a unique and originally constructed archive comprising diverse and multiple sources 
not previously compiled. This extensive dataset is an authoritative library and forms the basis 
underpinning the analyses of this thesis. 
As an exercise in green criminology, this thesis recognises that environmental degradation is 
often the result of crimes of the powerful; that is, it arises through their actions and inactions, 
justifications and denials of state and corporate actors. The thesis not only presents the story of 
who the stakeholders are and why they want to see the Carmichael Project approved, but it also 
argues for the need to establish an international law against ecocide – the term that arguably 
encompasses the environmental destruction which would result from the Project – to prevent 
the possibility of approval for similar projects in the future. 
This chapter provides an overview of what this thesis is about, how the study originated and 
the significance of the study. It describes the criminological lens of analysis and concludes with 
an outline of thesis chapters. 
Why the Carmichael Project? 
My interest in the Carmichael Project mainly arose from reading two news articles. The first, 
a Guardian article from 16 March 2016 titled, Peabody Energy, World’s Largest Private 
Coalminer, May File for Bankruptcy, described the U.S. coal mining company’s decline as 
long time coming (Walters 2016). Although Peabody was still profitable, the company had 
been struggling to pay back the loans it had taken out in order to fund new mines in Australia 
and to buy coal from the U.S. government. It was faced with plummeting global coal prices 
caused in part by the natural gas sector emerging as a competitor and environmentalist 
movements against the burning of fossil fuels as well as environmental regulations in the US 
and economic uncertainty abroad. Yet, another, less obvious (and more sinister) reason why 
the so-called ‘king of coal’ was driven to bankruptcy was uncovered: Peabody had been under 
an eight-year investigation by New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman for violating 
state laws that prohibit misleading conduct. The company’s public statements were at odds 
with its private actions. In public, Peabody had agreed that it was unable to predict the impacts 
of future policies on its revenues. In private, according to Schneiderman, the company 
circulated projections of the likely damaging effect that future laws and regulations governing 
the coal industry would have on its business (Walters 2016).  
This article led me on a small investigation of Peabody. I was particularly interested in the 
company’s deception and wanted to find similarities between the topic of Scheniderman’s case 
and Peabody’s previous dishonest practices. What I discovered was perhaps unsurprising to 
	 5 
those familiar with corporate public relations campaigns, but exciting to me: Peabody Energy 
had been the leader of the global pro-coal campaign, spending millions of dollars on public 
relations campaigns in order to prevent its demise. These campaigns included its ‘clean coal’ 
advertisement, which the British Advertising Standards Authority ruled as misleading 
consumers to believe that ‘clean coal’ processes do not produce greenhouse gas emissions (Loh 
2014); and its ‘Advance Energy for Life’ advertisement, which argued that using coal for 
electricity will lift millions of people in developing countries out of poverty (Goldenberg 
2015). Peabody also lobbied the US government extensively, including sending the White 
House’s Council on Environmental Quality a submission which claimed ‘the relationship 
between GHG emissions and any climate change has not been proven’ (Peabody Energy 2015: 
10). These expensive public relations campaigns coupled with the changing climate of the coal 
industry led Peabody to join the other recently bankrupted coal companies. 
 
The Peabody article not only alerted me to the state of the coal industry in the United States 
and the world, but also served as the catalyst for my interest in the influence of corporations 
and their public relations teams and their techniques of neutralising and denying harm. More 
specifically, I was interested in the scripts that industries that are ‘obviously’ harmful to the 
environment (based on CO2 emissions and harms to species and natural resources), such as 
coal mining, use to justify and promote their projects and maintain a working relationship with 
governments and journalists.  
 
The Peabody article led me to assume that the coal giant’s bankruptcy would signal a change 
in the way new coal mining projects would proceed. If they were to be successful, they would 
have to update their public relations to combat environmental activism and citizens’ ‘green’ 
awareness at a time of widespread information sharing and social media. This, to me, meant 
that any large-scale coal mining project should be investigated, especially if it receives the 
support of government. In other words, “something had to be up” for a coal mining project to 
seriously be considered at a time when coal is not viable, both environmentally and 
economically. 
 
My thinking was: How could any person or government deny the direct causal relationship 
between the burning of coal and increased greenhouse gas emissions (which has been proven 
to contribute to the warming of the Earth and cause climate change) now? Although there were 
many indicators that ‘coal is dead’ – including Peabody’s fate – and that the future of energy 
lies with renewable energy, there were indicators that status quo would not give up its power 
so easily. President Trump, for example, withdrew the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, 
championed climate change sceptics and drastically cut funding for the US Environmental 
Protection Agency. 
 
A couple of weeks after reading that Guardian article I came across an ABC article titled 
Carmichael coal mine: Mining leases approved for $21 billion project in Queensland’s Galilee 
Basin (ABC 2016). This article was interesting to me for a couple of reasons. First, 2015 
statistics ranked Australia as the fifth largest producer of coal and first largest exporter of coal 
by volume in the world (Australian Government 2016a). In 2015-2016, 54% of Australia’s coal 
was mined in Queensland and most of the coal mined throughout the country was exported to 
eastern Asia (Australian Government 2016a). Then in April 2016, the Queensland Government 
approved Adani’s mining lease for what would be the state’s 51st coal mine, the $21.7 billion 
Carmichael Coal Mine (ABC 2016b). If built, the Carmichael Mine will release 40-60 million 
tonnes of thermal coal annually. Once burnt, this coal will produce 4.7 billion tonnes of 
greenhouse gases (GHGs), which represents 0.6% of the global carbon budget that is necessary 
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in order to prevent Earth’s temperatures from rising 2 degrees (Taylor and Meinshausen 2014). 
The Great Barrier Reef, already suffering from unprecedented coral bleaching, would ‘cease 
to exist’ if GHG emissions continue on par with current trends (Milman 2014a) because an 
increase in carbon levels in the atmosphere cause the ocean, a ‘heat sink’, to acidify from its 
rise in temperature (Australian Government 2017a) and an acidified ocean cannot sustain coral 
life (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007). The Carmichael Project also involves the construction of a 
railway line to ship the coal to the eastern coast, where it would then be transported through 
the Great Barrier Reef to India (Slezak 2017a).  
 
Australia, a high polluter of greenhouse gases, had – unlike the U.S. – not withdrawn from the 
Paris Agreement. Instead, Australia had set a target to reduce its emissions by 26-28 percent 
below 2005 levels by 2030, building on their 2020 target of reducing emissions by five percent 
below 2000 levels, in order to prevent the global average temperature rising above 2°C 
(Australian Government 2015a). Yet despite the low price of coal and environmental 
movements that contributed to Peabody’s bankruptcy, the Australian government was 
approving a mine – the biggest coal mine in the world. I set out to study why, contrary to all of 
the evidence against coal and international movements against climate change, this mine was 
not being stopped but instead championed by the Australian federal and Queensland state 
governments. I also set out to study how this was happening: What were the arguments for the 
mine? Were the arguments similar to those made by Peabody? If so, what does this tell us about 
the nature of the coal industry’s methods of persuasion? How could this mine be stopped; what 




These news articles and the questions they provoked led me on a much larger investigation of 
Adani, the Carmichael Project, and the Australian government. At the beginning of my thesis, 
in the data collecting phase, I was surprised by the similarities between the justifications for 
the Carmichael Project and Peabody’s campaigns. The scripts seemed to be taken from the 
same ‘book’ – if one should exist – of denying environmental harm and promoting coal in the 
name of the economy and, ironically, in the name of morality. Based on these findings, I sought 
to investigate the Carmichael Project as, first, a state-corporate crime, and then more 




Scientists have already been able to map and predict the harms that will follow should the 
Carmichael Project go ahead. The various scientific predictions about the negative impacts on 
the Great Barrier Reef, the surrounding flora and fauna, land and water; and the proposed green 
house gas emissions and climate change; are fairly emphatic. I have compiled an outline of the 
Project’s harms to land, water, air, and the Great Barrier Reef at the forefront of this thesis, in 
Chapter Four, in order to provide a description of what is at stake should the Project begin to 
operate. A primary aim of this study is to examine whether the Australian government’s 
approval and support for the Project, in light of these predicted harms, can form the basis for a 
case of ecocide.  
 
Ecocide involves transgressions that violate the principles of environmental justice (for 
humans), ecological justice (for ecosystems) and species justice (for non-human species and 
plant life) (White 2014a). These transgressions are not only apparent in relation to 
environmental victims (both human and non-human) but also have temporal dimensions that 
	 7 
traverse the past, present and future. The causes of ecocide stem from current systems of 
production and consumption, controlled by transnational corporations and states, that relies on 
exploitation of the environmental resources for profit. 
 
This thesis acknowledges that the Carmichael Project cannot be studied as an event or entity 
that perpetuates harm on its own. In other words, the Carmichael Project is not afforded the 
personhood that is often legally granted to corporations in order to shield the stakeholders from 
responsibility for these harms (more on this in Chapters Seven and Eight). This study seeks to 
investigate the men and women in both the corporate and government sectors who are invested 
in seeing the Carmichael Project come to fruition. By examining their stakeholder interests and 
rationales behind granting numerous approvals for the building and operation of the Project, 
the social, ideological, and institutional facilitators of the harms that would result from the 
Carmichael Project’s operation are examined as a potential state-corporate crime. This entails 
critically exploring the relationship between the mining industry and the Australian 
government, including an analysis of Australia’s mining legislation (i.e. the processes through 
which the Carmichael Project was able to gain legislative approval) and the media’s framing 
of the events surrounding the Project. Furthermore, this thesis aims to propose a potential 
solution to prevent similar projects from being granted the approval to operate in the future 
through a discussion of the criminalisation of ecocide. Through a discussion of the ‘red flags’ 
that arise out of the Carmichael Project’s timeline of approvals, several suggestions are made 
that could potentially safeguard ecosystems such as the Great Barrier Reef and help assure 
intergenerational equity of the planet from future environmentally destructive project 
proposals.  
 
Research question  
 
In order to investigate the circumstances under which a demonstrably harmful resource 
extraction project, the Carmichael Mine and Rail Project (referred to as ‘the Carmichael 
Project’ or ‘the Project’), carried out by a private mining company, Adani, has received 
Australian state and federal approval, this thesis is guided by one central research question, 
namely: 
 
Does the collusion between the Australian Federal and Queensland State Governments and the 
Adani Corporation constitute a conspiracy to commit an act of ecocide insofar as the 
consequence and outcome of the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project is gross environmental 
harm and destruction of the Great Barrier Reef? 
 
The focus of the thesis is ‘ecocide’ and the ‘Carmichael Project’, and both are on trial through 
each other. If ecocide has any merit or future in international law, I want to investigate how it 
stacks up against a watershed, historical and pivotal environmental moment in Australian 
history; involving the greatest predicted environmental catastrophe of our time. If the 
Carmichael Project is not an act of ecocide, then it can be argued ecocide – as a legal concept 
– needs to be re-theorised and its parameters restructured. If it is, then we are entering a new 
era for dealing with corporate and state environmental destruction – one that should involve 
the ICC and its environmental chamber, as it has been called for since 1990. In other words, 
the thesis is about testing the validity of ecocide by testing a live and hotly contested 
contemporary case study – Adani’s Carmichael Project. To do so, I have developed a tripartite 





Figure 1.1 Testing the Carmichael Project as Ecocide 
	
Theoretical perspectives  
	
The criminological concepts of harm, collusion and denial become the means by which to test 
the Carmichael Project as a case of potential future ecocide, as the concept of ecocide currently 
stands. The motivation and intent of Adani and the Australian governments is assessed using 
techniques of neutralisation. The extensive damage or loss of ecosystem is assessed through 
harm. Together, they constitute the key principles– the intent of the actors and the act itself – 
of ecocide.  
 
These three key organisational concepts make up the lens through which I interpret the data of 
this research. The preliminary discussion of the concepts below is elaborated in greater detail 
in subsequent chapters along with relevant commentary. 
 
‘Techniques of neutralisation’ are rhetorical devices used to deny or neutralise harm either 
before or during an act, in order to allow a criminal act to occur, or after a criminal act takes 
place, in order to shield the perpetrator from blame and repercussion (Sykes and Matza 1957). 
Techniques of neutralisation are built upon the concept of denial and can be identified in 















attention in the U.S., with discussions surrounding ‘alternative facts’ and ‘post-truth politics’ 
involving the Trump administration (Brevini and Woronov 2017). However, statements of 
denial can take a number of forms (for example, accidentally lying in good faith versus 
deliberately deceiving someone) and have always existed among numerous types of 
communication: conversations between friends or work colleagues; reporting of an event by 
the news media; corporate press releases or policies; government justifications for legislation. 
Language is at the centre of denial, as statements of denial are an approach to presenting – or 
framing – an issue, event, or action (Maruna and Copes 2005) as well as a construction of 
meaning. How issues, events, and actions are framed depends on who is making the claim; 
what goal he or she seeks to achieve, or the motives behind the claim; the intended audience 
of the statement; as well as what they believe to be true. Denial can be achieved using a certain 
set of scripts – techniques of neutralisation (Cohen 1993; 2001). Whenever facts indicate that 
an issue, event, or action is harmful, those who stand to gain personal benefit can deny the 
harm through techniques of neutralisation. Techniques of neutralisation used by Adani and the 
Australian state to frame the Carmichael Project are studied in order to understand how 
environmental harms have been denied in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis; beginning on 
page 90. 
 
‘State-corporate crime’ describes a criminal act that occurs as a result of the relationship 
between two powerful actors, the state and corporation (Kramer and Michalowski 2006). While 
a corporation’s actions may be motivated solely by the maximization of profit, corporations 
require a legal framework in order to operate in and interact with the market of a state (Tombs 
and Whyte 2015; Whyte 2018). The state, as the legislator and enforcer of its legislation, thus 
has the ability (and responsibility) to control how a corporation may conduct itself within the 
state’s borders. Situations in which a state allows a corporation to function without oversight; 
when oversight is inadequate or easily manipulated on the corporation’s behalf; or when a 
corporation’s criminal activity is deemed lawful or not prosecuted by the state, can be argued 
to be evidence of the state and corporation’s collusion to commit a crime (Matthews and 
Kauzlarich 2000). Environmental crimes can potentially represent one type of state-corporate 
crime when the state is reluctant to regulate corporations that rely on the exploitation of the 
environment, such as the coal mining industry, and this lack of regulation leads to the damage 
of the environment (Kramer and Michalowski 2013; Tsing 2005; Zaitch and Gutiérrez Gómez 
2015). Capitalist states, seeking to maximize profit, are susceptible to such collusion with 
corporations, which often invest large amounts of money for their business endeavours (Green 
and Ward 2004). In asking whether or not the Carmichael Project can be understood as a state-
corporate crime, the relationship between the Australian Government, Queensland 
Government, and the Adani corporation is examined. The governments’ approval of the 
Carmichael Project, at the expense of the environmental harms that it will produce, is studied 
as potential collusion with Adani in Chapters Seven and Eight of this thesis; beginning on page 
139. 
 
‘Ecocide’ is defined as the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of ecosystem(s) of a 
given territory, whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that peaceful 
enjoyment by the inhabitants of that territory has been or will be severely diminished’ (Higgins 
2010). The term was first used in the 1970s to describe the effects of Agent Orange during the 
Vietnam War (Zierler 2011). Academics and legal scholars have since argued for the need to 
criminalise ecocide on an international level as the destruction of one ecosystem is never self 
contained and can have permanent effects on the Earth as a whole (Gauger et al. 2012). As an 
academic concept, ecocide acknowledges that environmental harms are often not illegal, as it 
is usually committed by the powerful who have a say in what actions are legal and illegal 
	 10 
(Higgins et al. 2013). For this reason, ecocide can be understood as a type of state-corporate 
crime. Yet one major point of debate involving ecocide as a legal concept has to do with the 
offender’s intent to commit the crime (Higgins 2018; MacCarrick 2016). In the case of the 
Carmichael Project, for example, are the consequences of extensive destruction of the 
environment severe enough to warrant a charge of ecocide regardless of the offender’s intent? 
Following a discussion of denial and state-corporate collusion, the Carmichael Project is 
investigated as a potential future ecocide by Adani and the Australian state in Chapter Nine of 
this thesis; beginning on page 172. The effects that the Project would have on the Great Barrier 
Reef through greenhouse gas emissions; to the land and water resources of the Galilee Basin; 
and to future generations who depend on present generations restricting their carbon emissions 
are considered in the analysis. 
 
Techniques of neutralisation and denial; state-corporate crime and collusion; and ecocide and 
harm are the framing concepts of this thesis. These concepts provide a lens through which I 
interpret the data available on the Carmichael Project, and are part of a larger perspective that 




While criminology can be broadly defined as the study of crime, green criminology specifically 
focuses on environmental crime. Environmental crime can be conceptualised in different ways 
within green criminology, however. Some scholars define environmental crime based on legal 
boundaries – ‘it is what the law says it is’ – while others view environmental harm to be a 
social and ecological crime – ‘if harm is done to animals to environments or animals, then from 
the point of view of the critical green criminologist this ought to be considered a crime’ (White 
2014a: 3). For this thesis, the latter, critical green criminology perspective will be used, which 
sees green criminology as the study of ecological, environmental or green harm or crime; and 
matters of environmental justice and injustice (South et al. 2013; South and Brisman 2013). I 
chose to study the Carmichael Project through this green criminological perspective because 
while mining is not illegal per se, the Carmichael Project would – according to the scientific 
consensus – affect people, animals and plants and the planet through its contribution to climate 
change and other environmental harms. Chapter Four further conceptualises environmental 
harm and provides a detailed account of the specific harms of the Carmichael Project. 
 
Green criminology is multidisciplinary, involving, for example, political science, 
environmental science, psychology, and economics.  Ruggiero and South (2013) describe green 
criminology as ‘a coming together of related work – the expression of the zeitgeist anxious 
about global warming and environmental degradation.’ This thesis weaves these multiple 
disciplines and areas of study together under the umbrella of green criminology in examining 
the Carmichael Project. As an example, I investigate the economic, social, and political climate 
in which the debate over the Carmichael Project’s approval occurs. The discussions of the 
Project’s environmental harm that arise out of the Australian economic, social, and political 
situation involve a number of intersecting variables, as White and Heckenberg (2014) point 
out:  
 
• Who the victim is (human or non-human); 
• Where the harm is manifest (global through to local levels); 
• The main site in which the harm is apparent (built or natural environment); 
• Scale of harm (contained, dispersed, cumulative); and 
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• Time frame within which harm can be analysed (immediate and delayed 
consequences). 
 
Depending on who is discussing the Project and when or why the discussion takes place, a 
different – and often opposing – narrative of the Project and its harms or benefits is presented. 
A central focus of the study is to untangle these narratives through analysing what is being 
argued, by whom, and how the timing of the argument influences what is being said. 
 
As a critical perspective, one central topic for green criminology includes corporate criminality 
and the social and political dynamics that determine what is officially labelled as a crime. 
 
The notion of ‘eco-crime’, according to Walters (2010: 180) is useful for both ‘existing legal 
definitions of environmental crime, as well as sociological analyses of those environmental 
harms not necessarily specified by law’: 
 
When eco-crime is contextualised within notions of harm we can observe a 
broadening of the gaze beyond legal terrains to include discourses on risk, rights 
and regulation. As a result, eco-crime extends existing definitions of environmental 
crime to include licensed or lawful acts of ecological degradation committed by 
states and corporations. 
 
The Australian state, which the thesis will argue has vested interests in the Carmichael Project’s 
approval and operation, does not consider the Project (and, by extension, its approval of the 
Project) criminal or harmful. Likewise, Adani, standing to gain financially from the Carmichael 
Project, casts the operation as beneficial and necessary. The labelling of an activity as criminal 
largely depends on the people with the power to create the label. Green criminology allows for 
a critique of illegal environmental harms (those activities that are defined as illegal and 
consequently subject to punishment) as well as legal environmental harms (those activities that 
are currently legal but are also ecologically and socially harmful).  
 
Green criminology is concerned with harms that directly damage the ecosystem or its parts 
(direct victimisation of the environment); victimise species through ecosystem damage 
(indirect victimisation); the types extent, and consequences of environmental harms that may 
or may not be defined as crimes under current forms of law; processes for controlling green 
crimes; and perspectives, hypotheses, and theories that promote analysis of environmental 
harms and law, crime, and justice concerns’ (South 1998; Beirne and South 2007; Lynch and 
Stretesky 2003; Lynch et al 2008; White 2008).  It is field of study that theorises and critiques 
transgressions that are harmful to humans, environments and non human animals regardless of 
legality as well as environmental-related harms facilitated by the powerful (White 2014a).  
 
Green criminology is oriented towards exposing activities that cause significant harm to the 
environment, incorporating concepts such as ecocide and crimes of the powerful to argue for 
the formal criminalisation of behaviour that is destructive of ecology and species – making it a 
useful perspective for studying what would be one of the largest coal mines in the world. 
 
Outline of Thesis Chapters 
 
This thesis is organised into ten chapters. This is the first chapter, which describes my rationale 
behind choosing this particular case study and provides the objectives of the study, lens for 
analysis, and layout of the thesis. Chapter Two describes how the study was conducted. It 
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explains how I chose my data; how the data was collected and organised; and the way I 
analysed the data to reach my conclusions.  
 
Chapter Three is a background chapter on the Adani Group and the Carmichael Project. It 
presents a timeline of key events that explain the historical, political, and social context during 
which the controversy surrounding the Carmichael Project arose. Chapter Three includes a 
summary of the legal cases surrounding the approval of the Project, which are referred to 
throughout the thesis, and introduces the stakeholders from the Adani Group, the Queensland 
Government, and the Australian Federal Government, who play significant roles in issues 
discussed in the thesis.  
 
Chapter Four describes the environmental harms that would result from the Carmichael Project. 
Specifically, harms to land; water; air in the form of climate change; and to the Great Barrier 
Reef are discussed, according to scientific evidence presented at various stages of the Project’s 
timeline.  
 
Chapter Five discuss techniques of neutralisation and Cohen’s concept of denial, which 
expands on Sykes and Matza’s concept of techniques of neutralisation to include crimes of the 
powerful. A description of the various strategies employed by corporations to stifle 
environmental discourse and environmental activism follows. The discourses that have been 
historically used by corporation and state alike to deny or neutralise harms can be recognised 
among stakeholder justifications for the proposal, approval, and operation of the Carmichael 
Project.   
 
Chapter Six examines the Carmichael Project in light of these techniques and scripts of harm 
denial and neutralisation. This chapter explains the ways in which the Carmichael Project’s 
harms were denied and its approvals were justified. It is shown that the Carmichael Project’s 
stakeholders were making – on record, to courts and various media outlets –  the same 
arguments that have always been made on behalf of coal and – as the New York Attorney 
General’s investigation into Peabody, for example, showed – these arguments or scripts are 
untrue and deceitful. 
 
Chapter Seven provides a discussion of crimes of the powerful: state crimes, corporate crimes, 
and state-corporate crimes. The research by Tombs and Whyte into the nuances in the types of 
crimes of the powerful proves to be essential in analysing the Carmichael Project as criminal. 
There are three components to analysing the Carmichael Project as a state-corporate crime: it 
must be a state crime, which involves the need to identify the Australian state as a potentially-
criminal entity in general and with regard to the Carmichael Project specifically; it must be a 
corporate crime, which involves the need to identify criminal or harmful actions committed by 
Adani and/or individuals acting on behalf of Adani; and there must be collusion between the 
two entities, which usually involves an exchange of mutual benefit. 
 
Chapter Eight investigates the Carmichael Project as a crime of the powerful, involving state-
corporate collusion. In light of the environmental destruction that would result from the 
Project’s operation, this chapter describes how this mining project was able to continuously 
receive government approval. This involves an analysis of Australian and Queensland mining 
legislation and the legislation that could potentially funding the operation using taxpayer 
dollars. Conflicts of interest between government officials who write and enforce this 
legislation and the mining industry are revealed. 
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Following the discussion of state and corporate crime and state and corporate denial of harm, 
Chapter Nine discusses the history, concept and proposed law of ecocide as it would apply to 
the Carmichael Project. At its core, ecocide implies that humans have obligations to animals, 
trees, oceans and other members of the biotic community. This suggests that States have a 
responsibility to exercise extreme caution before embarking on any project likely to have the 
possibility of adverse effects upon the ecosystems concerned. The failure by States to prevent 
(or take responsibility for) dangerous industrial activities thus becomes the failure of the State 
to ensure the welfare of the people and the planet. Previous chapters have shown the 
Carmichael Project will contribute to climate change, which has been argued to be a leading 
contributor to the Great Barrier Reef’s destruction, and other serious environmental harms. 
Previous chapters have also shown that instead of preventing or reducing carbon emissions and 
environmental degradation, the Australian Government approved and/or funded a major carbon 
producing project. The combined potential harms and cover-up or denial of those harms 
suggest the Government’s actions may constitute the crime of ecocide. 
 
Chapter Ten provides the concluding remarks of the thesis. After an examination of the 
Carmichael Project as a state-corporate crime and crime of ecocide, this final chapter suggests 
a number of changes in the Australian governance system that could potentially prevent future 
large-scale mining projects from receiving the government support that the Carmichael Project 
enjoyed. At the centre of this chapter is a discussion of democracy, which, when protected 
through legislation and the closing off of a number of loopholes, can be critical in the 




The processes through which a demonstrably harmful mining operation is able to receive 
approval from multiple government agencies provides insight into the ways in which the state’s 
legislation fosters an intimate and dangerous relationship between governments and 
multinational corporations. This thesis studies that relationship between state and corporation, 
in the particular case of the Carmichael Project. The story of the Carmichael Project is, in some 
ways, not unique – the Australian Government has supported similar operations in the past. 
However, at a time when the effects of human-caused climate change are irrefutably 
responsible for the destruction of ecosystems and disproportionately effect the most vulnerable 
populations; and at a time when the majority of citizens denounce the use of public resources 
for new mines, the approval of the Carmichael Project can be studied as not only harmful but 
also criminal.  
 
This thesis approaches the Carmichael Project using a harm perspective and notions of 
ecological justice. It is organised according to the tripartite test of the Project’s potential future 
ecocide. First, the proposed harms are investigated in order to understand the scope and scale 
of the environmental degradation that is at stake with the Project’s approval. The approval of 
the Project despite these harms is then studied. This investigation will determine whether there 
is evidence of collusion between government and corporation, i.e. whether a state-corporate 
crime occurred. The Australian state and Adani corporation’s denial of harm is then 
investigated to determine the stakeholders’ motivation and intent. If the Carmichael Project – 
through its harms and denial of these harms by politicians (who are elected to act in the best 
interest of their country) and corporate officials (who have justified, sometimes under oath, 
their trustworthiness in carrying out the mining project), can be understood as a state-corporate 
crime, the specific crime of ecocide is then tested. 
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As the globalised world enters an era of post-truth politics, the presentation of ideologies and 
opinions as facts has refreshed the need to understand the techniques of neutralisation and 
denial of harm that are used in justifying factually-harmful practices. The Carmichael Project 
is a significant case study in criminology. The Project is proposed at a time in which both the 
international community and Australian state claim to understand the urgency in addressing 
rising carbon emissions from fossil fuels. The majority of the Australian public do not support 
the building of the mine. The Project threatens natural resources, the survival of several species, 
and the entirety of the Great Barrier Reef. The land that the Project seeks to mine is Indigenous 
land. These are the facts. Nevertheless, the Project has been approved and re-approved by the 
Australian Government. This thesis investigates the connections between these facts; the why 
this is so. This single mining project’s approval involves questions of environmental 
governance, climate change, and democracy. As it will be shown, democracy and the managing 
of the commons is inextricable and, as a Labor figure stated, ‘[The Carmichael Project] is 
talismanic. It’s the litmus test. Adani has become shorthand for ‘are you serious about climate 











CONSIDERATIONS – CONTOURS, 




“Environmental damage has direct effects on the enjoyment of a series of human rights, such 
as the right to life, to health, to a satisfactory standard of living, to sufficient food, to housing, 
to education, to work, to culture, to non-discrimination, to dignity and the harmonious 
development of one’s personality, to security of person and family, to development, to peace, 
etc.” (UN Commission on Human Rights 1994) 
 
 
“Management of the health effects of climate change will require inputs from all sectors of 
government and civil society, collaboration between many academic disciplines, and new ways 
of international cooperation that have hitherto eluded us…Climate change also raises the issue 
of intergenerational justice. The inequity of climate change – with the rich causing most of the 
problem and the poor initially suffering most of the consequences – will prove to be a source 
of historical shame to our generation if nothing is done to address it” (Costello et al., 2009) 
 
 
“With more focus on environmental crime will come a new definition of victims to include 
species other than humans and a definition of offenders to include those who pollute for 
convenience … [and] for profit. Just as Sutherland’s white-collar crime expanded our crime 







This chapter describes how this study was conducted. It explains why I chose the data I used; 
how the data was collected and organised; and the way I analysed the data to reach my 
conclusions. As an exercise in green criminology, this thesis analyses the Carmichael Project 
as a case study of environmental harm, state and corporate collusion, and ecocide. This chapter 
explains the rationale behind using the case study method and an inductive analysis approach 
to gathering data. The challenges of conducting a study on a case that can be considered 
‘unresolved’ or happening in ‘real time’ during the analysis are also addressed in this chapter. 
The field visits and informed discussions that I had with stakeholders throughout my studies 
are also described in this chapter. This chapter concludes by describing the method of analysing 
the data, which includes considering my perspective as a researcher and the study’s 
trustworthiness. 
 
The Case Study 
 
There are numerous qualitative research methods available for a thesis in criminology. For my 
thesis, I chose to do a case study due to some particular characteristics of my study that were 
well suited for the case study method. According to Yin (2003: 23), the case study research 
method is ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; 
and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’. Based on the literature on qualitative 
theory and case study methods, it became clear to me that the case study method would suit the 
goals I had for my research. 
 
Yin (2003) and Baxter and Jack (2008) have recommended a researcher use a case study when 
the focus of the study is to answer ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions. In answering my research 
question – Does the collusion between the Australian Federal and Queensland State 
Governments and the Adani Corporation constitute an act of ecocide? (insofar as the potential 
consequence and outcome of the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project is gross environmental 
harm and destruction of the Great Barrier Reef) – several ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions must be 
asked and answered. For example, how the Governments’ approvals were able to have been 
granted, as subsequent chapters reveal, unravels the collusion or the why behind the approvals.  
 
Case studies should also be considered when the researcher cannot manipulate the behaviour 
of those involved in the study; and when the researcher seeks to investigate the contextual 
conditions because he or she believes they are relevant to the phenomenon under study, i.e. the 
boundaries are not clear between the phenomenon and the context (Yin 2003; Grunbaum 2007; 
Baxter and Jack 2008). The Carmichael Project involves the powerful (the Adani corporation 
and members of the Australian Federal and Queensland Governments), so it would not be 
possible for me to manipulate the behaviour of those stakeholders involved in my study. While 
environmental activists have manipulated the behaviour of some powerful players (e.g. the 
Queensland Government and banks on the subject of funding – as the next chapter will show), 
activists are a part of the puzzle and contribute to the dynamics that are studied. It also goes 
without saying that the Carmichael Project cannot be considered without the context in which 
it takes place. It is within the setting of the Australian political atmosphere; the global attitude 
towards climate change; and shifting views on coal mining and renewable energy that the 
Carmichael Project was justified; its benefits rationalised, and its harms denied.  
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Case studies contain a degree of flexibility (Heckenberg 2011), a characteristic that was 
particularly useful during the data collection of an ongoing phenomenon that itself was 
constantly developing and changing, as I describe below. All case studies focus on a single 
phenomenon, however in order to achieve a more in-depth picture of the dynamics of state-
corporate crime exposed in a way that theoretical analysis would not provide, I chose to do an 
explanatory case study. 
 
Explanatory case studies, according to Harder (2010: 370), ‘not only explore and describe 
phenomena but can also be used to explain causal relationships and to develop theory’ and 
should follow some type of pre-determined model that portrays the patterns to be investigated 
in order to guide researchers on which topics need to be explored. While the thought of fitting 
my case study into one over-arching theory was appealing, I was actually faced with a number 
of interrelated theories. As Mjoset (2006: 757, 738) observed, 
 
Rather than believing that we ‘observe’ in the light of some vaguely stated (high 
level) theory, we must realise that as empirical researchers, we observe with 
reference to several theories embedded in a smaller set of local research 
frontiers…there is no way of analysing a single case without drawing on a number 
of theories. 
 
The Carmichael Project will be studied, organised and presented through the theory-lens 
depicted by Figure 1.1.  A key objective of this case study method is the ‘deep understanding 
of the actors, interactions, sentiments, and behaviours occurring for a specific process through 
time’ (Woodside 2010: 6). ‘Deep understanding’ involves the knowledge of the sense-making 
processes created by individuals (i.e. how relevant players perceive and interact with their 
reality). Understanding the Carmichael Project stakeholders’ sense-making processes was 
crucial for my analysis, since I wanted to learn whether or not the stakeholders’ approval of 
the Project could constitute potential criminal behaviour; the crime of ecocide. I found that the 
analysis benefitted from the long lifetime of the Carmichael Project. The legal proceedings and 
environmental protests against the Project have spanned over seven years, during which several 
stakeholders have played long-term roles. Studying the developments of the Carmichael 
Project as time progressed provided insight into how relevant players interact with their reality 
as their realities changed. For example, in the months leading up to the 2017 Queensland 
election, the ways in which politicians spoke about the Project to the public shifted. Previously 
unashamed of supporting the mine, mounting pressure from environmental activists and 
citizens around the election prompted the politicians to take on a cautious perspective (see 
Chapter Three). These shifting scripts provided insight into the state’s strategies regarding 
which opinions on the Project should be presented to the public and when. Conducting an 
explanatory case study allowed me, as the investigator, to remain open to such new discoveries 
throughout the process. 
 
A common criticism of the case study method is that the results cannot be generalised; a 
particular case is unique and thus its results are also idiosyncratic. Flyvbjerg (2006) addresses 
this common misunderstanding regarding case study research and generalizability by drawing 
attention to the undervalued contribution of an in-depth ‘example’ and the overvaluing of 
formal generalisation to scientific development. A case study, according to Flyvbjerg, should 
be read as a narrative. Case studies feed into the process of ‘naturalistic generalisation,’ which 
refers to the context-specific information that the reader of the case study gains (Stake and 
Trumbull, 1982). Through naturalistic generalisation, the reader of a case study reflects on how 
the details of a particular case can be generalised to their own experience or research, gaining 
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self-generated knowledge in the process (Melrose 2009). When read by others, the analysis of 
the process of how subjects make meaning becomes a part of the reader’s process of making 
meaning out of analogous situations they may encounter. 
 
The findings of this case study will contribute to the ‘research frontier’ (Mjoset 2009) of 
environmental harms and crimes of the powerful. This particular case study also contributes to 
the field of criminology – and more specifically, green criminology – but also complements as 
it draws on other areas of study such as law, sociology, psychology, and environmental science. 
This thesis involves an analysis of the key players and stakeholders in the Carmichael Project, 
including politicians of the state government of Queensland and federal government of 
Australia and members of the Adani corporation. The ‘site’ includes the physical sites of: the 
Carmichael Mine area in Queensland’s Galilee Basin, the boundaries of the Galilee Basin and 
its geological and hydrological structures, the Carmichael Rail through Queensland to Abbot 
Point Port, Abbot Point Port itself, the Great Barrier Reef, and the surrounding Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park area; and the larger global environment, including the land, air, and water of 
Earth, which are all interconnected and affected by the Project. 
 
Data and Data Collection 
 
In writing this thesis, I was concerned with selecting the most appropriate way to furnish a 
theoretically informed account of the harms associated with and perpetuated by the Carmichael 
Project and its stakeholders. Deciding what kind of data to collect was my first challenge. This 
project is unique in that it is about a watershed, historical and pivotal environment moment in 
Australian history involving the greatest predicted environmental catastrophe of our time – and 
I was studying it as it was unfolding.  
 
Considering sources of information  
 
Initially, in the planning stages of this research, I considered using semi-structured interviews 
with people who represent all sides of the Carmichael debate as the source of data for my thesis. 
I thought it would be ideal for a well-rounded analysis if I could interview local and federal 
politicians, Adani officials, and environmental activists. However, even early on I had 
suspected that due to the case’s fame and controversy it would be difficult to find consenting 
informants (as, for example, trying to interview stakeholders during the politically 
controversial UK miners’ strike would be). Before applying for ethics approvals and furthering 
the idea of conducting semi-structured interviews, I decided to visit the Adani headquarters at 
10 Eagle Street during my first field visit to Brisbane to get an initial impression of how a 
researcher would be regarded. I thought it would be a good sign for acquiring interviewees if 
Adani officials – those with the most on the line in terms of reputation – are enthusiastic to 
speak with me (perhaps wanting to ‘set the record straight’). This visit was my way of testing 
the viability of gathering primary data for my thesis and this is what happened: 
 
At approximately 10:00 a.m., I rode the elevator to the 25th floor and was met with an empty 
hallway. At one end, through a pane of floor-to-ceiling glass doors, I saw an empty reception 
desk. The multi-coloured Adani logo hung on the wall behind the desk, so I knew I was in the 
right place. There was a sign beside the door that read, "if no one is at the reception desk please 
call one of these numbers" and listed approximately 20 names with their corresponding 
telephone numbers.  
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Just as I took my phone out of my pocket to take a photo of the list (so that I could quickly 
Google the names to see which one I should call to make an appointment to talk at a later time), 
an Indian man came out of what I assume were restrooms on the opposite end of the hall. 
Without an introduction or a smile, he asked, “why are you here?” I told him I was looking to 
talk to a receptionist at Adani Australia, to which he responds “you can talk to me.” I proceed 
to tell him my story: that I'm an American student in Tasmania studying the Carmichael mine, 
was at the recent court hearing and would like to talk to someone from Adani for my research.  
 
Visibly annoyed, he tells me that since these are ‘sensitive matters’, I should make an 
appointment and come back with some ‘authority from the university’ outlining what exactly 
I'm after and where this meeting would be published. The man also asked why I want to know 
about the Carmichael mine in particular. I attempted to make a light-hearted remark about the 
Carmichael’s controversy being a prime subject for a researcher. Unmoved, he then gives me 
the Adani reception desk’s email address – the one based in India, which I had already known 
about from Adani websites’ contact form – and tells me to contact them to request a meeting. 
I asked for his name so that I could reference this encounter in my email, to which he sternly 
responded: “I am not telling you my name.” I thanked him and left the building. Later that day 
and throughout that week, I emailed and called the Adani reception desk several times but did 
not receive a response. 
  
It was at this point that I knew I could not proceed with my idea of conducting interviews as I 
would be met with closed doors and dead ends. I also realised that due to the case happening 
in real time, even if I did manage to land an interview with a stakeholder, I would most likely 
receive scripted responses earmarked for researchers and journalists – the same responses I 
could read in secondary sources. There was just no way that politicians (especially those in the 
‘pro-Adani’ camp who I would need to talk to) or Adani representatives would tell a researcher 
anything they wouldn’t tell the media or state under oath in court. From their point of view, 
talking to me would be a risk; especially ‘now’ while the debate surrounding the Project was 
ongoing. Environmental activists would possibly be more willing to talk to me (although 
probably also hesitant to discuss more sensitive and unpublished matters, such as campaign 
strategy) but this would result in biased, one-sided data. Perhaps my luck would be different if 
I were studying the Carmichael Project as a historical event, 10 years from now. 
 
While the presently-unfolding status of the Carmichael Project had prevented me from 
conducting stakeholder interviews, its relevance in present-day Australian society was actually 
an advantage to me as a researcher. Adani, the Carmichael Project, and the politicians and 
activists involved were constantly in the media; in courts; and in political and civil discussions. 
The controversy was very much alive, and this fact meant there existed a wealth of secondary 
data – that had all the answers I’d seek in an interview – to be used for my thesis. 
 
I thus decided to utilise secondary sources, in the form of legislation, court documents, media 
releases and websites, and journal articles as the data for my research. Together, and given the 
current high-profile status of the Project, these sources would provide as much insight into the 
sense-making processes of each stakeholder that was so important for my analysis.  
 
The Carmichael Project archive 
 
Determining the type of data to use for my project was the first methodological challenge. In 
choosing to utilise secondary data, I still had a number of important decisions to make. The 
Carmichael Project’s present-day status meant each day was guaranteed to produce a number 
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of new potential secondary sources in various formats, from media reports to court documents 
and everything in between. The parameters, i.e. the period of time that my data would both 
cover and arise out of, therefore had to be strategically chosen. After careful consideration, I 
narrowed my data collection to the time between 4 August 2010 and 25 November 2017. The 
‘start date’ of 4 August 2010 marks the selling of the Galilee Basin coal reserves from Linc 
Energy to the Adani Group Ltd Pty (Murphy 2010). Prior to this date, only one news article 
existed that mentioned the coal in the Galilee Basin and the region’s long-term mining 
development plans (Jacques 2009).  
 
The acquisition of Linc Energy’s coal reserves in the Galilee Basin allowed Adani to begin its 
application process to turn the coal reserves into the Carmichael Project, making this date a 
logical beginning point of data collection. The ‘end date’ of 25 November 2017 marks the 
outcome of the Queensland state election. As the Carmichael Project is as much a political 
endeavour as it is a corporate resource extraction endeavour, Queensland politics played a 
central role throughout the Project’s lifetime. The Carmichael Project was a key issue in 
Queensland’s 2017 election, with activist groups targeting Queensland’s major parties for 
supporting the coal mine (The Sydney Morning Herald 2017), essentially forcing the 
Honourable Annastacia Palaszckuk (ALP) to vow to ‘have no role in the future’ with the 
assessment of the $1 billion loan to Adani for the Carmichael Project if she were re-elected 
(ABC 2017). Palaszczuk was successful in winning another term as the Premier of Queensland 
but the Greens were able to get 10% of the vote, winning them one seat (Brisbane Times 2017). 
In my view, this election not only highlighted the power of environmental activism but it also 
spoke to the immensely charged atmosphere in Australia during the Adani era. 
 
Still, a period of approximately seven years and three months (or approximately 2,650 days) is 
a very long time for data collection, considering new materials were being published daily. 
Before I could further narrow down my data sources, I had to see what was out there. To do 
so, I took on an inductive approach, as defined by Thomas (2006: 238): 
 
Inductive analysis refers to approaches that primarily use detailed readings of raw 
data to derive concepts, themes, or a model through interpretations made from the 
raw data by an evaluator or researcher. 
 
The inductive approach allowed me to cast a wide net for data pertaining to the Carmichael 
Project in order to see which themes would emerge, without the restraints imposed by 
structured methodologies. I collected the data in a few ways: 
 
I subscribed to daily Google Alerts for the terms ‘Adani’, ‘Carmichael Coal Mine’, and ‘Great 
Barrier Reef’ in order to stay up-to-date on Carmichael Project news and to have the news 
articles in chronological order, ready-at-hand. Using Google Alerts also prevented me from 
having to check each individual news source separately – a task that would have been 
immensely time-consuming – and made it possible to search for a specific article, i.e. regarding 
a particular Carmichael court case, retrospectively, through my email’s search function. Every 
day, from 1 November 2015 (the first day of my subscription) to 25 November 2017 (the 
Queensland election), I received three emails, one for each term, with links to any news article 
that mentioned them. Each term’s daily email contained approximately four articles. I then 
went through each of the Google alerts to see which were relevant to my research questions. I 
eliminated any repeats in media articles (for example, some news articles contained both 
‘Adani’ and ‘Carmichael Coal Mine’ and therefore appeared in my inbox twice that day) and 
any media articles that were irrelevant to this case study (for example, some Google Alerts for 
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‘Adani’ reported on the company’s stock and share prices). I then had to manually search for 
relevant news articles between 3 August 2010 (Linc Energy sale to Adani) and 1 November 
2015 (when I began Google Alerts). This equated to approximately 3,016 news articles per 
term, or about 9,000 articles in total.  
 
Due to the nature of my research involving the potentially-criminal activities of those who hold 
the most power within a society, i.e. politicians, government officials, and individuals acting 
on behalf of a multinational corporation, I was aware that news reporting of the Carmichael 
Project would only provide me with a basic understanding of the corruption that I had sought 
to investigate. As such, a portion of the data collected for this case study was a result of my 
being what I refer to as an ‘Internet sleuth’, engaging in ‘investigative social research’. Douglas 
(1976) described investigative social research as a necessary tool for a researcher to navigate 
propaganda and lies that surround the truth of a reported event; necessary when studying ‘the 
powerful’. Similar to my personal investigation of Peabody upon reading the article about the 
company’s bankruptcy, some of the data of this case study were discovered as a result of my 
personal curiosity of the subject matter. The aforementioned ‘power players’ have interests in 
maintaining a certain level of secrecy, which forces a researcher to take on a role akin to that 
of a private investigator whose main tool is the Internet rather than a traditional researcher 
whose data ‘ends’ with an interview, for example.  
 
As an Internet sleuth, I had to read between the lines and, as the adage goes, “follow the 
money.” One example of this investigative approach is in the chapter on techniques of 
neutralisation. In order to discuss the particular public relations campaigns regarding the 
Carmichael Project, it was necessary for me to find out which firm was working on Adani’s 
behalf. Yet this information was never mentioned in a single news report and was absent from 
Adani’s websites. After clicking from website to website and scrolling through countless 
comments made by the public on various media reports pertaining to the Carmichael Project, I 
found the Facebook of Adani’s hired public relations team. This allowed me to later research 
the staff, which exemplified the tight-knit relationship between industry and government – an 
argument central to my exploration of crimes of the powerful. The public relations team serves 
as an anecdote of the kind of investigative approach that I had to undertake in order to collect 
some of my data. Gaining access to secondary data was, at certain points, not much easier than 
it would have been to get stakeholder’s permission to be interviewed; the materials were 
sometimes just as elusive. 
 
It should be acknowledged that online news obtained via the Internet differs from newspapers, 
radio or television. The Internet can be considered a hybrid medium; a fusion of traditional 
print media, radio and television (Deuze 2003) and offers the possibility for live reporting with 
its ‘breaking news ideology’ (Volkmer 2006), useful for studying the developments of a mining 
project as they occur. In addition to the rapid dissemination of information, the ability of online 
news sources to link textual and visual materials to each other has ‘increased the internal and 
external intertextuality of news journalism, partly as a consequence of the new possibilities for 
re-producing news that the escalating digitisation of the media industry has brought’ according 
to Kautsky and Widholm (2008:85). While these characteristics provide challenges such as the 
data mountain previously described, they have also proven beneficial for my thesis. I wanted 
to know what was happening with the Carmichael Project as it was happening and I wanted to 
know how arguments for and against the Project were being framed. The instant nature of 
online reporting and the Internet’s intertextuality did exactly that. Through Google Alerts I 
know what was happening on a daily basis. Through finding the repeated phrases and 
quotations shared among differing news sources in their online articles, I was able to pinpoint 
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the ‘base script’ of the Project’s developments, according to different stakeholders. One 
example, further elaborated in Chapter Six, is the consistent describing of the mine as ‘a moral 
necessity’ by one government official. This phrase appeared throughout various online news 
sources at multiple points of the Project’s development, signalling the phrase’s importance. In 
other words, it was a message the stakeholder wanted the public to hear and through its 
repetition, as my analysis would later find, was a technique of denying the Carmichael Project’s 
harm in order to justify the government’s approval. 
 
In addition to news reports and articles, I also collected the submissions, witness statements, 
evidence, and decisions produced by each of the following cases involving the Carmichael 
Project:  
 
Table 2.1 Data Source: Court Cases  
 
Jurisdiction: Commonwealth of Australia 
Mackay Conservation Group v Commonwealth of Australia and Adani Mining 
Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment 
Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment and 
Energy 
Mackay Conservation Group Inc v Minister for the Environment 
Alliance to Save Hinchbrook Inc v Minister for the Environment 
Delia Kempii & Ors v Adani Miing Pty Ltd 
Adrian Burragubba v State of Queensland & Ors 
Adrian Burragubba & ors on Behalf of the Wangan and Jagalingou Peoples v State of 
Queensland & Ors 
Jurisdiction: Queensland 
Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors 
Land Services of Coast and Country Inc v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection and Adani Mining Pty Ltd 
North Queensland Conservation Council v Minister for the Environment & Ors 
Whitsunday Residents Against Dumping Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Environment 
and Heritage Protection & Adani Australia Coal Terminal Pty Ltd 
Adrian Burragubba & Ors v Minister for Natural Resources and Mines & Ors 
  
These sources proved to be essential for my analysis and are referred to throughout my 
investigation of the research questions. For example, the expert report of Dr. Malte 
Meinshausen to the Land Court of Queensland during the case Adani v Land Services of Coast 
and Country Inc & Ors (2015) QLC 48 contains information regarding the Carmichael 
Project’s climate change emissions and is therefore appropriate for Chapter Nine’s discussion 
on ecocide and the climate change impacts of the Project. 
 
In order to understand the legal grounds of each case, I also had to study the appropriate 
legislation and agreements that were referred to in the parties’ submissions. This meant that I 
had to locate and familiarise myself with a number of laws in Queensland and the 
Commonwealth of Australia, as well as international treaties of which Australia and/or India 
have signed. The specific legal texts used to inform the discussions of harm and justice in this 





Table 2.2 Data Source: Legislation  
 
Topic  Source  
Jurisdiction: State of Queensland 
Resource extraction project Prospecting Permit; 
Exploration Permit; 
Mineral Development Licence (MDL); 
Mining Lease; 
Water Monitoring Authority; 
State Agreement; 
Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (MRA); 
Native Title Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA); 
Right to Negotiate (RTN) 
Development State Development and Public Works 
Organisation Act 1971 (Qld), 
Environment Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) 
(EPA); 
Jurisdiction: Northern Australia 
Development Our North, Our Future: White Paper on 
Developing Northern Australia 
Funding  Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility 
Jurisdiction: Commonwealth of Australia 
Environment Environmental Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act) 
Great Barrier Reef  Reef 2050 Plan  
Jurisdiction: International 
Environmental treaties Paris Climate Agreement 2015; 
 
World Heritage UNESCO World Heritage Convention 
 
Thousands of hours went into collecting all of this information on the Carmichael Project. At 
the end of the data collection phase, I had at my fingertips approximately 9,000 news articles; 
3,000 pages of legislation and legal texts; 18,000 pages of submissions to courts and court 
decisions; and 12,000 pages of miscellaneous data, such as websites, NGO reports, and 
academic articles. Table 2.3 summarises the data I have collected for my analysis: 
 
Table 2.3 Summary of data collected for this study 
 
Source of data Type of data Example 
Court cases involving the 
Carmichael Project  
Submissions by applicants and 
respondents under oath; 
Outline of arguments; 
Affidavits of witnesses; 
Expert evidence; and 





Incorporated v Minister 
for Environment 
Queensland legislation  On coal mining: legislation 
regarding applications; leases; 
Mineral Resources Act 
1989 (Qld)  
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and funding of coal mining 
projects;  
 
On the environment: legislation 
regarding protection of 
endangered species; the Great 
Barrier Reef;  
 
On development: legislation 
regarding use of natural 
resources; sustainable 
infrastructure development; 
funding of corporate projects 
and criteria for loans and taxes 
of corporate projects 
Commonwealth of Australia 
legislation  
On coal mining: legislation 
regarding applications; leases; 
and funding of coal mining 
projects;  
 
On the environment: legislation 
regarding protection of 
endangered species; the Great 
Barrier Reef; climate change; 
and World Heritage site 
management. 
 
On development: legislation 
regarding use of natural 
resources; sustainable 
infrastructure development; 
funding of corporate projects 
and criteria for loans and taxes 




Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) 
International agreements and 
treaties  
International commitments of 
which Australia is a signatory 
and involves the environment; 
climate change; World Heritage 




Media coverage of the 
Carmichael Project 
State and federal newspaper 
articles; Indian newspaper 
articles; press releases made by 
environmental activists, NGOs, 
Adani, or the Queensland or 
Australian Governments 




Indigenous group.’ The 
Guardian, 27 May. 
Websites and NGO reports Adani websites that relate to 
their coal extraction projects, the 
Carmichael Mine, and their 





organisation and NGO websites 
that relate to the Carmichael 
Project, climate change, or 
ecocide; 
 
Queensland or Commonwealth 
of Australia Government 
websites that relate to the 
environment, resource 
extraction, developments, or the 
economy 
Academic journal articles Articles in criminology or 
related fields that pertain to 
relevant topics such as ecocide 
and greenwashing 
Hughes, T. et al. (2017) 
‘Global warming and 
recurrent mass 
bleaching of corals.’ 
Nature 543: 373-377 
 
The result of the thousands of hours spent collecting information on the Carmichael Project is 
an original and unique archive of the Carmichael Project on my computer. This database forms 
an authoritative library on Adani’s history; the Carmichael Project’s application and various 
approvals from the Queensland state and Australian federal governments; the Project in 
Australian courts; the issues surrounding financing the Project; and the harms that would result. 
My analysis and thesis chapters have been informed by this archive that I have built. 
 
In addition to this library of data that I’ve collected on the Carmichael Project, I have also 
chosen to attend strategic events to inform possible theoretical routes and modes of data 
analyses. These events have led to my speaking with people with reputable knowledge on the 
Carmichael Project. 
 
Field visits and informed discussions 
 
While most of my data was obtained through the Internet, I also took field visits from Hobart 
to Brisbane throughout the duration of my thesis with the purpose of attending strategic events 
of the Carmichael Project’s timeline and speaking with stakeholders who have unique 
perspective on the Project’s developments. Yin (1984) maintains that the observations and 
discussions of a researcher doing a case study is often a more direct method of assessing rich 
data than measuring, since an inductive analysis seeks to reveal unexpected issues. 
 
During my first trip in May 2016, I attended the proceedings of one of the first court cases 
involving the Carmichael Project, Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v 
Minister for the Environment and Energy, at the Federal Court in Brisbane (described in detail 
in the next chapter). This was my first time observing an environmental proceeding in an 
Australian court room. Being physically present allowed me a closer examination of how a 
single government decision involving the Carmichael Project can be interpreted differently by 
each of the stakeholders: the government, the corporation and the environmental activists. 
Listening to the arguments of the ACF, Adani, and council on behalf of the Minister for the 
Environment gave me a preview of the types of techniques of neutralisation I would later write 
about. Sitting in on this case also allowed me to put a face to some of the names of stakeholders 
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that I had read about – such as those in the Queensland Environmental Defenders Office, who 
represented the Australian Conservation Foundation – during the early stages of my thesis. 
This was beneficial to my understanding of ‘who is doing/saying/thinking what’, as these 
stakeholders were constant characters in the Carmichael Project’s developing story. Perhaps 
the most eye-opening moment of being in the audience, however, was witnessing the 
demeanour of Adani’s and the Minister’s counsels. While the lawyers for the ACF were making 
their statements, it shocked me to see the opposing counsel laugh and mock the ACF to each 
other. As I was beginning to think about the increase in violence against environmental activists 
around the world, watching the counsels’ behaviour made the topic more ‘real’. If lawyers, 
who were supposed to conduct themselves professionally (at the very least in a courtroom) 
were acting this way towards environmental lawyers, I wanted to learn how ‘ordinary’ activists 
were being treated outside the courtroom, in ‘real’ life. The field notes I wrote while observing 
this case have influenced the two articles that I had co-authored with my supervisors during 
my thesis on the ways environmental activists can ‘hit the powerful where it hurts’ and the 
dynamics between activism and the state. Witnessing this court case was thus beneficial for my 
thesis progression for a number of reasons even though the data collected from this particular 
court case comprises of the same type of data that I collected from each of the other cases.  
 
During that same visit to Brisbane in May 2016, I attended the ‘Reef Emergency Community 
Forum’ hosted by Kirsten Lovejoy, climate adaptation policy analyst and then-Greens 
candidate for Brisbane, and the Mt Coot-tha Greens. While I was able to familiarise myself 
with the relevant legal counsels during the ACF’s case, this event allowed me a more personal 
introduction with some of the local women and men challenging Adani’s actions on the ground. 
Approximately thirty Brisbane locals attended the forum. The attendees were diverse in age 
and background, revealing how stopping Adani was a priority for people in various 
demographics and not just in one particular group, as ‘Greenies’ are often depicted. The event 
was set up to have three presenters, each giving a 20-minute presentation before opening the 
floor to questions from the audience.  
 
The keynote speaker that the forum hosted was Dr. Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Director of the 
Global Change Institute at the University of Queensland and one of the world’s leading expert 
on coral reefs. Incidentally, Dr. Hoegh-Guldberg’s expert report was used in the ACF case that 
I had just witnessed. Dr. Hoegh-Guldberg’s work on the effects of climate change on coral 
reefs has also been published in various scientific journals and referenced throughout my thesis. 
His message was clear: if the Carmichael Mine is built, the Great Barrier Reef will die. Hearing 
this from an expert reinforced the severity of the stakes of the Project. One point that Dr. 
Hoegh-Guldberg made that particularly impacted me regarded the renewability of the Great 
Barrier Reef. If adequately protected, he stated, the Reef can provide tourism revenue for 
Queensland and Australia indefinitely. Beyond tourism, however, the Reef also provides a 
lesser-known benefit, this time to the entire world: medicine. Dr. Hoegh-Guldberg referred to 
coral reefs as the ‘medicine cabinets of the 21st century’ and explained that since corals and the 
animals that live in coral ecosystems have been stationary for millions of years, many have 
evolved complex chemical defences from predators. One species of animal only found in the 
Great Barrier Reef has been linked to medicines developed to treat multiple illnesses such as 
cancer, heart disease, arthritis, and Alzheimer’s disease. Furthermore, there are millions of 
species native to the Great Barrier Reef whose potential benefits remain undiscovered and, due 
to the threat of climate change, could remain undiscovered. As I was just beginning to become 
exposed to intricate scripts regarding economic benefits of the Carmichael Project, this lesson 
about the medicine cabinet of the 21st century was an important one as it debunked the claims 
of economic necessity for the Project.  
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The forum also hosted two additional speakers: Dr. Susanne Becken, Director of the Griffith 
Institute for Tourism and Professor of Sustainable Tourism at Griffith University; and Dr. Mark 
Gibbs, climate adaptation practitioner. Together, Dr. Becken and Dr. Gibbs spoke about the 
urgency to curb climate change impacts on the Reef. Stopping the Carmichael Mine, according 
to the speakers, was the most basic and fundamental step in saving the Reef but additional 
protective measures through sustainable tourism and climate change technology were also 
necessary. The complexities surrounding climate change impacts on the Reef and the urgency 
required to address these impacts were presented in an accessible format to a non-specialist 
audience. This format of discussion influenced my thinking about the links between civil 
society and environmental activism and my notes on the forum also contributed to my 
published articles. Attending the forum and listening to the questions raised by citizens of 
Brisbane and the answers given by the guest speakers shaped my preliminary understanding of 
the issues surrounding the Great Barrier Reef. 
 
During my second and third field visits, in September 2017 and June 2018, I had arranged to 
have informed discussions with ten key players, mostly activists, in the Carmichael Project’s 
developments. To protect their identities – as most had wished to remain anonymous if I chose 
to write about our meeting – their names will not be revealed. The purpose of these discussions 
were twofold: First, I was curious to hear anything they wanted to tell me about their roles in 
the debate surrounding the Carmichael Project. Our conversation was loosely structured and 
guided by what each stakeholder chose to share, which revealed what she or he considered 
most important to disclose to a PhD candidate undertaking an analysis of the Project. In turn, 
this exposed their thought processes, motivations, and priorities on this particular 
environmental issue. Second, I sought fresh perspectives on the issues I would be writing about; 
anything the media had not covered. The activists I had spoken to were actively engaged in 
protest – sometimes on the proposed Carmichael site. They had the personal experiences of 
environmental activism that I was reading (and later, wrote) about so I wanted to pick their 
brains. 
 
These conversations were fascinating and I am thankful that these women and men took time 
out of their schedules to speak with me. I chose three visits because, as Picken (2013: 343) 
writes, ‘the time required in the field has become more dependent on the social enquiry, how 
much and what kind of access is available, and how much information [the researcher] already 
has’. My notes from these conversations are excluded from the formal data that informed this 
thesis – as these informed discussions were not interviews as such – but my recollections of 
them have allowed me to write portions of this thesis with a deeper understanding of the 
personal nature of the Carmichael Project. The ‘micro’, or personal, can often be overlooked 
when studying the ‘macro’ of global environmental issues, and I am thankful to have had these 
conversations that reminded me that the ‘personal is political’. 
 
These field visits to Brisbane and informed discussions with stakeholders contributed to my 
understanding of the Carmichael Project as events unfolded. As Picken (2013:343) states, 
‘fieldwork must be designed to collect information about what people say and do, how they 
represent themselves and others, what belief systems might underpin their actions, what actions 
constitute processes and routines…’ My archive of data was made richer by these accounts and 
visits as they gave me an insider point of view of the sense making process of stakeholders – 
crucial for a case study. My collection of data on the Carmichael Project along with the 
knowledge I gained in Brisbane talking to the stakeholders and sitting in on the court case and 
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reef forum has given me a detailed, comprehensive and accurate account of what was 




This thesis, as a work of qualitative research, is intended to generate knowledge grounded in 
human experience (Sandelowski 2004). In The Discovery of Grounded Theory, Glaser and 
Strauss (1967) describe studies using grounded theory, a research methodology widely used in 
the social sciences, as beginning with a question or the collection of qualitative data. My study 
began with a question, but – unlike the grounded theory approach – does not involve the 
construction of a theory upon reviewing the data. So, while qualitative analytic methods are 
diverse and nuanced (Holloway and Todres 2003), and there are elements of grounded theory 
in my methodology, ultimately thematic analysis was chosen because of its (1) compatibility 
with my inductive approach to the study and (2) its promotion of trustworthiness through its 
process. 
 
Thematic analysis is defined by Mills et al. (2010: 926) as:  
 
[A]n analytic approach and synthesising strategy used as part of the meaning 
making process of many methods including case study research. As a sense-making 
approach, thematic analysis is a tactic for reducing and managing large volumes of 
data without losing the context, for getting close to immersing oneself in the data, 
for organising and summarising, and for focusing the interpretation. 
 
I wanted to search for certain themes or patterns across my entire data set (because of its 
reliance on secondary data), rather than within each data item. Thematic analysis suits this 
inductive style, as: 
 
Themes emerge from and are grounded in the data. Through a process of noticing 
patterns…defining emerging themes, constantly comparing data against codes and 
categories, cycling back through documents to revise coding, recording interpretive 
insights in research memos, and developing data displays that reveal overarching 
patterns, the researcher builds a complex exploratory, descriptive or explanatory 
case analysis grounded in the particulars of the case or multiple cases (Mills et all 
2010: 926). 
 
While themes are described as ‘emerging from the data’, I acknowledge the active role I have 
played as a researcher in identifying patters and themes. As Ely et al. (1997: 205-206) state, ‘If 
themes reside anywhere, they reside in our heads from our thinking about our data and creating 
links as we understand them.’ Researching and writing about a defining moment in Australian 
history, specifically one involving the environment, was both a controversial and emotional 
endeavour. In reflecting on and honestly assessing my role in the study early on, as 
Liampottong and Ezzy (2005) recommend, I was able to be conscious of my position 
throughout the research process. My position includes one as an ‘outsider’ in that I am an 
American who moved to Australia to examine a controversial environmental and political 
moment in Australian history and I have never worked or had other first-hand experience in 
the industry I am writing about. My position also is that of an ‘environmentalist’ – through my 
undergraduate studies in politics and philosophy I had developed a strong sense of 
environmental justice and passion for animal welfare. I would further identify myself as a 
member (in ideology) of Greens parties and therefore also lean towards socialist democratic 
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policies, recognising and critiquing the injustices caused by capitalist ideologies and 
neoliberalist policies. In fact, one of the reasons I chose to embark on a study in green 
criminology was because I very strongly personally identified with the field’s goals and 
philosophy. My personal beliefs do not prevent my conducting of a trustworthy study on the 
Carmichael Project, however, as I am not naïve to but very much aware of my position. In 
being able to articulate these beliefs I am not restrained by them and have studied the 
Carmichael Project as guided by the data. Doing a thematic analysis has also worked to keep 
my research unbiased and trustworthy during data collection, data analysis and report writing. 
Table 2.4 summarises the six phases of thematic analysis, as described by Braun and Clarke 
(2006), alongside Lincoln and Gruba’s (1985) criteria for trustworthiness at each step of the 
research process. 
 
Table 2.4 Phases of Thematic Analysis and Ensuring Trustworthiness in Research 
 
Phases of Thematic Analysis Ways of Ensuring Trustworthiness 
Phase 1: Familiarising yourself with your 
data 
Prolong engagement with data; 
Documentation of theoretical and reflective 
thoughts; 
Documentation of thoughts about potential 
codes and themes; 
Storing of raw data in well-organised 
archives;  
Keeping records of all data field notes 
Phase 2: Generating initial codes Reflexive journaling; Documentation of code generation; 
Phase 3: Searching for themes 
Diagramming to make sense of theme 
connections; 
Keeping detailed notes about development 
and hierarchies of concepts and themes 
Phase 4: Reviewing themes 
Testing for referential adequacy by returning 
to raw data; 
Themes and subthemes reviewed by 
supervisory team 
Phase 5: Defining and naming themes Documentation of theme naming process 
Phase 6: Producing the report 
Describing process of coding and analysis in 
sufficient detail; 
Thick descriptions of context; 
Report on reasons for theoretical, 
methodological, and analytical choices 
throughout the entire study 
Source: (Braun and Clarke 2006; Lincoln and Gruba 1975; and Nowell et al. 2017) 
 
Due to the fact that the chosen and logical ‘end date’ of the parameters of data was 25 
November 2017, over two years into my position as a PhD researcher, and due to the ongoing 
nature of the Carmichael case, the process of data collection, data analysis, and the writing of 
my findings have not been distinct steps. Instead, and as it is often the case in qualitative 
research, these ‘steps’ have been interrelated and occurred simultaneously throughout the 
research process (Creswell 2007). Although I will present my thematic analysis as a linear, six-
step method similar to that developed by Braun and Clarke (2006), the actual process was more 
reflective, developing over time, and involved constantly moving backwards and forwards 
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between these steps. As Holliday (2007: 94) states, data collection, analysis and writing occur 
simultaneously ‘and feed off one another.’ 
 
Phase 1: getting to know the data 
 
The qualitative data used in this study takes on a number of various forms, as described in the 
previous sections. At the start of data collection, I set up seven Word documents, one for each 
of the years in the data parameters (2010-2017) to chronologically archive the media articles 








Organising the media articles (which make up the largest number of data items) that I would 
use for the analysis in this way allowed me to familiarise my data as I was collecting it. I would 
read each article before logging it into the document and, each time I logged in a new entry, I 
was forced to scroll past all of the previous entries, which helped reinforce each article’s 
content. This method of organising my data allowed me to to ensure a diversity in sources (e.g. 
not having all media articles from March 2015 come from the Guardian), eliminate any over-
use or repetition of sources (e.g. some media reports were merely copies or references to the 
same article in another source – in this case, the ‘primary’ source was kept), and identify any 
gaps in time periods that would need bridging, perhaps with other types of data items. 
 
In addition to Word documents for media articles, I organised the other types of data in a similar 
fashion. For court documents, for example, I made a folder for each case, downloaded each 
document (e.g submission, evidence, decision) and saved them in their respective files. The 
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same was done for Adani’s various applications for the Carmichael Project, relevant 
Queensland and federal legislation, and NGO reports. 
 
Since I would read each of the data items as I found it, I arrived at the analysis with prior 
knowledge of the data and some initial thoughts. I documented my theoretical and reflective 
thoughts that developed through my immersion in the data in a notepad. I also made notes about 
ideas for coding, which were helpful in subsequent phases. 
 
Data management was imperative to the success of this large, complex project. Small, practical 
decisions made early on in the thesis, such as naming files to represent particular court cases, 
made a big difference later on when I needed to quickly access a particular file for the write-
up of the analysis.  
 
Phase 2: generating initial codes 
 
The ‘second phase’ of thematic analysis began once I had read and become familiarised with 
the data up from the 2010 Linc Energy sale to Adani until a few years of data later, 
approximately 2015. At this point, I had ideas about what was in the data and why it was 
interesting in the context of my study. Nowell et al. (2017) describe qualitative coding as a 
process of reflection and a way of interacting with and thinking about data. This process of 
conceptualising on the first level of abstraction is referred to as ‘open coding’ by Glaser and 
Strauss (1967). Producing codes from the data allowed me to simplify the data items, only 
focusing on specific characteristics.  
 
I systematically worked through the entire set of data that I had so far collected, identifying 
important sections of text and attaching labels to index them as I went on. The Word document 
for March 2015 media articles, for example, was modified with an additional column for codes. 
As I continued to collect data (in the form of media articles, as these had the longest span) I 
would code each item as I added them into the organising Word documents. Throughout the 
coding phase, I kept a personal journal where I would keep track of my emerging impressions 
of what the data meant and how they relate to each other.   
 
Phases 3-5: Searching for, reviewing, and defining themes 
 
When I had mostly completed coding (barring any media articles that were being collected and 
coded as they were released), I created a separate document containing the list of different 
codes that I identified across the data set. This process produced a clearly accessible snapshot 
of the labels that described the themes or issues in the data. I then sorted and collated all the 
potentially relevant coded data extracts into themes, as defined by Braun and Clarke (2006: 
10): 
 
A theme captures something important about the data in relation to the research 
question, and represents some level of patterned response or meaning within the 
data set. (emphasis in original) 
 
This putting together data in new ways after open coding was referred to as ‘axial coding’ to 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998). The themes were initially generated deductively from 
criminological theory and prior research. Since my research questions included concepts of 
techniques of neutralisation and denial; crimes of the powerful and state-corporate crime; and 
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ecocide, these concepts were used to guide the development of themes in the data. I found 
drawing thematic networks, or webs, to be helpful in organising the codes to depict my thought 
process and procedure of moving from text to interpretation. These webs were similar to what 
Strauss and Corbin (1990, 1998) developed through their ‘coding paradigm’: creating a 
framework (web) of relationships (themes) between codes.  
 
Once my initial set of themes were developed, I reviewed the coded data for each theme to 
ensure that the data items were accurately organised. I found one of my themes, ‘eco-justice’, 
needed to be broken down into separate themes, ‘environmental activism’ and ‘environmental 
justice’, in order to better support the diverse data. In addition, I originally thought to have 
separate themes for each of the courts that heard a case relating to the Carmichael Project, but 
found the data was too thin and instead collapsed the themes according to jurisdiction. After 
another review, I had a good idea of the different themes, how they interact, and the story they 
told about the data. I was then able to revisit the names of all themes with the consideration of 
how each theme fit into the overall story about the entire data set in relation to the research 
questions. 	
	
The use of open and axial coding, or organising the codes into themes, allowed me to see how 
the relationships between the codes as well as how they interacted. By physically arranging the 
immense amount of data in this way, I was able to see how such a complex social and political 
moment – the Carmichael Project – was developing, and by extension, develop my 
understanding of what was happening in order to answer my research question. 	
	
Phase 6: producing the report 
 
Once the final themes were established, I started the process of writing up my analysis. King 
(2004) describes direct quotes as essential components to final reports. Shorter quotations are 
used within my narrative, to aid in the understanding of points of interpretation and demonstrate 
prevalence of the themes (Nowell et al. 2017).  Longer block quotations can be found at the 
beginning of each relevant chapter and occasionally included within chapters to embed raw 
data within the analytical narrative. All of the themes are interpreted and the significance of 
their patterns are discussed throughout the thesis. Some themes are presented in tables to aid 
their articulation, as shown in the chapters on techniques of neutralisation and denial. My 
discussion often returns to the original theoretical literature used to inform the study, as well 
as research and other literature that supported my arguments.  
 
While these six phases of thematic analysis are useful to depict the process of turning raw data 
into a coherent argument for a thesis, I was involved in multiple steps at the same time and 
sometimes worked backwards between phases. Thematic analysis has been useful, in my 
experience, to organise data; signpost areas for further research; and providing useful headings 
that structured my writing (Holliday 2007). The result of this process was an immersion in the 




This thesis is a case study in green criminology. Three criminological concepts – techniques of 
neutralisation and denial of harm; crimes of the powerful; and ecocide – and the relationship 
between them form the basis of my study. Perspectives of harm and ecological justice are used 
to analyse the Carmichael Mine and Rail Project. Data was retrieved from submissions, 
evidence and decisions of court cases pertaining to the Project; local, federal, and international 
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legislation, agreements, and treaties; media reports; and websites. This data was thematically 
analysed to form the narrative of my research. 
 
The developments surrounding the Carmichael Project’s approval and operation have been 
ongoing throughout the data collection, analysis, and writing of this thesis. On one hand, this 
presented a challenge with regard to setting parameters for collecting data and resisting the 
urge to comment on ‘everything’ that has to do with the Project. On the other hand, studying 
an event that is occurring in the present allowed me the opportunity for a type of immersion 
with my study that would not be possible if I were studying a mining project of the past. 
Furthermore, utilising online sources allowed me to receive quick updates on developments 
but I was able to experience the subject of my studies through observing a trial (whose decision 
would influence both the timeline of the Project and my thesis) and by having conversations 
with people who were in the midst of protesting the Project (the same people who I first read 
about and would later refer to in my writing). Although the debate surrounding the Carmichael 
Project remains unresolved, it has provided me with a living subject of study, which I believe 
makes a unique contribution to the field of green criminology. 
 
The next chapter provides an overview of the historical, political and social context of the 
Carmichael Project and introduces the key stakeholders. It describes the timeline of events that 
led to Adani applying for a mining lease for the Carmichael Project with the Australian 
Government and continues with an outline of legal cases that have resulted from the granting 




Chapter Three  
	
THE ADANI GROUP AND THE 




“Adani Australia is proud to be leading the way in opening Australia’s Galilee Basin, 
generating jobs for regional Queensland and stimulating Queensland’s resource-strong 
economy” (Adani Australia 2016). 
 
 
“Adani Australia recognise the traditional owners of the land of which the Carmichael mine, 
rail and port are located, the Juru, Jangga, Birriah and Wangan and Jagalingou people. Adani 
is committed to creating sustainable employment and economic opportunities for Traditional 
Owner communities” (Adani Australia 2016). 
 
“Adani will undertake its Australian operations in a manner, which meets our legal obligations, 
recognises the importance of working closely with our internal and external stakeholders, and 
strives to prevent environmental harm and improve our environmental performance. We 
understand that our environmental performance is critical to the sustainable success of the 
organisation and we will implement an environmental management framework that is 


















At the time of my writing of this thesis, ‘Adani’ and ‘the Carmichael Mine’ were popular terms 
both in the news and in conversation. The majority of people I spoke with throughout my three 
and a half years working on this case study had, to some degree, an understanding of the 
controversial mining project. A number of key events that were necessary to allow for the 
possibility of a Carmichael Project, however, took place long before ‘Adani’ became a 
household name.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to go back to the beginning, when Gautam Adani first established 
the Adani Group, and to describe the events that allowed for the Carmichael Project in the 
present day. The Carmichael Project was not born out of chance; it is the result of a series of 
well-thought and planned political decisions, economic opportunities, and social attitudes by 
various governments and groups.  
 
This chapter provides the background information necessary to understand the significance of 
the proposed Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project, both as the topic of my case study and 
as a part of Australian (and global) history. It is divided into sections that outline the life of 
Gautam Adani and how he started Adani Group Pty Ltd; The Adani Group’s evolution and its 
environmental history; and the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project, including the litigation 
and funding of the Project.  
 
Gautam Adani and the Adani Group 
 
In 1980 Gautam Adani stopped working for his family’s textile business, left his home in 
Ahmedabad, and moved to Mumbai, where he had secured a position as a diamond sorter for 
the now-key player in the global diamond business, Mahendra Brothers (Elliott 2017).  
 
Two years later, Gautam Adani set up his own brokerage. His first sale earned him 10,000 
rupees (Elliott 2017). By the age of 20, Gautam had made his first million rupees (Mehta 2014). 
Shortly thereafter, his brother Mansukhbhai had purchased a plastics manufacturing unit and 
Gautam moved back to Ahmedabad to manage the business. His responsibilities at the unit 
included overseeing the import of key raw materials for the manufacturing of plastics (Elliott 
2017). This opportunity allowed him a first glimpse into the complexities of global trade, a 
space that he would return to with the Adani Group.  
 
As Gautam was learning his hand in foreign affairs, the Indian government announced a 
comprehensive policy that incorporated both export and import policy for the first time (Jain 
et al. 2010). The Export-Import Policy (EXIM) of 1985 was initially introduced for a period of 
three years, with the goal of controlling the export of the resources ‘whose supply demands 
that their exports be regulated in the interests of the country’ (Exim Policy 2016).  
 
Gautam Adani saw an opportunity to utilise his knowledge of global trade in his country’s new 
EXIM Policy. In 1988, with a capital of 500,000 rupees, the Adani Group and its flagship 
company, Adani Exports Limited, was established as a trader of power and agricultural 
commodities (Adani 2016). In 1993 it grew into a public limited company and in 1994 entered 
the capital markets with an IPO (Mehta, 2014). The swift developments of the youngest trading 
house in India were noticed by the Ministry of Commerce, who awarded Adani Exports 
Limited the status of “Super Star Trading House” in 1994 (Adani 2016).  
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When the Gujarat Government decided to open infrastructure development to the private in the 
1990s, Adani Group secured the contract to Mundra Port, strategically located on the Gulf of 
Kachchh, across the ocean from the Middle East, Africa and Europe. In 1998, Mundra Port was 
incorporated as Gujarat Adani Port Limited and it began operating three years later.  
 
Figure 3.1: Adani’s Mundra Port 
 
  
(Adani Ports 2016) 
 
 
In 2000, the Indian federal government replaced its Export Processing Zone (EPZ) scheme 
with a new Special Economic Zone (SEZ) scheme. The policy promoted SEZs through several 
new benefits, including tax incentives and exemptions from investment restrictions of India’s 
domestic economy (Khan 2008). Adani Group incorporated the Mundra Special Economic 
Zone (MSEZ) in 2003. Mundra Port signed an agreement to handle crude oil and set up a 
mooring facility. It has been rapidly expanding ever since, growing from a size of 2 berths to 
24. MSEZ merged with “Adani Chemicals Limited” and “Gujarat Adani Port Limited” and in 
2006 changed its name to “Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone” (MPSEZ).  
 
On January 6, 2012 MSPEZ once again changed its name, this time to “Adani Ports and Special 
Economic Zone Limited” (APSEZ), as a part of a strategy to collaborate the brand with the 
global port infrastructure business of Adani Group (Pandit 2012). In 12 years, Mundra Port 
became the first port in India to reach the 100 million metric tons of cargo mark (Adani.com, 
2016), becoming India’s largest commercial port. Gautam Adani’s son, Karan, has managed 
port operations for APSEZ since 2009; in 2016 he became its CEO (Mehta 2014). Today 
APSEZ is the largest private port operator in India, dominating the Indian coastline with ports 











Figure 3.2: Map of ports and terminals operated by APSEZ 
 
 
                                (Adani Ports 2016) 
 
In 2007 Adani Group purchased the Bunyu Mine, located on the oil-rich Bunyu Island, from 
the Indonesian Government (Adani 2016). This purchase marks the beginning of the 
company’s interest in the energy sector. One year later, Mundra Power Plant was built and a 
15-year fuel supply agreement was signed with the Indonesian government in order to import 
coal from the mine to Mundra Port for use by the Mundra Power Plant. Today, the Mundra 
Power Plant is one of the biggest thermal power plants in the world (Adani 2016). The 
country’s largest importer of coal soon sought to expand its domestic base by developing a new 
coal block in Orissa. The block has been estimated to contain reserves of 1.6 billion tonnes of 
coal, with an annual production capacity of 40 million tonnes (Economic Times 2010). This 
deal allowed the company to reach a total of 110 million tonnes per annum coal mining 
contracts in India, becoming one of the largest mining companies in the private sector (The 
Economic Times 2010).  
 
Adani Group and the Galilee Basin  
 
Adani Group continued to expand its coal reserves. In 2010 the company purchased the Galilee 
coal tenement in Queensland, Australia from Linc Energy for $500 million in cash, plus a 
royalty of $2 per tonne over 20 production years (Linc Energy 2010). Adani’s official reason 
for seeking to expand its business into Australia remains unclear. However, Australia remains 
the world’s largest exporter of coal and, as later discussions will demonstrate, the Australian 
legal framework for mining projects encourages mining investment. Adani also described the 
Galilee Basin as the ‘last undeveloped coal resource within Queensland’ and claims demand 
for coal is ‘expected to continue to experience strong growth in the next decade’ in the Project 
Justification and Project Rationale sections of its Initial Advice Statement to the Queensland 
Government (GHD 2010). 
 
The sale to Adani was Linc Energy’s largest deal with an Indian company, with a net present 
value of $1.5 billion or $3 billion over 20 years if the seam was mined out, according to the 
company’s chief executive, Peter Bond (Fraser 2010). Linc Energy, based in Brisbane and 
	 38 
listed in Singapore, sold the royalty it was due to receive back to Adani for $155 million in 
2014 (Macdonald-Smith 2014). Bond saw the decline of thermal coal prices as an incentive to 
cash in the royalty rather than risk keeping it long-term. The buy-back also allows Adani to 
have full control over the net income from the coal reserves instead of owing Linc Energy a 
portion of the profits.  
 
Adani Group made another international investment when it leased Terminal 1 (T1) of Abbot 
Point, Australia’s northernmost deep-water coal port, for 99-years on 1 June 2011 (North 
Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation 2016). The deal, signed by the Queensland Government 
and Mundra Port Pty Ltd (the Australian subsidiary of Mundra Port and Special Economic 
Zone Ltd and a part of the Adani Group), cost approximately $1.8 billion and was a part of the 
Queensland Government’s privatisation of government-owned assets that began in 2009 under 
Premier Anna Bligh (Tan 2012; The State of Queensland Department of Premier and Cabinet 
2009). At the time, Abbot Point comprised of rail in-loading facilities, coal handling and 
stockpiling areas, and a jetty and conveyor connecting to two berths and two shiploaders 
located offshore (North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation, 2016). It had a capacity of 50 
million tonnes per annum. Adani Group sought to invest $750 million to develop another 
terminal, Terminal 0 (T0), which would allow another 35 million tonnes of thermal coal exports 
per year (The Economic Times 2011). This expansion would allow for coal mined from the 
Galilee Basin to be exported to India (North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation 2016).  
 
Adani received approval from the Minister for Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population 
and Communities under the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(EPBC) for the T0 Terminal in December 2011 (The Australian Government 2012). The 
proposed development was determined to be a ‘controlled action under the provisions of the 
EPBC Act, as the action has the potential to have a significant impact on a number of matters 
of National Environmental Significance’ (The Australian Government 2012: 2). The 
controlling provisions under the EPBC Act were listed as: 
 
• World Heritage properties (sections 12 & 15A); 
• National Heritage places (sections 15B & 15C); 
• Listed threatened species and communities (sections 18 & 18A); 
• Listed migratory species (sections 20 & 20A); 
• Commonwealth marine areas (sections 23 & 24A); and 
• Great Barrier Reef Marine Park (sections 24B & 24C). 
 
The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Protection Authority (GBRMPA) approved the dumping 
of 3 million cubic metres of dredging spoil in the waters of the Great Barrier Reef as a part of 
the port expansion (Jabour 2014a). Two of the board members of the GBRMPA were 
subsequently investigated for potential conflicts of interest that included connects to mining 
companies (Jabour 2014b). Jon Grayson was appointed to the GBRMPA by the former Labour 
Government. He set up and owned one-sixth of ‘Gasfields Water and Waste Services’, which, 
although inactive, could potentially benefit from a growth in the industry (Jabour 2014b). Tony 
Mooney, a former Labour federal candidate and an executive for the mining company 
Guildford Coal, claimed that none of Guildford Coal’s proposed projects were operational in 
Queensland. Both Grayson and Mooney denied any allegations of a conflict of interest (Jabour 
2014b). Environment minister Greg Hunt ordered legal expert Robert Cornall, to conduct the 
inquiry. Cornall found Grayson and Mooney have not breached their public duty as board 
members of the authority and both properly disclosed their financial and personal interests 




Figure 3.3: Map of Proposed Dumping Area for T0 Terminal 
 
 
                                     (source: Jabour 2014a) 
 
In 2013 Adani Ports announced the sale of its interest in T1 to a private Adani family company 
in Singapore. Since then, Adani Ports has not listed the $2 billion port anywhere among its 
subsidiaries on its annual report. The $2.2 billion in associated debt was also absent from its 
balance sheet (Robertson 2016a). Years after the announcement of the transfer of ownership of 
the port, the transaction has still not been finalized. The incomplete transaction raises a question 
about corporate transparency: there is a clear discrepancy between what the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and Adani Ports’ shareholders in India are 
being told regarding the status of a major global transaction. This concealment also raises a 
question about Adani Mining’s financial position: the company had lodged a net debt in March 
2016 with ASIC while simultaneously seeking a federal government loan for the rail line. 
According to Tim Buckley of the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, 
Adani’s behaviour complicates ‘any efforts at due diligence’ by the Northern Australia 
Infrastructure Facility that is considering funding the rail project (Robertson 2016a). The 
approval of the sale by the Foreign Investment Review Board has expired, yet Adani Ports did 
not inform the Mumbai stock exchange or reverse the transaction (Robertson 2016a). An Adani 
spokesman stated that there is an intention to proceed to change ownership of Abbot Point but 
it remains “subject to financier approval” (Robertson 2016a). This issue has not been referred 
for further investigation by politicians or regulators. 
 
The Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project 
 
The purchase of the Galilee coal tenement from Linc Energy and the Abbott Point port terminal 
from the Queensland Government allowed for the possibility for Adani Group to set up a large 
scale coal mining operation. In 2010, Adani Mining, a subsidiary of Adani Group, submitted a 
proposal for the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project in Queensland. The Initial Advice 
Statement (IAS) on the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project was released by Adani Mining 
Limited that year as a requirement under Australia’s Environmental Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act of 1999 (EBPC). The IAS provides the Queensland Coordinator 
General with information about the proposed mining plan so that a decision could be made as 
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to whether the project should be classified as a ‘significant project.’ Under the 1971 State 
Development and Public Works Organisation Act of Queensland (SDPWOA), any 
development given the “significant project” label requires an Environmental Impact Statement 
(EIS). 
 
Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project’s IAS claimed that the project would produce 60 
million tonnes of coal annually for 150 years, making it one of the largest coal mines in the 
world. According to the IAS, approximately 4,000 jobs during construction and another 5,000 
permanent jobs be created during the mine’s lifetime and the ‘last undeveloped coal resource 
within Queensland’ would be utilised (GHD 2010). The Carmichael Project’s plan includes the 
transport of the mined coal by a rail line to the Port of Abbot Point, where it would then be 
shipped over 8000km to India’s Vizag Port, which is also owned by the Adani Group. 
Coordinator General of Queensland, Barry Broe, declared the project a “significant project” 
under the State Development and Public Works Organization Act of 1971.  
 
Figure 3.4: Location of Carmichael Mine in Queensland 
 
 

















Figure 3.5: Map of Proposed Carmichael Mine and Rail Project 
 
 
                     (Adani Mining 2016a) 
 
 
In its 2011 EIS, Adani Mining reduced the projected lifetime of the mine to 60 years and 
lowered the expected job creation to 3,920. The Coordinator General took nine main issues 
into consideration during his evaluation of the EIS: 
 
1. Matters of national environmental significance (threatened species, threatened 
communities, Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area, wetlands of international importance, 
groundwater, surface water);   
2. Matters of state environmental significance (flora and fauna, Bygana West Nature 
Refuge, offsets);  
3. Mine issues (subsidence, mine waste, rehabilitation and final land use),  
4. Landholder impacts;  
5. Flooding from the rail line;  
6. Coal dust management;  
7. Road impacts;  
8. Social and local economic impacts; and  
9. Environmental management plans, proponent commitments and conditions (the State 
of Queensland 2014). 
 
In 2014 the Queensland Coordinator General concluded the ‘environmental impact assessment 
requirements of the SDPWO Act for the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail project have been met 
and that sufficient information has been provided to enable a thorough evaluation of the 
potential impacts of the project’ (The State of Queensland 2014). He argued there are 
significant state benefits to be derived from the development, and that any undesirable 
environmental impacts could either be ‘avoided, minimized, mitigated or offset’ through the 
strict adherence of the measures outlined in the EIS (The State of Queensland 2014). The 
Coordinator General’s decision outraged many Australian citizens and environmental groups 
throughout the state, sparking a legal battle regarding the approval of the Project that is still 
ongoing at the time of my writing of this thesis. 
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As a World Heritage Property, the Great Barrier Reef is subject to status assessments by 
UNESCO. In early 2012, UNESCO issued a warning to Australia, stating that the GBR was 
under threat and could be listed as ‘in danger’. Such status would allow the Australia to seek 
assistance through the World Heritage Fund, but would potentially damage tourism and 
embarrass the Australian Government for failing to safeguard the Reef (Greenpeace 2017). In 
2015, as a result of lobbying by the Australian Government, UNESCO declined to list the GBR 
as ‘in danger’, instead placing it on a ‘watch list’, subject to monitoring over the next five years, 
and instructed the Australian Government to demonstrate significant progress in reef 
conservation efforts by the end of 2016. This pressured the Australian Government to publish 
its ‘Reef 2050 Plan’, the framework for protecting and managing the GBR, in March 2015. 
While the report acknowledges that climate change is the ‘biggest long-term threat’ to the 
Reef’s health, little action was proposed to curb the impacts of climate change. The main 
proposals included a partial ban on dumping dredge spoil from coral port developments in the 
GBR, $100 million to improve water quality, and reductions in pesticide and sediment 
pollution.  
 
A bill that would prevent land clearing (one source of carbon emissions and runoff pollution to 
the reef), a key part of the 2050 Plan, failed to pass in Queensland’s state parliament in August 
2016 (Burke 2016). During the following month, the Australian Government claimed that it 
was ‘making good progress’ in protecting the GBR in its first annual update on the Reef 2050 
plan. The gravity of the effect of climate change on the Reef was largely dismissed - climate 
change was only mentioned four times in the 36-page document, as one of the “range of 
sources” of pressure facing the Reef (Department of Energy and the Environment 2015).  
 
In 2017, the Great Barrier Reef Independent Review Group issued a report on the progress of 
the implementation of the Reef 2050 Plan. The report indicated that the 2016 coral bleaching 
had set back the Plan’s objective by at least two decades, with overall progress described as 
“less than anticipated in a number of important areas” (Great Barrier Reef Independent Review 
Group 2017). Following this report, it was suggested that the Reef 2050 Advisory Committee 
changes its goal to one that can “maintain the ecological function” of the GBR, since the decline 
of the Reef’s health and viability was now inevitable (Great Barrier Reef Independent Review 
Group 2017). 
 
Later that year, the World Heritage Committee completed a review of the Great Barrier Reef. 
Despite reports of unprecedented coral bleaching, the Committee did not recommend the GRB 
be labelled as endangered; the Reef’s ‘official status’ was to remain on UNESCO’s World 
Heritage ‘watch list’ (UNESCO 2017a). It was later revealed that the Australian Government 
lobbied the World Heritage Committee in order to avoid having the Great Barrier Reef labelled 
as endangered (Milman, 2015; Hasham, 2015). The Australian Government’s lobbying of 
UNESCO is discussed in further detail in Chapter Seven’s analysis of the Carmichael Project 
as a state-corporate crime. 
 
Adani Group’s Global Environmental Record 
 
The Carmichael Project threatens to destroy or permanently damage important wetlands and 
farmlands, habitats of threatened and endangered species, significant natural heritage, and the 
traditional lands of the Wangan and Jagalingou people. Each of these sites of impact presents 
the federal and Queensland governments with legal grounds to refuse to issue the necessary 
approvals to the Adani Group. 
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If the federal and Queensland governments wish to issue the approvals regardless of the 
Project’s potential environmental and social impacts, the governments should be confident that 
Adani Group will operate with caution and compliance with all relevant laws to minimise harm 
to the environment and Indigenous culture. The onus lies with the Adani Group to demonstrate 
that their previous operations have been executed with special attention to approval conditions 
and harm minimisation and they can therefore be trusted to undertake the Carmichael Project 
in the same manner. However, the Adani Group’s environmental record for its past projects 
suggests the company has not and can not meet this standard. 
 
Disregard for environmental laws in India: Mundra Port 
 
Most evidence relating to the Adani Group’s lack of compliance with environmental regulation 
and history of environmental harm concerns the company’s activities with Mundra Port in 
India. One of the company’s subsidiaries, Adani Ports and Special Economic Zone Ltd (‘Adani 
Mundra’), which was previously called Mundra Port and Special Economic Zone Ltd (Adani 
Enterprises 2012) operates one of the world’s largest coal-fired power plants, together with a 
port and special economic zone in Mundra, India, the ‘Mundra Port and Special Economic 
Zone (‘Mundra SEZ’) (Adani Ports n.d.). The disregard for environmental regulation and 
resulting destruction of the environment in Mundra spans many years and has been the subject 
of significant litigation.  
 
Following a complaint by a local organisation that works with fishing communities around 
Mundra, the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests’ (‘Ministry’) visited the Mundra SEZ 
in December 2010 (Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a). Environmental clearances for the 
Mundra SEZ required no existing mangroves be destroyed; that the creek would not be filled 
up or reclaimed; and any construction activities in the Coastal Regulation Zone must have 
approvals of the relevant State Government Departments/Agencies (Ministry of Environment, 
Forest and Climate Change n.d.).  
 
The Ministry’s investigation found evidence of large-scale destruction of mangroves near 
Adani Mundra’s North Port caused by reclamation using dredged material, obstruction of tidal 
flow by a dredging disposal pipeline, obstruction of creek stems and natural seawater flow by 
reclamation along creeks, and the development of a township, airport, and hospital without the 
necessary environmental approvals (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 
n.d.). The Ministry issued a ‘show cause’ notice to Adani Mundra on 15 December 2010 
(Ministry of the Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2010), which stated Adani Mundra 
‘had violated the Coastal Regulation Zone Notification, 1991, approved Coastal Zone 
Management Plan of Gujarat dated 27 September 1996, and have not complied with the 
conditions listed in the environmental clearance letter issued by the Ministry…’. (Ministry of 
the Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2010). 
 
On 23 February 2011, the Ministry ordered project managers not to initiate any new 
construction work in the coastal regulation zone (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate 
Change 2011).  
 
Following complaints from Indian environmental NGO, Kheti Vikas Sewa Trust’, the Ministry 
launched an independent Committee for Inspection into the Mundra SEZ, in September 2012 
(Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a). In April 2013, the Committee issued its report. The 
allegations against Adani Mundra were summarised as: 
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• There has been widespread destruction of mangroves, which was strictly prohibited in 
the clearances granted; 
• The creeks and inter-tidal system has been adversely affected, particularly, the Kotdi 
creek, which has been blocked; 
• There has been mismanagement of fly ash from the thermal power plant, which has 
resulted in fugitive emissions during disposal and pollution of groundwater; 
• The large volume of seawater stored in the unlined pond and conveyed through the 
intake and outfall channel has increased salinity and contaminated water sources; 
• The original [high tide line/low tide line] has been distorted because of human made 
bunds and blocking of creeks; 
• The company is non-compliant with conditions imposed at the time of environmental 
clearance (Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2013a). 
 
The Committee’s report also found ‘incontrovertible evidence of violation[s] of [environmental 
clearance] condition[s] and non-compliance. It must also be recognized that [Adani Mundra] 
has bypassed environmental procedures in certain cases’ (Ministry of Environment, Forest and 
Climate Change 2013a). The report recommended the establishment of an Environment 
Restoration Fund, to be comprised of 1% of the project cost (or Rs 200 crore; approximately 4 
million AUD – whichever is more), to be used to ‘protect marine ecology, develop new 
mangrove conservation areas, restore and conserve creeks, conduct independent studies and 
monitoring, and for social infrastructure and livelihood support for fishing communities’ 
(Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change 2013a). In addition to the fund, the 
report made several other recommendations, including cancelling the environmental clearance 
for the North Port (Environmental Justice Australia 2015a).  
 
Adani Group countered the findings in the report, claiming: that its power plant used 
technology to ensure there was no stray fly ash; that while any large development would effect 
the environment, it was certain that its net impact was positive; and that all government 
requirements were followed in setting up its projects (Bahree 2014).  
 
In September 2013, the Ministry issued a ‘show cause’ notice to Adani Mundra, placing the 
company’s North Port in ‘abeyance’ and requesting the company claim why the environmental 
clearance for the North Port should not be cancelled (Ministry of Environment, Forest and 
Climate Change 2013b). 
 
The Mundra SEZ has been the subject of at least five substantial litigations. Two of these cases, 
which demonstrate the government of India’s willingness to trust the Adani Group regardless 
of the company’s past environmental violations and the people of India’s lack of trust with the 
company, are described below. 
 
Notably, in January 2014, the Supreme Court of India ruled that existing units in the SEZ may 
continue to function but new construction activity was not permitted while the government 
decided whether or not to grant an environmental clearance to Adani Mundra following the 
government’s suspension of the North Port (Skaps Industries India Pvt Ltd v Gajuba 
(Gajendrasinh) Bhimji Jadeja & Ors, 2014). In July that year, the Ministry issued an 
environmental clearance with a significant number of new environmental conditions 
(Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a). 
 
In 2013, residents of a village near Mundra have accused Adani Mundra of using land that was 
not allotted to the Mundraw SEZ for building employee accommodation. Adani Mundra was 
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able to prove that it had demolished the construction and consequently the case was dismissed 
(Pravinsingh Bhurabha Chauhan and Others v State of Gujarat and Others 2013, 
Environmental Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
Corruption and environmental destruction throughout India 
 
Other than Adani’s environmental destruction and regulatory non-compliance in Mundra, the 
company has also been accused of other acts of corruption throughout India. 
 
In July 2011 Adani Enterprises Ltd was found to have been ‘actively involved in large scale 
illegal exports of iron ore causing huge loss to the Government’ by the ombudsman of the state 
of Karnataka (Government of Karnataka 2008). Adani Enterprises Ltd was one of four 
operators at the Port of Belekeri in Karnataka, where iron ore from local mines was transported 
for loading onto ships for export. All operators of the Port of Belekeri were required to maintain 
records of iron ore exports and payments. The report found that Adani Enterprises Ltd: 
 
Paid bribes to officials at the Port department, customs, police, the State Pollution Control 
board, local politicians and others to receive ‘undue favour for illegal exports’; 
Routinely received trucks that were loaded with iron ore above the allowable amount. ‘Over 
loading of trucks carrying iron ore is a routine practice leading to substantial iron ore theft’; 
Received iron ore from suppliers without permits to supply that ore; and 
Forged multiple permits. (Government of Karnataka 2008).  
 
The documents seized by police from Adani Enterprises Ltd’s offices allowed police to 
calculate around 7.7 million tonnes of iron ore was illegally exported from the Port between 
2006 and 2010 (Environmental Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
In July 2014, the Competition Commission of India found Adani Gas Ltd guilty of using its 
position in the market to impose unfair conditions on gas customers. Adani Gas Ltd was 
ordered to modify its supply contracts and pay approximately $4.8 million AUD 
(Environmental Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
The Adani Group has been accused of using its stakeholders’ connections with the Modi state 
government of Gujarat to secure land for the Mundra SEZ at a discounted rate from the market 
value (DNA India 2012). 
 
The Adani Group was also reported to have colluded with the Gujarat state power authority to 
supply electricity at rates higher than those offered by competing electricity providers 
(Environmental Justice Australia 2017). The power authority prevented Adani’s competitors 
from bidding for supply contracts (Environmental Justice Australia, 2017). While Gujarat 
suffered from power shortages, the power authority bought short-term power from the Adani 
Group at high prices and refused competitors’ cheaper, long-term supply (Environmental 
Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
In December 2014, a subsidiary of Adani Enterprises Ltd, Adani Mormugao Port Terminal Pvt 
Ltd, was issued a notice by the state pollution control board in relation to the Mormugao Port 
in the state of Goa (The Times of India 2014a). This notice required the Adani company to 
show cause as to why its ‘consent to operate’ should not be cancelled on the basis the state 
pollution control board had identified the company had failed to install air quality monitoring, 
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as required by law, and observed coal dust pollution caused by uncovered coal stockpiles and 
unutilised sprinkling and dry fogging systems (The Times of India 2014a).  
 
The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) has found instances of the Adani group 
receiving unfair tax benefits.  In the 2013 financial year, for example, Adani Group allegedly 
obtained an approximately Rs 234 crore (approximately 4.6 million AUD) tax deduction that 
it was not entitled to. In another instance, Adani Exports was granted an illegal tax deduction 
of Rs 179 crore (approximately 3.5 million AUD). In both cases, the Adani companies had 
received excess exemptions by not claiming an accurate profit (The Times of India 2014b). 
The CAG brought these charges against Adani in its report on partnership firms, which was 
tabled in Parliament in 2014 (The Times of India 2014b). No legal actions have been taken 
against Adani for these matters. 
 
Adani Australia CEO’s record of environmental destruction in Zambia 
 
In addition to the Adani Group’s record of harm to the environment and communities in India, 
the chief executive officer of Adani Mining Pty Ltd in Australia, Jeyakumar Janakaraj, who 
would be overseeing the Carmichael Project in Queensland, was Director of Operations of a 
mining company in Zambia that committed environmental offenses during his tenure 
(Environmental Justice Australia 2015b).  
 
Janakaraj was the Director of Operations and later CEO of Konkola Copper Mines (KCM) in 
Zambia from 2008 until he joined Adani Group in September 2013. KCM, a subsidiary of 
Vedanta Resources Plc, is one of Africa’s largest copper producers, with mining operations in 



























Figure 3.6 KCM Assets 
 
 
(Konkola Copper Mines plc n.d.) 
 
 
Around the end of October 2011, KCM discharged a highly acidic, metal-laden water generated 
from leaching in copper mining into the Kafue River, the source of water relied upon by local 
communities for drinking, cooking, domestic use, fishing, and agricultural irrigation. The river 
changed colour (Mines and Communities, 2017). KCM not only failed to report the pollution, 
but first pled ignorance before later agreeing that the pollution came from the tailings leach 
plant (Environmental Justice Australia 2015b). 
 
In November 2010, the Government of Zambia brought a criminal prosecution against KCM 
for the pollution of the Kafue River and the harm it caused (The People v Konkola Copper 
Mines 1C/232 2010). KCM was charged with four offences: 
 
‘Polluting the environment contrary to section 91(1) of the Environmental Protection and 
Pollution Control Act No. 12 of 1990 Cap 204 of the Laws of Zambia’; 
‘Discharging poisonous, toxic, ecotoxic, obnoxious or obstructing matter, radiation or other 
pollutant into the aquatic environment contrary to sections 24 and 91(1) of the Environmental 
Protection and Pollution Control Act No. 12 of 1990 Cap 204 of the Laws of Zambia’;   
‘[W]illfully failing to report an act or incident of pollution of the environment contrary to 
section 86 subsections (1) and (3) of the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control Act 
No. 12 of 1990 Cap 204 of the Laws of Zambia’; and 
[F]ailure to comply with the requirements for discharge of effluent contrary to Regulation 12(b) 
of the Environmental Protection and Pollution Control [Water Pollution (Effluent and 
Wastewater)] Regulations Statutory Instrument No. 172 of 1993’ (The People v Konkola 
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Copper Mines 1C/232 2010). 
KCM plead guilty to all charges and the Subordinate Court of the First Class for the Chingola 
District Holden at Chingola, Zambia imposed a monetary fine of KMZ 21.9 million (equivalent 
to approximately $4000 USD) on the company. Nevertheless, KCM’s pollution of the region 
continued. 
A few months later, in January 2011, a newspaper reported that KCM was once again polluting 
the Kafue River (Lusaka Times 2011). In April 2015, the Supreme Court for Zambia agreed 
with the High Court for Zambia’s 2011 decision that KCM was liable for polluting water in 
Chingola in 2006, which resulted in local residents getting sick (Environmental Justice 
Australia 2015b). 
1,800 members of the local community also filed a lawsuit against KCM in the UK to recover 
damages for injuries that have resulted from the company’s water pollution (Vidal 2015). The 
locals have claimed that people have become sick and died, the soil has become irreparably 
damaged and the water is no longer safe for consumption or use (Vidal 2015). Leaked reports 
have indicated that KCM has been discharging toxic chemicals into water sources in Zambia 
as their reservoirs have overflowed: ‘The pollution control pond is handling too much material. 
No effort has been made to correct this scenario. Only one of four [waste] pipelines is running 
– the rest are in disrepair…The company has very good plans on paper that have not 
materialized on the ground for the last 10 years’ (Vidal 2015). 
In the case of KCM in Zambia, Jeyakumar Janakaraj had the responsibility of ensuring that his 
mine operated in compliance with local laws that serve the environment and communities. 
Australia recognises that environmental issues related to a company’s stakeholders (and other 
companies those stakeholders have been in charge of) are relevant matters in considering a 
company’s environmental history to determine whether that company should be allowed to 
operate in Australia (Environmental Justice Australia 2015b). The actions of KCM in Zambia 
under the executive director of Adani Australia along with the Adani Group’s environmental 
record in India present a serious concern with Adani’s ability to regard the environment and 
local communities of Queensland’s Galilee Basin. 
Non-compliance in Australia: The Abbot Point Stormwater Return Dam 
 
Adani already has a record of environmental harm and non-compliance of Australian 
legislation. Adani Group’s ‘Construction Compliance Report,’ prepared in order to meet a 
condition of the approval under the EPBC Act for Abbot Point Stormwater Return Dam finds 
a number of non-compliances with the EPBC Act approval, the Construction Environment 
Management Plan, and other sub-management plans (Adani Ports 2013). These include failing 
to comply with: 
 
• Conditions in relation to marking and eradicating weeds and separating weeds prior to 
mulching; 
• A condition to complete pest declarations for all earthmoving vehicles; 
• A condition to wash down vehicles; 
• Pest monitoring conditions; 
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• A condition regarding requirement for supplier certification that soils brought onto site 
are free of contaminants; 
• A condition to maintain register of flammable liquids; 
• A condition in relation to site inductions and induction about environmental objections 
and requirements; and  
• The water quality monitoring plan (Environmental Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
The Construction Compliance Report considered the impacts from the non-compliances to be 
‘negligible’ (Adani Ports 2013).  
 
Adani Mining Pty Ltd: a (non) suitable operator in Queensland 
 
Under the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld), any company that intends on performing 
industrial activities such as mining must be registered as a ‘suitable operator’ in Queensland. 
The Act allows the chief executive of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 
(‘the Department’) to refuse, cancel, or suspend a company’s application for registration on the 
basis of the company’s previous environmental record (Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld)).  
 
Although the applicant is ‘Adani Mining Pty Ltd’, it is clear that this company is directly related 
to a group of companies that have a history of environmentally harmful activities. It is also 
possible that Adani Mining Pty Ltd’s executive officers could have served as executive officers 
of other Adani companies while those companies have committed events that would disqualify 
or cancel the registration under section 318K(a) of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld) (Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a).  
 
The analysis by the Queensland environmental regulator of Adani Mining Pty Ltd’s suitability 
to operate the Carmichael Project has not been thorough. Given the severity of the legal 
violations and environmental destruction in India and the gravity of the potential environmental 
impacts in Australia should Adani Mining Pty Ltd fail to comply with Australian environmental 
approvals, the company’s suitability should be reconsidered. In fact, the process for 
determining suitability to operate the Carmichael Project was itself marred with lack of public 
disclosure and loopholes and for this reason, it is investigated below. 
 
A mining company wishing to operate in Queensland requires an environmental authority 
issued by the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection following an assessment 
process (Business Queensland, 2016). Adani Mining Pty Ltd however, did not go through this 
preliminary step. Instead, the company purchased its first environmental authority from another 
company in August 2010, just one week after Adani Mining Pty Ltd was incorporated in 
Australia (Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a). At the time of transfer, the Department was 
legally required to consider Adani Mining Pty Ltd’s suitability to hold an environmental 
authority in Queensland and its environmental record (Environmental Protection Act 1994 
(Qld)).Sections 540 and 540A of the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) requires the 
Department to make environmental authorities public, however Adani’s original environmental 
authority is not publicly available, nor has the Department been able to locate it (Environmental 
Protection Act 1994 (Qld); Environmental Justice Australia 2015a).  
 
In August 2011, the type of environmental authority held by Adani Mining Pty Ltd was 
changed and in March 2012 the environmental authority number was changed by the 
Department, which cited administrative error for the change (Environmental Justice Australia 
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2015a). This suggests that over a period of two years, Adani Mining Pty Ltd’s environmental 
authority had three different numbers. A report by the Queensland Auditor General in 2014 
found that the Department is exposing the environment to unnecessary harm as the data being 
used to regulate industries that harm Queensland’s environment is ‘unreliable, hard to access, 
difficult to analyse; and often incapable of providing timely and quality information to inform 
decisions’ (The State of Queensland Queensland Audit Office 2013). 
 
In March 2013, the Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) was amended with the 
Environmental Protection (Greentape Reduction) and Other Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
(Qld) law, which required a company to be registered as a ‘suitable operator’ before the 
Department could grant it an environmental authority. The amending law, however, also 
allowed holders of existing environmental authorities to be registered as a ‘suitable operator’ 
(Environmental Justice Australia, 2015a). Adani Mining Pty Ltd was therefore automatically 
registered as a ‘suitable operator’ without having to disclose its environmental record and 
without the government investigating its suitability (Environmental Justice Australia 2015a). 
 
Since its automatic register as a ‘suitable operator’, Adani Mining Pty Ltd has received four 
additional environmental authority permits without having its environmental record 
investigated by the Queensland Government. Although the confirming documents are not 
publicly available, the company’s suitability to hold an environmental authority has only once 
been investigated by the Queensland Government in August 2010 – before Adani’s 
environmental harm and breach of environmental regulations in India and elsewhere had 
occurred.  
 
The Carmichael Project in Courts  
 
In order for a ‘significant mining project’ to be approved in Queensland, a mining lease under 
the Mineral Resources Act 1989 (Qld) (MRA); an environmental authority under the 
Environmental Protection Act 1994 (Qld) (EPA); and an approval under the Environmental 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) (EPBC Act) must be obtained. Since 
these requirements involve both levels of government (state and federal), legal challenges to 
the Project have been heard in both jurisdictions, as outlined below.  
 
Mackay Conservation Group v Commonwealth of Australia and Adani Mining [2015]: First 
approval under the EPBC Act; First judicial review challenge 
 
When the Queensland Coordinator General classified the Project as a “significant project” 
under the State Development and Public Works Organisation Act 1971 (Qld) in 2010, an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) process was launched. The Carmichael Project’s EIS 
was prepared by Adani between 2011 and 2013. It was then assessed under under the MRA 
and EPA by the Queensland Coordinator General; and under the EPBC Act by the 
Commonwealth Environment Minister. The Project received its first green light from the 
Australian government in 2014 when Barry Broe, the Queensland Coordinator General and 
Greg Hunt, the Commonwealth Environment Minister at the time, both gave their 
recommendations for the approval of the mine. This approval was short-lived, however, as the 
Mackay Conservation Group, an environmental organisation that focuses its conservation and 
protection efforts on Central Queensland, led the challenge to the Commonwealth Environment 
Minister’s approval of the Project under the EPBC Act in the Federal Court in Sydney.  
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This preliminary approval was set aside by consent by the Federal Court in August 2015, after 
the Minister agreed he had not properly considered the effect of the mine on two vulnerable 
species, the yakka skink and the ornamental snake (ABC 2015). Queensland Resources Council 
Chief Executive Michael Roche accused ‘anti-coal advocates’ of using ‘legal loopholes’ to 
delay a significant economic investment in Australia (ABC 2015). Attorney-General George 
Brandis called the lawsuit illegitimate, brought upon by groups that ‘have no legitimate interest 
other than to prosecute a political vendetta against development and bring massive 
developments … to a standstill’ (Clark 2015). Brandeis proposed a change in section 487(2) of 
the EPBC Act in order to prevent ‘vigilante litigation’ and ‘lawfare by radical green groups’ 
(Clark 2015).  
 
The section in question allows a ‘person aggrieved by the decision,’ including individuals or 
organisations who have engaged in ‘a series of activities related to the protection or 
conservation of, or research into, the environment’ to seek legal action and formed the basis of 
the grounds for the Mackay Conservation Group to initiate legal action against the Project. 
Brandis’ proposal was eventually shelved (Taylor 2016). 
 
Environmental groups and the Greens saw the court’s decision as an opportunity to urge Adani 
to walk away from pursuing the Carmichael Mine, citing the legal uncertainty of the Project. 
Activists claimed the Minister could either refuse the mining project or he could decide to 
follow the proper legal procedures to re-approve the mine, after considering new evidence and 
information regarding the project (ABC 2015).  
 
In October 2015, two months after the approval of the Project was overturned, the Project 
received its second green light with the Minister granting a second approval under the EPBC 
Act. This time, the approval came with what Minister Hunt referred to as ‘36 of the strictest 
conditions in Australian history’ (Hasham 2015). The conditions include the requiring of Adani 
Group to execute and submit a Groundwater Management and Monitoring Plan; a Matters of 
National Environmental Significance Management Plan; a Biodiversity Offset Strategy and 
biodiversity funding; a 3D Seismic Survey Management Plan; a Groundwater Flow Model 
Review; a Great Artesian Basin (GAB) Springs Research Plan; and a Rewan Formation 
Connectivity Research Plan before commencing excavation of the first box cut (Australian 
Government 2010).  
 
Regarding the effect of the mine on the two vulnerable species, Minister Hunt instructed the 
Adani Group to “legally secure” the minimum offset areas within two years of commencement 
of each action (Australian Government 2010). In Queensland, only ‘significant residual 
impacts’ are required to be offset (Environmental Offsets Act 2014). Offsets are proposed only 
if the project proponent first proves that they cannot ‘avoid’ the impacts on the environment 
and, further, the impacts cannot be avoided or mitigated in a cost effective way. Mandating 
offset areas for endangered species is a common court prescription for legal cases brought by 
environmental groups, with court decisions suggesting offsets ‘counter-balance’ environmental 
impacts of a particular project (EDO QLD 2014). Some environmentalists view the prescription 
of offsets as a legal ‘last resort’ that allows for a project with proven significant environmental 
consequences to nevertheless proceed (EDO QLD 2014). Environmental offsets are discussed 





Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] 
FCA 1042: Second approval under the EPBC Act; second judicial review challenge 
 
The second EPBC Act approval was challenged by the Australian Conservation Foundation 
(ACF) in the Federal Court of Brisbane before Justice Griffiths on 3 and 4 May 2016. As a 
judicial review application, the ACF argued that the Minister failed to properly consider the 
Carmichael Project’s impacts of climate change pollution on the Great Barrier Reef.  
 
A judicial review proceeding is more limited in scope than an appeal of merit. As a judicial 
review proceeding, the court’s role in this case was limited to reviewing whether the Minister 
complied with his requirements before the law. The court was not able to evaluate whether or 
not the Minister’s decision was correct based on the facts. Justice Griffiths addressed this 
distinction at the beginning of his decision: 
 
It is important to emphasise at the outset the restricted character of this proceeding. 
On a judicial review application, the Court cannot step into the shoes of the 
Minister and decide for itself whether Adani’s action should be approved and, if 
so, what conditions should apply. The Parliament has conferred that task and 
responsibility on the Minister and the Minister alone. This Court’s function on a 
judicial review is significantly more limited, confined as it is to a review of the 
legality, and not the merits, of the Minister’s decision. Ultimately, it is the Minister 
who must accept responsibility and be accountable for the merits of his decision. 
 
The ACF argued Australia is obliged, under the World Heritage Convention, to ensure the 
protection of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area. After the first decision to approve 
the mine was set aside by consent, the Minister of the Environment received new data regarding 
the impact of green house gases (GHGs) on the Great Barrier Reef. Part of this data revealed 
that at current global emissions, assuming no further growth in emissions, the global emissions 
budget that limits global temperature rises beneath 2 degrees Celsius would still be a very 
dangerous level of warming for the Reef. In order to limit the warming to beneath 2 degrees 
Celsius, no more than 850 billion tonnes of GHGs could be emitted globally after 2015 (ACF 
2016). The Carmichael Mine is scheduled to produce 2.3 billion tonnes of coal over its 30 to 
60-year lifetime. This figure amounts to 4.7 billion tonnes of greenhouse gases (GHGs) once 
the coal is burnt, or 0.6% of the carbon budget. 
 
In giving the second approval, ACF argued that the Minister evaluated the new data in a manner 
that was at odds with the statutory scheme involving the exercise of the power to make the 
decision. Specifically: 
 
(Ground 2) The Minister should have asked whether those consequences (listed in 
the new data) were considered ‘relevant impacts’ within the meaning of sections 
82 and 527E of the EPBC Act. Instead, he dismissed this information and applied 
a range of criteria not listed in the EPBC Act. 
 
(Ground 3) The Minister should have taken into account the precautionary 
principle but instead relied on the Coordinator General’s conclusion that there was 
sufficient scientific evidence to conclude that the Project would not result in threats 
of serious or irreversible damage to the Great Barrier Reef. 
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(Ground 1) The Minister should have but has not acted consistently with 
Australia’s obligations under the World Heritage Convention, which would require 
him to quantify the impacts of GHGs on the Great Barrier Reef, take the 
precautionary principle into consideration when there is any scientific uncertainty, 
and consider what other measures might be used to avoid or repair the damage. 
(ACF 2016 italics added) 
 
The Minister’s submissions argued that while Section 527E of the EPBC Act defines an event 
or circumstance as an ‘impact’ of an action ‘if the event or circumstance is a direct consequence 
of the action; or for an event or circumstance that is an indirect consequence of the action—
subject to subsection 2, the action is a substantial cause of that event or circumstance’, in this 
case, the ‘physical effects’ associated with climate change (increased ocean temperature and 
acidification) are not a direct impact of the proposed action (EPBC Act 1999; Australian 
Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] FCA 1042).  
 
The Minister’s submissions also claimed the Minister was not required to take measures or 
consider taking measures if he finds that a proposed action would not have any adverse effect 
on matters of national environmental significance. He had concluded that ‘given the variables 
that would affect actual net emissions from transport by rail, shipping and combustion of the 
[Carmichael Project’s] product coal, it would be mere speculation to find that the emissions 
would have any impact on matters of national environmental significance’ (Australian 
Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] FCA 1042). 
The government’s conceptualisation of carbon emissions, specifically ‘net emissions’ is 
discussed in subsequent chapters as an essential element used in the government’s techniques 
of neutralisation and denial of environmental harm.  
 
The Minister further argued the ACF mistook the scope of Australia’s international obligations 
regarding the World Heritage Convention. It was argued that while Article 4 of the World 
Heritage Convention states that each state party has a ‘duty of ensuring the identification, 
protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the cultural and 
natural heritage…,’ the Article cannot be interpreted literally. Article 4 should instead be 
interpreted in context, including in light of Article 5, which allows each state party to ‘take the 
appropriate legal, scientific, technical, administrative and financial measures necessary for the 
identification, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of this heritage’ 
(Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] 
FCA 1042). The Minister’s submissions cited international law as set out in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969: that the general rule of treaty interpretation is 
a treaty shall be interpreted ‘in good faith’. 
 
Article 5 of the World Heritage Convention (along with Article 31 of the Vienna Convention) 
thus allows Australia a ‘margin of appreciation’ with regard to the measures it chooses to 
implement and comply with Article 4. This argument also suggests that the Minister did not 
act inconsistently with his obligations under the EPBC Act, which requires decisions to be 
made in accordance with Australia’s obligations under the World Heritage Convention, 
because he concluded there would be ‘no unacceptable impact on the world heritage values of 
the Great Barrier Reef’ after considering the Project’s GHG emissions (Australian 
Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] FCA 1042). For 
these reasons the Minister suggested the grounds advanced by the ACF should be rejected. 
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Adani also argued that the case should be dismissed for similar reasons. Adani stated the 
Minister did take into account the estimates of the Carmichael Project’s GHG emissions. 
Further, when the Minister concluded that climate change is a significant threat to the Great 
Barrier Reef, he also concluded that the extent of the impacts of climate change to the Great 
Barrier Reef depends on how the rising levels of GHGs are addressed at a global level. Thus 
the potential impacts of climate change on the Reef are uncertain.  
 
Adani’s submissions stated the Minister concluded that the connection between combustion 
emissions and adverse impact on the Great Barrier were speculative because: 
 
• combustion emissions are subject to variables including whether the coal from the mine 
will be burned in addition or instead of other coal;  
• determining ‘actual net emissions’ was ‘speculative’;  
• the future extent of climate change is uncertain and therefore it is not possible to 
conclude that these emissions will contribute to any increase in global temperature; and 
• it is difficult to draw a causal relationship between the Project and matters of 
environmental significance in Queensland (Adani Mining 2016b).  
 
Adani argued that despite these conclusions, the Minister did not disregard combustion 
emissions but instead considered how they might be addressed, i.e. through existing control 
frameworks within Australia and other countries that make up the import market for coal from 
the Project. This consideration, according to Adani’s submissions, reflects the Minister’s 
application of the precautionary principle and led to his conclusion that the Project will not 
have ‘an unacceptable impact’ on the Great Barrier Reef (Adani Mining 2016b). 
 
This second application was dismissed by the Federal Court on 29 August 2016. Justice 
Griffiths stated: 
 
In my view, [138] of the statement of reasons indicates that the Minister proceeded 
on the basis that the combustion emissions could not be regarded as a direct 
consequence of the proposed action. It is evident that the Minister then proceeded 
to determine whether or not the relevant events or circumstances flowing from the 
combustion emissions were the “impact” of the action within the meaning of s 
527E. The Minister explained in [140] that the quantity of overseas gas emissions 
was subject to a range of variables and that, although it was possible to determine 
a possible gross quantity of such emissions that may occur (as set out in [136] of 
the statement of reasons), the range of variables relevant to such a determination 
meant that the quantity of actual net emissions was speculative at that time. 
Consequently, so the Minister found, it was not possible for him to draw firm 
conclusions as to the likely contribution of Adani’s action to a specific increase in 
global temperature. This meant, in turn, that it was difficult to identify the 
necessary relationship between the taking of the action and any possible impacts 
on relevant environmental matters, including the Reef (Australian Conservation 
Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment (No 2) [2016] FCA 
1095).  
 
After the decision was delivered, the Court ordered ACF to pay 70% of the Minister’s costs 
and 40% of Adani’s costs (Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for 
the Environment (No 2) [2016] FCA 1095). EDO QLD, on behalf of the ACF, appealed the 
decision to the Full Court of the Federal Court on 3 March 2017 (Australian Conservation 
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Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment and Energy [2017] FCAFC 134). The 
appeal challenged the lawfulness of the Minister’s finding that the burning of coal from the 
Carmichael mine will not have an impact on global warming and the Great Barrier Reef (EDO 
QLD, 2017). On 25 August 2017 the Federal Court dismissed the appeal. 
 
Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors [2015] QLC 48: 
Approval under the EPA  
 
When the Queensland Coordinator General issued his recommendation for the Carmichael 
Project, it became advertised for objections under the MRA and EPA. The Land Services of 
Coast and Country Inc. (LSCC) objected the granting of the mine to the Land Court in 
Queensland from 31 March to 1 May, 2015. 
 
LSCC argued the construction of the mine would not protect Queensland’s environment while 
allowing for ecologically sustainable development, and therefore its approval contradicted the 
objective of Section 3 of the EPA. The approval of the mine, according to LSCC, also 
contradicted Section 5 of the EPA, which requires the administering authority and the Land 
Court to exercise its power under the Act in the way that best achieves the object of the Act. 
Furthermore, the LSCC believed that because the mining operation would not make appropriate 
use of the land (due to the adverse environmental impacts; the prejudice of the public’s interest; 
and the lack of necessary finances for the project), the sections of the MRA that require the 
consideration of the current land use versus the proposed land use (Section 269(4)(c), (f), (i), 
(j), (k), (l), and (m)) also provide grounds for the Project’s rejection (Land Services of Coast 
and Country 2014).  
 
The conservation group referred to the principals of environmental policy set forth in the 
Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment - the precautionary principle, the 
intergenerational equity principle, and the conservation of biological diversity and ecological 
integrity principle – as mandatory criteria that must be considered in the decision to approve 
the mining project. Together, these principles help assess the environmental harm of a project.  
 
Section 14 of the EPA defines environmental harm as, ‘any adverse effect, or potential adverse 
effect (whether temporary of permanent and of whatever magnitude, duration or frequency) on 
an environmental value, and includes environmental nuisance’ and may be caused by an 
activity ‘whether the harm is a direct or indirect result of the activity; or whether the harm 
results from the activity alone or from the combined efforts of the activity and other activities 
or factors (EPA 1994).  
 
LSCC argued that the proposed mine’s adverse environmental impacts on groundwater on the 
Doongmabulla Springs, the artesian springs complex surrounding the mining lease area, 
constitute an ‘inappropriate use of the land when current land use does not pose a similar threat’ 
(Land Services of Coast and Country 2014). The extent of the faulting of the Rewan Formation 
(the aquitard upon which the Carmichael Mine would be built) and, by extension, the 
environmental harm to the groundwater and dependent systems, was unknown due to the 
absence of seismic testing conducted in the area by the state or federal government. Adani had 
seismic testing and drilling for faults done on the proposed mining lease area by a 
hydrogeologist at a private consulting firm, which revealed faulting of ~300km through the 
Rewan Formation on the mining site. LSCC argued that it would therefore be logical to 
conclude there would also be faulting at the source of the springs, which are not far west of the 
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proposed mine (Land Services of Coast and Country 2014). If a fault beneath the Rewan 
Formation exists, the springs – a nationally important wetland – that have existed for tens of 
thousands of years would disappear overnight. LSCC claimed Adani’s EIS did not provide a 
sufficient assessment of the environmental harm to surface water and its dependent users, 
species, and ecosystems. However, the adverse environmental impacts caused by the proposed 
mine on surface water ‘by the creation of a permanent final void, alienating the land from 
current and future productive use’ make it an inappropriate use of the land when current land 
use does not pose a similar threat, when considering Section 269(4)(m) of the MRA (Land 
Services of Coast and Country 2014).  
 
LSCC referred to the possible extinction of the Black Throated Finch (BTF), citing the lack of 
information provided in Adani’s EIS regarding the adverse environmental impacts to the 
biodiversity in the proposed area of mining. While it is known that the population of the BTF 
on the mine site is the largest population in the world, scientists do not know why the birds live 
directly on the mine site instead of on the surrounding areas. LSCC argued that in order to 
ensure the species’ survival, its habitat must also be preserved (Land Services of Coast and 
Country 2014). The court case revealed that Adani’s EIS downplayed the number of birds that 
lived on the site. Authorising environmental harm to biodiversity through the approval of the 
mine would be illegal under sections 437, 438, and 493A of the EPA and 269(4)(j) of the MRA 
(Department of Environment and Heritage Protection 2014). 
 
Those referenced sections of the EPA and MRA also make it unlawful to authorise the 
environmental harm that would result from climate change and ocean acidification due to the 
operation of the mine. LSCC (2014) stated that it is the Land Court’s duty in assessing the 
application for the approval of the mine to consider the amount of environmental harm, 
including the environmental harm from emissions of greenhouse gases from the transport and 
use of the coal which are a direct or indirect result of the mining activity; and the environmental 
harm from climate change and ocean acidification resulting from the combined effect of the 
mining activity and other activities and factors. 
 
The mine is expected to produce 40-60 million tonnes of thermal coal per year; 0.6% of the 
carbon budget until 2050. The Australian government divides greenhouse gas emissions into 
Scope 1 & 2 emissions, GHGs that are released during the mining (i.e. from vehicles and 
various machinery used on-site), and Scope 3 emissions, GHGs that are released from the 
burning of the coal after the mining. Of the potential 4.7 billion tonnes of GHGs the Project 
will produce, approximately 98% are Scope 3 emissions, or result from the burning of the coal. 
However, Scope 3 emissions have generally been ignored by governments and mining 
companies. Adani’s EIS did not include Scope 3 emissions; only focusing on the emissions 
associated with the process of mining. Since the emissions from not only the mining and 
transportation but also the use of the coal will increase the likelihood, severity and longevity 
of climate change with significant and long term adverse impacts on the environment, LSCC 
(2014) argued that the refusal of the mine is warranted under the combined effect of Sections 
3, 14, 171, 191, 437, 438, 493A of the EPA and 269(4)(j) and (l) of the MRA (Department of 
Environment and Heritage Protection 2014).  
 
The LSCC closed with a statement on public interest, arguing the adverse impacts, risks, and 
environmental harm the mine will cause to groundwater; surface water; biodiversity; and 
climate change and ocean acidification; along with economic and social matters collectively 
outweigh the purported benefits of the mine and justify refusal on the basis that it is against 
public interest (Land Services of Coast and Country 2014). 
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The Court delivered its decision on 15 December 2015. The President of the Land Court 
recommended that the mining lease be granted. In order to grant approval for the mine under 
the Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Act, research into the connectivity across the 
Rewan Formation three months prior to commencing excavation of the first box cut was 
ordered. However, the results of the research were not required; only a research plan needed to 
be submitted (Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors [2015] 
QLC 48).  
 
The Court responded to the threatened extinction of the BTF by subjecting the approval of the 
mine to further conditions on the monitoring of the impacts on the BTF. These conditions 
include implementing offset areas for the birds into the mining plans, surveying of the BTF’s 
breeding areas, monitoring of BTF movement across the project sites, and botanical 
assessments to record habitat values. ‘If those conditions are included in the EA then I consider 
that the impact on the BTF will be lessened,’ the Land Court declared (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 
v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors 2015).  
 
The Court ruled that the contribution of the mining project on climate change cannot be made; 
Scope 3 emissions are not relevant as the mine is exporting the coal overseas. The EPA granted 
the environmental authority for the mine on 2 February 2016. The mining lease was granted 
on 3 April 2016. 
 
Land Services of Coast and Country Inc v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and 
Heritage Protection and Anor [2016]QSC 272: judicial review of environmental authority 
 
LSCC appealed to the Supreme Court of Queensland. On 26 April 2016, an application for 
judicial review of the grant of environmental authority for the mine under the EPA was filed. 
Section 5 of the EPA states that there is an obligation to exercise a power under the Act in order 
to best achieve the object of the Act: ecologically sustainable development.  
 
The following principles are principles of ecologically sustainable development, according to 
Section 3A of the EPA (1994): 
 
(a)    decision making processes should effectively integrate both long term and 
short term economic, environmental, social and equitable considerations; 
(b)    if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to 
prevent environmental degradation; 
(c)    the principle of inter generational equity – that the present generation should 
ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment is maintained 
or enhanced for the benefit of future generations; 
(d)    the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration in decision making; 
(e)    improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms should be promoted.  
 
The application for judicial review was originally based on the failure of the law to consider 
these sections of the EPA. However, when the Manager in the Environmental Services and 
Regulation Division of the Department of Environment and Heritage Protection stated that she 
was aware of Sections 3 and 5 at the time of her decision, the LSCC sought to append its 
application on the basis that the Manager had not acted in a way that fulfils her obligation to 
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section 5 of the EPA. This application was heard in the Supreme Court in Brisbane on 5 August 
2015. It was dismissed on 25 October 2016. 
 
Legal Objections by the Wangan and Jagalingou People  
 
Part of the land on which the Adani Group plans to build and operate the Carmichael Mine 
belongs to the Wangan and Jagalingou People. The Wangan and Jagalingou People applied for 
their native title for the area in central Queensland in 2004. Their claim had been registered by 
the National Native Title Tribunal (NNTT) but a decision had not been made. Registration, 
however, allowed them the right to negotiate government decisions that affect their native title 
interests under the ‘Future Acts’ section of the Native Title Act of 1993 (NTA). The Future Acts 
specifically references the grant of a mining tenement as an example of a future act (NNTT 
2016a).  
 
Adani had proposed to negotiate an Indigenous Land Use Agreement (ILUA), an agreement 
between native title groups and others concerning the use of land and waters (which can be 
regarding areas where the native title has not yet been determined), with the Wangan and 
Jagalingou People for the granting of the mining lease (NNTT 2016b). When the Wangan and 
Jagalingou People rejected the ILUA, Adani applied to the NNTT for a decision on the granting 
of the mining lease under the NTA. In 2013, the NNTT decided that it has jurisdiction in 
matters of an inquiry into a future act determination application (Adani Mining Pty Ltd/ Jessie 
Diver & Ors on behalf of the Wangan and Jagalingou People/ State of Queensland [2013] 
NNTTA 30). On 8 April 2015, the NNTT decided that the mine could proceed under the Futures 
Act section of the NTA (Adani Mining Pty Ltd and Another v Adrian Burragubba, Patrick 
Malone and Irene White on behalf of the Wangan and Jagalingou People [2015] NNTTA 16).  
 
On April 16, 2016, a group of the traditional owners met with representatives of Adani Group. 
The outcome of this meeting, according to Adani, was that a majority of the 12-person native 
title applicant group voted to authorize an ILUA for the construction of the mine (The 
Australian 2016). It was later revealed through an investigation by Guardian Australia that the 
seven representatives of the Wangan and Jagalingou People who attended this meeting were 
pocketed ‘sitting fees’ of at least $10,500 and were offered $550,000 to authorize the ILUA 
(Robertson 2016b). An Adani spokesperson rejected these allegations. The seven 
representatives would not release any information regarding the meeting but, according to 
Barrister Dan O’Gorman, since those people had negotiated with Adani Group on behalf of the 
larger group of native title claimers, the larger group is entitled to know ‘whether any 
inducements were offered to these people to come at the recommendation that they’re 
providing’ (Robertson 2016b).  
 
Both the Queensland government and Adani have interests in the seeing the authorization of 
the ILUA by the traditional land owners. Without the ILUA, the land would have to be forcibly 
taken by the government for Adani’s mining leases. An authorization would also make it easier 
for Adani to approach banks to finance the Carmichael Project. Most major banks support 
equator principles, which allow for the backing of resource projects as long as the project has 
received traditional owner consent (Robertson 2016b). 
 
Adrian Burragubba, representing the Wangan and Jagalingou People, appealed the NNTT’s 
determination to the Federal Court on the grounds that they did not consider the Wangan and 
Jagalingou families’ submission of court documents claiming that Adani acted in bad faith by 
overestimating the economic benefits of the Carmichael mine. Burragabba stated: 
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The native title system isn’t what people think it is. There’s inherent bias in the 
system where companies know if they get a “no” they can go to the tribunal and 
are virtually guaranteed to get their mining lease. Hopefully this case will ventilate 
the issues around free prior and informed consent and the native title system 
(Milman 2015).  
 
The Federal Court dismissed the application on August 2016 (Burragubba v State of 
Queensland [2016] FCA 984). Justice John Reeves concluded that the tribunal did not fail to 
exercise its jurisdiction (Kos 2016). Burragabba said that the Wangan and Jagalingou People 
would continue to fight the mine, lodging an appeal to the full bench of the Federal Court in 
the beginning of September 2016. The appeal challenged the decision by Justice Reeves, 
arguing that he should have found Adani ‘misled’ the NNTT on matters of jobs and economic 
benefits created by the mine. The case was heard on 2 November 2016 (Robertson 2016c). The 
appeal of the Federal Court’s decision was dismissed by the Full Federal Court on 25 August 
2017 (Burragubba v State of Queensland [2017] FCAFC 133). 
 
The Wangan and Jagalingou People also applied for judicial review of the grant of the mining 
lease under the MRA based on native title grounds in the Supreme Court of Queensland. This 
application was dismissed on 25 November 2016 (Burragubba & Anor v Minister for Natural 
Resources and Mines & Anor [2016] QSC 273). A subsequent appeal in the Queensland Court 
of Appeal was also dismissed, on 22 August 2017 (Burraguba v Minister for Natural Resources 
and Mines [2017] QCA 179). 
 
In 2018, the Burragubba and four other Wangan and Jagalingou leaders brought a case to the 
Federal Court to ask for relief from personal and collective liability to the legal costs of their 
losing cases (Kemppi v Adani Mining Pty Ltd (No 5) [2018] FCA 2104 (QUD 197 of 2017)). 
The ruling, issued on 21 December 2018, found that the applicants were required to pay legal 
costs. Eight days later, Adani presented the court with a petition seeking payment of 
$637,960.32 in legal costs accumulated in defending the Wangan and Jagalingou People’s 
failed cases (Stevens 2019). 
 
Litigation against Abbot Point 
 
Four cases have been brought against the expansion of the Abbot Point Coal Terminal. 
Expanding the port is a necessary component of the Project, as it would allow the export of the 
large increase in coal production associated with the Carmichael Mine.  
 
The first case (North Queensland Conservation Council v Minister for the Environment & Ors 
[AAT2014/1043]) was filed on 27 February 2014 in the Administrative Appeals Tribunal 
(AAT) by the North Queensland Conservation Council (NQCC), represented by the 
Environmental Defenders Office Queensland (EDO QLD). The case challenged a permit that 
was granted to North Queensland Bulk Ports Corporation (NQBP) under the Great Barrier 
Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) for dredge spoil disposal in the Great Barrier Reef Marine 
Park.  
 
In particular, NQCC contends the decision is inconsistent with the London Protocol, an 
international agreement which includes the obligation to prevent, reduce and where practicable 
eliminate pollution caused by sea dumping. It also establishes an assessment regime for sea 
dumping permit applications (EDO QLD 2014). 
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The hearing did not proceed. On 26 June 2015 the AAT ordered the cancellation of the permit 
by consent of the parties because on 2 June 2015, regulation 88RA of the Great Barrier Reef 
Marine Park Regulations 1983 was placed into effect, banning the dumping of capital dredge 
spoil in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. This made NQBP’s sea dumping permit redundant, 
thus closing the case (EDO QLD 2014). 
 
The second case was brought on 24 March 2014 by the Mackay Conservation Group, 
represented by EDO QLD, in the Federal Court of Australia in Queensland (Mackay 
Conservation Group v Minister for the Environment [QUD118/2014]). The environmental 
group sought judicial review of the EPBC Act for approval of dredging and disposal of the 
dredge spoil in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park. On 4 November 2015 the case was 
dismissed, for the same reason as the NQCC case (EDO QLD 2015a). 
 
The third case was heard in early 2015 to the Federal Court by the Alliance to Save 
Hinchinbrook (ASH) conservation group. As a judicial review case, the group challenged the 
decision under the EPBC Act to fast-track the assessment of a proposal for the dredge spoil 
disposal in the Caley Valley Wetlands. ASH, also represented by EDO QLD, alleged errors of 
law in Minister Hunt’s decision to allow assessment by preliminary documents rather than via 
a more thorough process, and in allowing a shorter public consultation period (EDO QLD 
2015b). The Queensland Government withdrew its application for this proposal on 12 March 
2015, ending the case, after the Queensland Government officially announced its plan not to 
dump dredge spoil on the Caley Valley wetlands (EDO QLD 2015b). 
 
The fourth case, brought by the Whitsunday Residents Against Dumping conservation group 
in the Queensland Supreme Court on 7 October 2016 challenged the legality of the Queensland 
Government’s decision to approve an environmental authority under the EPA for the Abbot 
Point coal terminal expansion. The application was dismissed on 15 June 2017 (Whitsunday 
Residents Against Dumping Ltd v Chief Executive, Department of Environment and Heritage 
Protection & Anor [2017] QSC 121). 
 
In mid-2018, it was revealed that Adani and the Queensland Government sought to hide details 
about the pollution of coal-laden water into the Great Barrier Reef at Abbot Point (Slezak 
2018). Documents uncovered using freedom of information laws showed that Adani applied 
for an extension to its temporary pollution licence ahead of Cyclone Debbie in 2017. In 
communication with the Queensland Environmental Department, Adani revealed the water it 
would spill contained 900mg of coal per litre, despite applying for a licence to spill water with 
100mg per litre (Slezak 2018). Facing pressure from environmental protesters, who argued the 
Queensland Government was notified of the extreme pollution and allowed it to occur anyway, 
the Queensland Government decided to prosecute Adani for the breach of its pollution licence 
and issued a $12,000 fine (Swanston 2017). Adani appealed this fine, ‘categorically refuting’ 
any wrongdoing and submitted a report regarding the nature of the spill (Ludlow 2018). 
Reporters for the Guardian (Remeikis and Slezak 2018) wrote an article regarding this 
investigation: 
 
It’s believed [Department of Environment] officers noticed a difference between 
documents provided by Adani through its Abbot Point Bulkcoal operation and 
those obtained directly from the laboratory responsible for testing the level of coal 
contamination in discharge water…. the original report found worse pollution than 
had earlier been alleged. 
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Adani could face fines up to $2.7 million if found guilty of breaching its licence (Horn 2018). 
 
Funding the Carmichael Project  
 
On 3 April 2016, Minister for Natural Resources and Mines Anthony Lynham approved three 
Adani mining leases: 70441 Carmichael, 70505 Carmichael East, and 70506 Carmichael North. 
The leases are worth $21.7 billion and are estimated to contain 11 billion tons of thermal coal 
(Mitchell-Whittington 2016). A representative for Adani stated that the approval grants the 
company certainty as it seeks to move on to the next phase of the project (Mitchell-Whittington, 
2016). Both the government and Adani Group stressed the strict nature of the 200 conditions 
attached to the mining lease. Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk said that these 
imposed conditions would continue to protect the environment, traditional owners’ interests 
and the Great Barrier Reef. Following the approval of the mining leases, Adani Group stated 
that it aims to start work in 2017 (ABC 2016). However, Adani has had difficulty in securing 
funding for the Carmichael Project. The timeline surrounding applications, approvals, and 
rejections for funding the Project involves members of the Australian Government, Adani 




In September 2015, before the mining leases for the Carmichael Project were approved, 
National Australia Bank (NAB) ruled out lending to the Carmichael Project. Cameron Clyne, 
the former NAB chief executive stated that the bank’s ruling out involvement with the Project 
seemed “proper” and “prudent” for shareholders. December 2016, Australia New Zealand 
Banking Group (ANZ) joined NAM in ruling out financing the Adani Carmichael Project, 
citing its 2016 corporate sustainability review, which addressed the need to move away from 
coal. Shayne Elliott, ANZ’s chief executive, claimed:  
 
Our customers mining for coal, oil and gas, as well as those in coal-fired electricity 
generation, and related industries, are increasingly exposed and may experience 
transition risk as a result of decreasing demand for fossil fuels and increasing 
demand for clean energy. We encourage customers in these sectors to plan for, and 
start making, the necessary changes for climate adaptation (Hunt 2016).  
 
Then in April 2017 Westpac, Australia’s second-largest bank, also decided against funding 
Adani’s Carmichael Project. At the same time, the bank released its new climate policy that 
limits its lending for new thermal coal projects to ‘only existing coal producing basins’ and 
increased its lending target for ‘climate change solutions’ from $6.3bn to $10bn by 2020 and 
$25bn by 2030. Westpac CEO Brian Hartzer stated: 
 
Westpac recognises that climate change is an economic issue as well as an 
environmental issue, and banks have an important role to play in assisting the 
Australian economy to transition to a net zero emissions economy,” Hartzer said. 
“Limiting global warming will require a collaborative effort as we transition to 
lower-emissions sectors, while also taking steps to help the economy and our 
communities become more resilient (Robertson 2017a).  
 
The bank cited ‘community pressure’ as indication that people want to stop the ‘climate disaster 
in its tracks and that Adani and our government ignore them at their peril’ (Robertson 2017a). 
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An Adani spokesman said that the company would not abandon the Project despite Australian 
banks’ withdrawal, claiming that the financial houses have instead chosen to ‘bow to 
environmental activists’ (Robertson 2017a). 
 
The last bank to withdraw its support from the Carmichael Project was the Commonwealth 
Bank. While Commonwealth Bank had previously ended its role as a financial advisor of the 
Project, it was not until August 2017 that the bank affirmed it would also not be financing it 
(Slezak 2017b). The bank’s decision meant that Adani’s Project would not be funded by any 
of Australia’s big four banks. The Chief Executive of 350.org Australia, Blair Palese, stated 
that Commonwealth Bank’s decision was ‘a huge win for the two and a half years 
campaigning…[with] thousands of protests at Commbank branches around the country” 
(Slezak 2017b). A spokesman for Adani claimed that Adani had never approached Westpac, 
Commonwealth, ANZ or NAB and that financing arrangements ‘have been and continue to be, 
with international financial institutions’ (Slezak 2017b). 
 
In October 2017, two months after the big four banks decided not to finance the Carmichael 
Project, Frances Adamson, the secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
claimed that Adani may have requested that the Australian government send a formal letter to 
the National Development and Reform Commission in China to confirm that the Carmichael 
Project has passed all of Australia’s necessary environmental approvals, in order to help Adani 
secure funding from the Chinese government (Hutchens, 2017). This letter was alleged by 
Adamson to have been signed by Steve Ciobo, the minister for trade, and Barnaby Joyce, the 
deputy prime minister. Attorney general George Brandis said he did not know whether the 
letter was sent at Adani’s request but that the government sent the letter in order to dismiss the 
‘misinformation campaign of those from the radical left’ (Hutchens 2017). Adamson told 
Senate:  
 
My interpretation of what would have happened is the Adani company will have 
themselves been assessing how they can fund the project [and] in the course of that 
assessment they’ve looked at a range of different sources and I think what they did 
was request a statement of fact…where the project is up to, and a statement of 
endorsement, or support… from the Australian government which the Australian 
government, given its support for the project, ministers were happy to provide 
(Hutchens 2017). 
 
In January 2017, the China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) released a public 
statement announcing its president had met with Adani representatives and Australian mining 
construction company Downer EDI. CMEC’s involvement as a contractor and financier of the 
Carmichael Project would allow the Project to attain funding from the state-owned China 
Construction Bank and Export-Import Bank of China (Slezak 2017c). However, according to 
Tim Buckley from the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, if these banks 
were to get involved, the loans would ‘almost certainly’ have requirements for jobs to be 




At the end of 2016, the Courier Mail reported the rail connecting the Carmichael Mine and the 
coastal point of Abbot Point was ‘one step closer to being funded by the Federal Government’ 
through the Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF), which has given the $2.2 billion 
project ‘conditional approval’ (Viellaris 2016).  
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The NAIF was created by Senator Matt Canavan – a vocal Adani supporter – in 2016. 
According to the Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, the NAIF is 
supported by the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (EFIC), Australia’s export credit 
agency and designed to provide up to $5 billion over five years in concessional finance for 
infrastructure projects in the northern states and Northern Territory (Northern Australia 
Infrastructure Facility 2018.; Gogarty 2017).  
 
The NAIF Board has so far only offered three small-scale Financing Mechanisms to projects 
in northern Australia: In September 2017 the NAIF Board offered the Onslow Marine Support 
Base in Western Australia up to $16.8m to ‘provide supply and support services for onshore 
and offshore businesses such as logistics, fuel suppliers, waste management, and construction 
and maintenance companies in the Carnarvon Basin (NAIF 2018). In May 2018, the NAIF 
Board offered Humpty Doo Barramundi Pty Ltd up to $7.18m for the company’s first stage of 
expansion of its barramundi farm in the Northern Territory, including the building of a solar 
farm, medium fish nursery, and processing equipment (NAIF 2018). Most recently, in June 
2018, the NAIF Board granted Genex Power $516m in concessional finance for its solar and 
pumped hydro storage project in the former Kidston gold mine in north Queensland (Parkinson 
2018). 
 
Using taxpayer funds to support a foreign-owned coal company’s mining project became a 
major target of environmental campaigns during the Queensland election in November 2017. 
It was found that Shaun Drabsch, Queensland Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s partner, 
worked on Adani’s application to NAIF with his employer, PricewaterhouseCoopers (Gregory 
2017). Further conflicts of interest involving NAIF were uncovered by Environmental Justice 
Australia. Two board members have connections to mining companies that would benefit from 
the approval of the Adani mine: Annabelle Chaplain was a board member of EFIC and also a 
director of Downer EDI, which had a $2 billion commercial agreement with Adani for the 
drilling, blasting, and coal haulage at the Carmichael Mine. Karla Way-McPhail was a NAIF 
board member and chief executive of two companies that are involved with the mining 
industry; Undamine Industries, which hires out labour and machinery for mining operations, 
and Coal Train Australia, a mining company based in central Queensland. (Willacy and 
Blucher 2017) EFIC and NAIF both released statements that said its directors are aware of their 
obligations regarding disclosure of conflicts of interest but did not comment on whether or not 
Chaplain or Way-McPhail would recuse themselves from decisions regarding Adani. NAIF 
rejected ABC’s Freedom of Information request for the dates and locations of its board 
meetings, with the chief executive claiming that the release of this information would adversely 
affect NAIF’s operations by creating media attention and protest activity (Willacy and Blucher 
2017). EFIC board secretary, John Hopkins, stated that no EFIC directors had any need to 
recuse themselves from EFIC’s discussions concerning NAIF since the EFIC Board “was not 
required to have, nor does it have, any actual knowledge of the projects NAIF is considering” 
(Robertson 2017c). Hopkins’ claim that EFIC is a “service provider,” not the “decision maker” 
on “specific transactions” made by the NAIF board (Robertson 2017c). 
 
Palaszczuk, who had previously supported the Carmichael Project, promised to veto a NAIF 
loan to Adani after facing increasing pressures during the November 2017 election campaign. 
She claimed that she wanted to continue her government’s legacy of having ‘no role to date in 
the federal government’s NAIF Loan Assessment Process for Adani’ and no ‘role in the future’ 
(Gogarty 2017).  
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In order to actively stop NAIF from funding the Carmichael Project, Palaszczuk would need to 
write a formal statement to NAIF refusing the loan – not a letter to the Prime Minister, as 
Palaszczuk claimed. Yet a “Master Facility Agreement” that has been set up between 
Queensland and NAIF allows the treasurer of Queensland to pass the money to Adani without 
the money going into the state’s bank accounts.  This agreement suggests that while Palaszczuk 
can say that her government will not assist Adani, the Queensland opposition must also agree 
to a veto because Palaszczuk cannot actively block the loan herself (Gogarty 2017). 
 
Following Queensland election and Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk’s veto of the NAIF loan 
for Adani and facing pressure from environmental campaigns, Downer EDI and Adani 
cancelled their contract (Robertson, 2017b). This split has threatened Adani’s operation, as 
Downer EDI was one of two mine contractors considered capable of handling an operation of 
the Carmichael Project’s scale.  At the same time, the Chinese embassy stated that Adani’s 
Carmichael Project would not be funded by Chinese banks. Julien Vincent, from the financial 
activist group Market Forces suggested that the Project could have run out of ‘credible options 
for funding’ (Slezak 2017d). Without being able to start the Carmichael Mine, Adani’s Abbot 
Point coal terminal was also threatened. The terminal was not being fully utilised and needed 
the coal from the Carmichael mine to maintain its viability. 
 
After the Premier of Queensland’s veto and the split from Downer, Adani said it decided to 
‘develop and operate the mine on an owner operator basis’ (Robertson 2017b). Ben Pennings, 
spokesman for the Galilee Blockade, an environmental organisation that seeks to stop the 
mining of the Galilee Basin, stated that Downer’s departure marked the biggest ‘nail in the 
coffin’ for the Carmichael Project yet. Pennings claimed investors are becoming aware of the 
scale of Adani’s project, which would take years and poses significant risks for investors 
(Robertson, 2017b). Minister for Northern Australia, Matthew Canavan, who is responsible for 
the legislation, supports the Carmichael Project and had influence over the White Paper that 
detailed the terms of eligibility for NAIF loans, had ‘looked into the NAIF legislation to see 
whether there was a way to pay a loan to Adani without state government support but the veto 




In November 2018, Adani Australia’s mining chief, Lucas Dow, stated that it could finance a 
‘smaller open-cut mine comparable in size to many other Queensland coalmines’ itself (Smee 
2018a). This ‘scaled down’ version of the mine would produce 27 million tonnes of coal per 
year, instead of the 60 million in the original plans and only require an investment of $2 billion 
(Hepburn 2018). 
 
Despite this announcement, construction cannot legally begin until the groundwater-dependent 
ecosystem management plan (GDEMP), involving identifying the source of the Doongmabulla 
Springs, is approved by the Queensland Government and the federal Department of 
Environment and Energy (which will receive independent scientific review from CSIRO and 
Geoscience Australia) (Smee 2018a). Adani also needs to obtain approval for the management 
plan for the black-throated finch before it is allowed to commence work on the Carmichael 
Mine as well as negotiate access to the rail network needed to transport the coal from the mine 
to Abbot Point. The railway also requires upgrades, and, at the time of Adani’s announcement, 
it remains unclear who will pay for the its construction.  Lastly, Adani has not signed a royalties 
package with the Queensland Government. Smee (2018a) writes, ‘questions remain about 
whether Adani can meet the terms of state government’s royalties framework that would allow 
	 65 
such a deal…which analysts estimate would be worth $315m to the company in deferred 
payments’. These unresolved issues suggest that Adani’s building of the Carmichael Mine will 




If Adani’s Carmichael Project were a country, it would be the seventh largest polluter in the 
world. Yet the Carmichael Project has been able to receive multiple approvals from the 
Queensland and Australian federal governments regardless of the impacts it will have on land, 
water, biodiversity, and climate change. Adani’s history of corner-cutting, environmental 
destruction, and non-compliance of environmental legislation has not stopped the company 
from being deemed an unsuitable operator in Queensland and Australia.  
 
This chapter has summarised the major timelines surrounding the Carmichael Project, 
including the history of Adani; the company’s purchase of the Galilee Basin coal reserves and 
proposals for the Project; the legal cases that have attempted to stop Adani; and the history of 
environmental and social harms that have resulted from the company’s various activities 
around the globe. The next chapter discusses ‘what’s at stake’, or the harms to land, water, air 
and the ecosystem of the Great Barrier Reef that would result from the operation of the 











“Of note is the consistent use of the preface ‘illegal’ in the listed activities constituting 
environmental crime, a preface not regularly employed when describing other categories of 
crime” (Bricknell 2010: 4). 
 
 
“[T]hroughout the approval process and design of operating conditions, large uncertainties 
remained unresolved regarding the conceptual hydrogeological model and numerical model 
for the mine” (Currell et al. 2017: 675). 
 
 
“All emissions from the burning of product coal from this Mine will have a climate impact in 
the physical cause-effect sense” (Taylor and Meinshausen  2014).  
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Introduction 
   
The Carmichael Project has been awarded approvals by the Queensland and federal 
governments at a time when 71% of the population agree that Australia should be the world 
leader in climate change action (World Wildlife Foundation Australia 2018: 7). Scientists have 
been able to map and predict the environmental damage, including the contribution to climate 
change, that the Carmichael Mine and Rail Project would cause if it is allowed to operate 
according to Adani and the governments’ plans. The native owners of the land, the Wangan 
and Jagalingou People, have also voiced their concerns about the Project’s environmental – 
and social – harms. This chapter presents a summary of the Carmichael Project’s harms. 
Through a green criminological perspective, ‘issues relating to the environment (in the widest 
sense possible) and social harm (as defined in ecological as well as strictly legal terms)’ are 
focused on, ‘extending the definition of environmental harm to those actions which degrade 
the environment but are not legally defined as criminal’ (White and Heckenberg 2014: 1). 
 
Since ‘ecocide’ can be understood as ‘the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of 
ecosystem(s) of a given territory to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants 
of that territory has been or will be severely diminished,’ corporations and states whose actions 
cause such damage can be found to have committed an act of ecocide (Higgins 2010). 
Beginning with a theorisation of environmental harm this chapter will demonstrate that the 
building and operating of the Carmichael Project as per the request of the Adani Corporation 
(and as approved by the Queensland and Federal governments), will have potentially ecocidal 
impacts on land, water, air, climate change, and the specific ecosystem of the Great Barrier 
Reef.  
 
All of the harms described have been identified and substantiated by independent committees 
and published in reports. Some of the harms have even been confirmed by Adani. This chapter 
details what is at stake, for our climate, local Australians, and the global community with the 
approval of the Carmichael Project. The seriousness of these harms, along with the deliberate 
denial of them (which will be discussed in the upcoming two chapters) forms the basis for the 
argument that state’s approval of the mine can be understood as a potential conspiracy to 
commit the crime of ecocide. 
 
Conceptualising Environmental Harm  
 
According to White (2014a), environmental harm can be conceptualised through a legal, 
ecological, or eco-justice perspective. Legal conceptions of environmental harm are informed 
by laws and rules at the local, state, federal, and international levels. Environmental activities 
(from illegal waste disposal to environmental protests) perpetrated by corporations, states, 
activists, and private citizens are labelled as either ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ based on the legislation 
of a jurisdiction. Bricknell (2010:4) articulates a contradiction in legal conceptions of 
environmental harm: 
 
Of note is the consistent use of the preface ‘illegal’ in the listed activities 
constituting environmental crime, a preface not regularly employed when 
describing other categories of crime. This reflects the fact that some component or 
level of these activities is still condoned and that it only becomes illegal once a set 
boundary has been passed. The tipping point of illegality contrasts environmental 
crimes with other established criminal offences. 
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The ‘wrongdoing’ studied within green criminology is thus initially informed by legal 
conceptions and constructions of crime and harm and later moves to a broader view of 
environmental harm (White and Heckenberg 2014). For this study, Australia’s legislation on 
subjects such as mining permits, land use agreements, carbon emissions, endangered species, 
sustainable development, and corporations are analysed to identify the way in which the state 
divides environmental activities into ‘legal’ or ‘illegal’ categories. As Sutherland (1949) 
observed, research of the crimes of the powerful is difficult without a willingness to move 
beyond legal definitions of crime. Studying a resource extraction project as a potentially 
criminal activity – the crime being ecocide – requires a broader view of crime than the one that 
is currently prescribed by the state. While coal mining is not inherently illegal according to the 
laws of Australia, the proposals for the Carmichael Project’s involve allowing certain 
environmental harms that would affect the land, atmosphere, and water at a local and global 
level. These harms include: 
 
• The selling of Indigenous lands for the mining permit without the approval of the Native 
People of the land; 
• The reallocation of fertile cropping lands for mining, ending the possibility for future 
farming on the land; 
• Unlimited access to underground water reserves of which the local ecosystems rely; 
• Harm to the local farmers who rely on this water and cropland for their livelihood; 
• Harm to the species who live on the Carmichael Project’s site, including endangered 
and vulnerable; 
• Contributing to the increase in atmospheric CO2, which results in climate change; 
• Harm to the Great Barrier Reef caused by the rise in global temperature and ocean 
acidification;  
• Harm to the Great Barrier Reef from the shipping vessels used to transport coal to India 
and dredge spoil from the mining and transportation process;  
• Harms to the world’s poor and those living in impoverished nations who are most 
immediately affected by climate change; and 
• Harm to future generations as a result of global warming affecting the security of food 
and other conditions that allow for a peaceful enjoyment of life. 
 
This list is not exhaustive, but it exemplifies how the harms caused by the Carmichael Project 
affect both human and non-human victims, both immediately and long-term. For these reasons, 
this thesis considers the harm resulting from a ‘technically legal according to the law’ project. 
Ecological conceptions of harm are informed by the interrelationship and connectivity between 
species and the environment, using the concept of ecological sustainability to divide activities 
into nonthreatening or destructive (White 2008). Ecological conceptions of harm move beyond 
legally informed harms but it is the eco-justice perspective, which conceptualises harm as 
informed by notions of egalitarian rights for human and non-human species and the 
environment, that is utilised in this study (White 2008). The eco-justice approach to harm is 
described by Heckenberg as (2009: 13): 
 
an approach to the conceptualisation of harm within green criminology that refers 
to the distribution of environments among peoples in terms of access to and use of 
specific natural resources in defined geographical areas and the impacts of 
particular social practices and environmental hazards on specific populations (e.g. 
as defined on the basis of class, occupation, gender, age, ethnicity). The concern is 
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with human [and non-human] health and wellbeing and how these are affected by 
particular types of production and consumption. 
 
Environmental harms can be categorised in terms of ‘green’, ‘brown’ and ‘white’ types of 
crime (White 2008; White and Heckenberg 2014). ‘Green’ issues have to do with conservation 
of wilderness such as habitat destruction; depletion of the ozone layer; and water pollution. 
‘Brown’ issues relate to urban life and pollution such as air pollution; oil spills, or disposal of 
hazardous waste. ‘White’ issues refer to the impact of science and new technologies such as 
genetically modified organisms and animal testing and experimentation. Environmental harms 
can also be classified according to the four elements, as air crimes, water crimes, land crimes 
and energy crimes.  
 
Environmental harms can also be conceptualised according to their locale (White 2011). 
Environmental harms commonly occur at the local level. For example, it has been discovered 
that most residents of Flint, Michigan in the United States have been living without access to 
safe and clean drinking water. Harms can also occur at a national level when specific states 
dealing with particular environmental problems. An example of a national environmental harm 
was the ecological impact of the oil tar-sands projects in Alberta, Canada. Of course, 
environmental harms can also be region-specific, as evidenced by the logging of the Amazon 
rainforest, which spans multiple countries. Lastly, environmental harm can be global or 
transnational. Global warming is perhaps the most prominent example of an environmental 
disaster that does not adhere to borders (although it affects some spaces earlier and more 
drastically than others). Critical criminology arises from the understanding that what happens 
on a local level is important to and has effect on what happens on the other side of the planet. 
 
Most environmental harm is intrinsically transnational since it is mobile and transferable by 
nature, as exemplified by air pollution. Transnational environmental crime includes 
unauthorised acts or omissions that are against the law and therefore subject to criminal 
prosecution and sanctions; crimes that involve some kind of cross-border transference and an 
international dimension; and crimes related to pollution (e.g. of air, water and land) and crimes 
against wildlife (e.g. illegal wildlife trade) (White 2011). National and international laws 
relating to the environment focus on these areas. For example, Interpol has working groups on 
fisheries crime, forestry crime, pollution crime and wildlife crime (White 2011).  
 
Harms to Land 
 
Ahead of the G7 meeting in Italy in 2017, NATO lawmakers warned that climate change will 
worsen the long-term prospects for food and water security around the globe (UN 2017). The 
report states that while the global demand for renewable water supply and land for agriculture 
will increase, climate change will create hotter, drier conditions that will disproportionately 
affect the Middle East and North Africa’s food and water supply, consequentially contributing 
to the refugee crisis as people move from regions that will no longer be able to support life. 
The warning also emphasises the importance of governing land for agricultural use. 
 
According to the Department of Agriculture and Resources, Queensland’s land is primarily 
used for grazing and cropping; less than 5% of land in Queensland is in national park; and less 
than 7% is in any type of conservation reserve (The Australian Government 2017b). These 
figures put Queensland’s national park coverage to the bottom 30% of countries globally 
(Hockings et al. 2013).  
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Queensland has the largest area of agricultural land of any Australian state and the highest 
proportion of land area dedicated to agriculture – 152 million hectares or 88.4% of the total 
land area (The State of Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 2018). In 2015-
2016 this land supported approximately 24,200 farm businesses (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics 2017a). Besides the large-scale food production that takes place on Queensland’s 
agricultural land, the agricultural sector has also contributed through the employment of 
approximately 53,000 people in 2017 (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2017b) and contributed 
an estimated $20 billion to the Queensland economy (The State of Queensland Department of 
Agriculture and Fisheries 2017). Queensland’s population of nearly 5 million people – less 
than 0.1% of the world’s population – produces 0.4% of the world’s food supply and nearly 
1% of the world’s agricultural exports, from 1% of the world’s total land area (The State of 
Queensland Department of Agriculture and Fisheries 2018).  
 
However, the land currently used for the agricultural sector is threatened by a growing demand 
for non-agricultural land use. Between 2009 and 2014, for example, 120 Mining Lease 
applications were lodged, spanning an area of about 600,000 hectares of agricultural land (Lock 
the Gate Alliance 2014). The mining activities and rail infrastructure of the Carmichael Project 
specifically threatens the Galilee Basin State Development Area (GBDSA), a section of fertile 
cropping land in Queensland. 
 
The governing of Queensland’s crop land  
 
The Galilee Basin State Development Area (GBSDA) extends over 2 million hectares of land 
that is considered “Good Quality Agricultural Land” (GQAL). The State of Queensland defines 
GQAL as land that is “capable of sustainable use for agriculture, with a reasonable level of 
inputs, and without causing degradation of land or other natural resources”. This land is crucial 
for the production of food and sustainable for long-term use. These 2 million hectares of GQAL 
include 400,000 hectares of Class A crop land, defined as “land that is suitable for current and 
potential crops with limitations to production which range from none to moderate levels”; Class 
B limited crop land, “land that is marginal for current and potential crops due to severe 
limitations; and suitable for pastures”; and almost 60,000 hectares of potential Strategic 
Cropping Land (SCL), “a finite resource that must be conserved and managed for the longer 
term” (Fensham et al. 2010: 1). Figure 4.1 depicts the GBDSA’s location in relation to the 




Figure 4.1 The Galilee Basin State Development Area and coal mines 
 
(Lock the Gate Alliance 2014) 
 
 
The Queensland Government classifies its land according to its suitability for agricultural 
production to allow for the planning of its use and to protect it from developments that would 
result in its diminished productivity. GQAL has been “considered” in planning approvals for 
industrial activities since 1992, according to the government (The State of Queensland 2018), 
but protective legislation was not established until 2011. 
 
The Queensland Government’s Strategic Cropping Land Act (2011) was passed with the aim 
of protecting land SCL by managing the impacts of development on the land in order to 
preserve the productive capacity of that land for future generations. The Act was the first to 
identify and map potential SCL and protection and management areas and develop criteria for 
determining whether or not land could be considered SCL. In order to be considered SCL, an 
area’s history of cropping is considered and its soil moisture; depth; acidity; slope and 
rockiness are tested. The Act also created a process to access development; allowed for 
conditions to be imposed on development plans in order to prevent permanent impacts on SLC 
in protection areas; and required mitigation to be paid by developers if SCL is permanently 
impacted in a protection (Lock the Gate Alliance 2014).  
 
Although the Strategic Cropping Land Act 2011 worked to protect the degradation of 
agricultural land, it was repealed on 20 March 2014 by the passing of the Regional Planning 
Interests Act 2014. Under the new Act, Queensland’s sole classified land became “Priority 
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Agricultural Areas,” defined as “an area used for a priority agricultural land use” (Lock the 
Gate Alliance 2014). All previously classified SLC became preserved as “regional interests” 
under Section 7 (c) of the Act.  
 
The Regional Planning Interests Act 2014 contains provisions that pertain to coal mining (and 
therefore the Carmichael Project). First, the Act does not prohibit coal mining or gas extraction 
in Priority Agricultural Areas, within 2km of residential areas, or within critical water 
resources. The Act also does not have agricultural impact assessments as a requirement for a 
Regional Planning Interest Authority, which would permit industrial activities such as coal 
mining if they are considered “regional interests”. While Priority Agricultural Areas are 
identified in new regional plans, the Galilee Basin State Development Area does not have any 
in its entire region because the current regional plan pre-dates the Act’s terminology (The State 
of Queensland Department of State Development, Infrastructure and Planning 2012). 
 
In addition to the Regional Planning Interests Act 2014, on 7 November 2013, Queensland 
Premier Campbell Newman announced the Galilee Basin Development Strategy (‘The 
Strategy’) that threatens the GBDSA’s strategic cropping land. The Strategy included the 
following proposal: 
 
Under Section 14 of the draft GBSDA Scheme, landholders and others with interest 
in land affected by the scheme must apply in writing to the Coordinator General to 
continue making use of the land. This may be granted, as long as they had approval 
to use the land in that way before the SDA comes into effect, and as long as the 
SDA scheme doesn’t state another use for the land in question. To make such an 
application, they must pay a fee, and provide documentation demonstrating that the 
use they want to make of the land was permitted prior to the SDA coming into 
effect. The Coordinator General has the power to refuse the application, with no 
right of appeal (Lock the Gate Alliance 2014). 
 
Over 60% of the GBSDA sits within SCL zones (Lock the Gate Alliance 2014). Section 14 of 
the Galilee Basin Development Strategy thus allows the Coordinator-General to compulsorily 
acquire any land in accordance with Section 82 of the State Development Public Works 
Organisation Act. The Strategy, along with the Regional Planning Interest Act, allows Adani 
to seek to coal mine in the Galilee Basin. 
 
Impacts on Queensland’s crop land and local properties 
 
Adani’s rail line, which would take coal from the Carmichael Mine in the Galilee Basin to 
Abbot Point, is one of five rail lines proposed for the GBSDA. A map of the rail proposals for 















(Lock the Gate 2014) 
 
According to Adani’s Environmental Impact Statement, “It is likely that only one of these rail 
lines will proceed” (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: 8-25). However, both the Alpha Coal Project 
Rail and the Waratah Coal Pty Ltd Galilee Coal Northern Export Facility Rail were already 
approved by the Queensland Coordinator General and the Federal Environment Minister while 
Adani’s Carmichael Rail Project was awaiting approval. Adani’s proposed rail project on the 
GBSDA would reduce the area of available agricultural land and divide the landscape in the 
region. 
 
Adani’s proposed rail line would be 189 kilometres in length and 95 kilometres in width, 
covering a total of 1795.5 hectares; passing through 21 properties; and spanning 1,334 hectares 
of GQAL (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a). Adani has admitted that fragmentation and intrusion 
of agricultural property, GQAL, and loss of SCL is an “unavoidable cumulative impact of rail 
construction” but maintained that 54% of the 1,334 hectares is Class C1 land (pasture land 
classified as suitable for improved or native pastures) (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2013a:12 and 
Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: 54). If this were the case, 46% – approximately 613 hectares – 
would have to be either Class A or B land; land suitable for cropping.   
 
Adani also argued the potential impacts on GQAL have been avoided and minimised: 
  
Where mapped strategic cropping land is unable to be avoided, the route selection 
process has considered (amongst other environmental, social, cultural, economic, 
and technical constraints), the placement of the rail corridor such that it traverses 
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around or as close as possible to, the edges of polygons to minimise fragmentation 
(Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: 56).  
 
The assessment documents, on the other hand, depict 120 kilometres of the Carmichael rail 
corridor crossing the western extent of the strategic cropping land management area in the 
western cropping zone, seizing 155 hectares of land in the Strategic Cropping Land trigger map 
(Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: iv and 47).  
 
Adani also claimed that the rail alignment would follow property boundaries along these 
smaller landholdings, in order to reduce the potential land fragmentation. Once again, the plans 
in the assessment documents for the rail show that the alignment would traverse 11 leasehold 
properties and 10 freehold properties, affecting small landholdings near Moranbah. Quarry 
developments for the rail line would further affect five predominantly grazing or pastoral 
properties (Adani Mining 2013a: 21).  
 
An assessment was undertaken on the properties containing SCL in the Carmichael rail plans. 
It was determined that only two of these properties contain SCL: Avon Downs (53.5 hectares) 
and Lambing Lagoon (19.3 hectares). Adani accepted the findings of the assessment and noted  
that the SCL Act offers alternatives to completely avoiding development on strategic cropping 
land. Measures to further avoid or minimize potential impacts, however, include developing 
and agreeing to a soil survey methodology with the Department of Natural Resources and 
Mines to determine the actual presence of strategic cropping land prior to construction. Lock 
the Gate Alliance (2014) stated that this process of assessing the land to determine the presence 
of SLC has the effect of whittling down the lands that are legally classified as SCLs until they 
no longer exist so the industrial activity can proceed.  
 
Following the SCL assessment, Adani and the Queensland Department of Natural Resources 
and Mines negotiated the mitigation fees and rehabilitation requirements necessary for 
establishing a Deed of Agreement between Adani and the Department of Agricultural, Fisheries 
and Forestry to facilitate impact mitigation. (Adani Mining 2013a: iv and 20). It was agreed 
that Adani would be able to mitigate the loss of SCL by paying a fee between $4,750 and 
$15,000 per hectare – a “financial contribution commensurate” with the area that is a “common 
and reasonable management approach to minimise potential strategic cropping land impacts” 
(Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: 57).  
 
Even though the Galilee Basin State Development Area includes over half a million hectares 
of land that is suitable for agricultural productivity, the repeal of the Strategic Cropping Land 
Act prevented Adani from having to make amendments to their rail plan in the presence of 
SCL. And, under the Galilee Basin State Development Strategy, hectares of Class A good 
quality agricultural land will be available for compulsory acquisition by the state or a private 
foreign company and the land’s use for food production would potentially be lost forever (Lock 
the Gate Alliance 2014).   
 
Under the Galilee Basin State Development Strategy, the Coordinator General is required not 
to support land use that is inconsistent with railways, once railways are approved. This 
provision has damaging effects on landholders in the GBSD area. Landholders would be 
required to submit applications for permissions to continue using the land. Cropping and animal 
husbandry are listed in the scheme as activities that “may be consistent” with the railways, yet 
farmers would have to pay a fee to apply to continue farming as long as they had approval to 
	 75 
use the land before the SDA comes into effect (Lock the Gate 2014). The Coordinator General 
also maintains the power to refuse applications with no right to appeal.  
 
This legislation (and subsequently, the approval of the Carmichael rail line) is at odds with the 
Regional Plan for the Mackay-Whitsunday-Isaac region, which does not allow for the 
alienation, loss or fragmentation of good quality agricultural land unless there is an “overriding 
need in the public interest for the proposed use, and there are not alternative locations available” 
(Lock the Gate 2014). The Carmichael rail project proposed for the GBSDA will reduce the 
availability of high quality farmland in Queensland, fragment the agricultural landscape in the 
Mackay-Whitsunday-Isaac region and operate against the interests of the farmers who have 
long relied on the land for production. The Carmichael Project also threatens Queensland’s 
land with severe flooding. 
 
Impacts from flooding 
 
Queensland’s State Planning Policy (‘SPP 2017’) defines the specific matters of state interest 
in land use planning and development. A ‘state interest’ is defined as “an interest that the 
Planning Minister considers to affect an economic or environmental interest of the state or part 
of the state and/or the interest of ensuring that the purpose of the Act is achieved” (The State 
of Queensland Department of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning 2017). One of 
these state interests is titled ‘natural hazards, risk and resilience’. According to SPP 2017, risks 
associated with natural hazards, “including the projected impacts of climate change” must be 
avoided or mitigated in order to the protect the community (State of Queensland Department 
of Infrastructure, Local Government and Planning 2017). According to the The State of 
Queensland’s Department of Natural Resources and Mines (2017: 6), one of the natural hazards 
identified is the management of flood risk: 
 
Management of flood risk is essential to limiting the impacts of flooding on the 
community in balance with maintaining the benefits of occupying the floodplain to 
society and the benefits of flooding to the environment. The goal is to have flood 
risk management that is sustainable, provides long-term benefits for the community 
and environment, and improves community resilience. Best practice promotes the 
understanding of flood behaviour so that the full range of flood risk to the 
community can be understood, effectively communicated and, where practical and 
justifiable, mitigated. It facilitates informed decisions on the management of this 
risk, and economic investment in development and infrastructure on the floodplain. 
 
The construction of Adani’s rail line in the GBSDA does not comply with the Queensland State 
Planning Policy as it has the potential to create severe flood impacts, further damaging the 
farmland it crosses over. Adani’s assessment states that the proposed rail alignment would 
cross 12 major waterways and 76 minor waterways. As most of the length of the GBSDA is 
identified as a flood-prone area, extensive crossing of the floodplains would result in an 
intensification of flood impacts. Adani admits that the construction and operation of their 
Carmichael rail project may alter overland water flow and increase flood height and duration 
(Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2013a: 77). Afflux, the rise in the water level immediately upstream of 
and due to a natural or artificial obstruction, can potentially erode soil, impacting native species 
of plants and degrading farmland and grazing land (Lock the Gate Alliance 2014). Adani notes 
that introducing any permanent drainage infrastructure that interacts with an existing waterway 
will alter the existing drainage patterns and lead to temporary changes in afflux upstream of 
the flow path: 
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[A]chieving afflux design criteria is a process that seeks to achieve a balance 
between minimising the impacts of afflux and achieving a practical and cost 
effective design. Some amount of afflux is unavoidable due to the proposed 
structures, and infrastructure assets in the floodplain such as roads and farm tracks 
will most likely be affected by any increased depth and duration of flooding (Adani 
Mining Pty Ltd 2013a: 49). 
 
Despite these impacts, the rail line was approved. Under the State Development Public Works 
Organisation Act, the policies of the SPP do not apply to Adani’s proposals. This loophole 
makes hazard reduction and assessment measures for such a large infrastructure project less 
stringent than those applied at the local government level for decisions about building sheds 
on the same floodplains (Lock the Gate Alliance 2014). 
 
Queensland has a naturally varying climate that is projected to become more extreme in the 
future, potentially affecting the frequency and severity of climate-related events such as 
flooding (Lock the Gate 2014). The GBSDA includes over half a million hectares of land that 
is prone to regular flooding. Thus, any railways built on this land requires substantial drainage 
plans to offset the flood impacts that would be exacerbated by elevated rail lines crossing the 
GBSDA’s waterways and floodplains. Although the potential impacts that the Carmichael rail 
line would have on flooding is significant and should be subject to precautionary measures, 
Adani’s rail proposal does not detail the effects that its railway infrastructure would cause by 
raising flood levels during high floods.  
 
The Queensland Government had promised a doubling of agricultural productivity and food 
production by 2040, but instead has facilitated the loss of the highest quality agricultural land 
to accommodate a powerful corporation. In order for agricultural production to be a priority 
for the Government, there needs to be a prohibition on development that sterilises land that is 
suitable for food production (Lock the Gate 2014). 
 
Rather than following Regional Plans or acting in accordance with the interests of most 
Australians, the Queensland Government has considered financial reward, operated on lax 
regulatory approval pathways, and even promises unlimited water permits for Adani’s 
development of the Galilee Basin. 
 
Harms to Water 
 
Underground coal mines rely on large quantities of water throughout their operation. In the 
excavation phase, water is used cool surfaces of mining equipment to reduce the hazard of fires 
and for equipment maintenance. In the processing stage, water is used to suppress dust and for 
coal washing. Water management is thus one of the key environmental sustainability 
challenges for the mining industry (Amezaga et al. 2011; Mudd 2008; Northey et al. 2016). 
Approximately 250 litres of freshwater are used per tonne of coal produced (Moon 2017). The 
Carmichael Mine is set to produce 40-60 million tonnes of coal, requiring approximately 
12,000 ML of groundwater (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2013a). The importance of water has led to 
an increase in conflicts regarding water resources and impacts from mining around the world 
(Kemp et al. 2010; Gleick and Heberger 2014). In Australia, the debate has largely focussed 
on groundwater (Harrington and Cook 2014).  
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Most of the water for the Carmichael Project, according to the Commonwealth Government, is 
scheduled to come from the Great Artesian Basin – one of the largest underground water 
reservoirs in the world, pictured in Figure 4.3 (Commonwealth of Australia 2015a and Moon 
2017).  
 
Figure 4.3 The Great Artesian Basin 
 
 
   (Moon 2017). 
 
The Carmichael Mine’s water use would result in major negative changes to groundwater 
reserves. Groundwater is an essential resource for pastoral use, domestic and town water 
supplies and ecosystems due to its reliability. (Hydrocology Environmental Consulting 2013). 
In Australia, mining companies and governments have focused on obtaining the legal rights to 
use groundwater for their projects from state governments. Currell et al. (2017) examined how 
hydrogeological science was incorporated into the Carmichael Coal Mine’s assessment. They 
found:  
 
[T]hroughout the approval process and design of operating conditions, large 
uncertainties remained unresolved regarding the conceptual hydrogeological 
model and numerical model for the mine. This was acknowledged in the Land 
Court judgment on the case, and the Federal Minister for the Environment’s 
approval conditions for the mine specify that, prior to commencement of 
excavation, research and monitoring plans must be submitted that address these 
issues (Currell et al. 2017:675). 
 
Open-pit mining projects like the proposed Carmichael Mine may result in permanent impacts, 
but these impacts are often slow to develop and therefore difficult to measure (Currell et al. 
2017). A thorough assessment should include post-mine closure conditions and long-term 
management strategies. In the case of the Carmichael Mine’s approvals, however, courts have 
decided to defer the resolution of scientific uncertainties regarding groundwater until after the 
mine has been approved to commence (see Chapter Three). In addition, Adani’s water licence 
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application was exempt from the public scrutiny due to an amendment passed in November 
2016 to the existing laws (Moon 2017). Adani was thereby granted an unlimited water licence, 
thereby eliminating the requirement for the corporation to apply for a new licence (and go 
through the standard approvals assessments) if they should discover they need more water than 
initially expected. In March 2017, Adani was granted a water licence by the Queensland 
Government to use up to 26 million litres of water per day for a period of sixty years, from the 
only reliable supply of water for large parts of northern Australia – the Great Artesian Basin 
(Agarwal 2018).  
 
Adani’s Environmental Impact Statements and other formal assessments show that the 
Carmichael mine has the potential to cause permanent damage to regional groundwater and 
surface water resources (directly impacting water availability in nearby towns) and to the 
Doongmabulla and Mellaluka Springs.  
 
Impacts of mine de-watering and groundwater discharge 
 
The Carmichael mine proposes to use significant volumes of groundwater in order to dewater 
underground mines and open cut pits (Hydrocology Environmental Consulting 2013). This 
dewatering will result in permanent changes to groundwater levels and flow direction; 
hydrochemistry; recharge and discharge mechanisms of regional aquifers (underground layers 
of water-bearing permeable rock) and potentially Great Artesian Basin aquifers (Hydrocology 
Environmental Consulting 2013). 
 
Adani projects that by the year 2067, approximately 125 billion litres of groundwater will have 
entered the Carmichael Mine’s open cut pits and over 112 billion litres into its underground 
workings by 2047 (Hydrocology Environmental Consulting 2013). Since the proposed location 
of the Carmichael Mine is in close proximity to other proposed mines in the Galilee Basin, the 
compounded effects from the overlap between the groundwater drawdown areas (which are the 
radius of which the water is drawn from, and larger than the target area of dewatering) will 
impact a region far beyond the Carmichael Mine’s operating area. This is largely because 
drawdown spreads through acqifers and cannot be confined to the area being dewatered. 
 
The Carmichael Project’s EIS states that after about 60 years of the proposed 90-year life of 
the mine – the period of most intensive mining – drawdowns of 30 to 60 meters would occur 
in the groundwater table in the vicinity of the Carmichael River (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a). 
It has been acknowledged that this will result in the reduction of the flow of the Carmichael 
River (Hydrocology Environmental Consulting 2013). The Carmichael Project’s EIS also 
states that groundwater discharge to the Carmichael River may be occurring upstream of the 
proposed mine, but the degree to which the river is fed by direct discharge from groundwater 
into the river itself, or from the upstream Doongmabulla Springs (which are Great Artesian 
Basin discharge springs) was not able to be determined (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a).  
 
Groundwater and surface water are connected through the hydrological cycle. Through 
discharge and drainage into springs, rivers, lakes and wetlands, groundwater can become 
surface water. Similarly, surface water can seep into the ground and recharge the aquifers, 
becoming ground water (Siebert et al. 2010). By impacting groundwater, the Carmichael Mine 
will also put the area’s surface water (and ecosystems that depend on them) at risk (Winter et 
al. 1999). Adani has assessed the water chemistry of the Carmichael River and nearby 
groundwater resources and discovered that it is likely that the surface water of the Carmichael 
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River is influenced by the nearby groundwater aquifers, especially during the dry season 
(Adani Mining Pty Ltd, 2012).  
 
The past 120 years of exploitation have used less than 0.1% of the water stored in the Great 
Artesian Basin, meaning while it is not in danger of running dry due to Adani’s usage, the 
problem is with the effect on water pressure (Moon 2017). 
 
Water accumulated in aquifers below the earth’s surface are accessed via bores or wells. Flows 
from artesian bores are currently approximately half of 1915 levels. A third of bores have 
completely stopped flowing and the water levels in some of the remaining bores have fallen by 
as much as 80 metres since 1915 (Moon 2017). This lack of flow, caused by a lack of pressure, 
has consequences that affect the human and non-human animals and plants that rely on the 
water. 
	
Impacts on the Doongmabulla Springs Complex 
	
Doongmabulla Springs Complex (DSC) are a series of approximately 60 fresh water springs 
scattered around the Carmichael River, approximately 8km west of the proposed Carmichael 
Mine (Currell et al. 2017), depicted in Figure 4.4 below (Currell et al. 2017). The springs are a 
part of a larger spring ‘supergroup’ that is associated with the Great Artesian Basin. The DSC 
is a rare source of reliable water in this region, feeding approximately 160 wetlands up to 8.7ha 
in size (Fensham et al. 2016; Wangan and Jagalingou Family Council 2015). They are protected 
under a Nature Refuge Conservation Agreement between the landholders and the State of 
Queensland and the Environmental Protection Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Currell et 
al. 2017). The protection recognises the spring complex’s high level of endemic plant and 
animal species as well as the diversity of the vegetation in the area that relies on the springs 
(Fensham et al. 2010; Fensham et al. 2016).  
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Figure 4.4 Location of Carmichael Coal Mine and Doongmabulla Springs 
 
 
(Currell et al. 2017) 
 
Joshua Spring (‘J’ in Figure 4.4) – the largest spring in the complex – has a flow rate of 
approximately 5L/s into the ‘turkey-nest dam’, a small earth dam which has a water level of 2-
3m above land (Currell et al. 2017). The outflow from Joshua Spring and the two springs closest 
to it, Moses and Little Moses Springs, provides the base flow to the Carmichael River, which 
then flows for 20km downstream into the Belyando River.  
 
The Mellaluka Springs is the second spring complex near the proposed Carmichael Coal Mine 
site. This complex is made up of three artesian, freshwater springs, Mellaluka, Lignum and 
Stories Springs, lying approximately 35km southeast of Doongmabulla Springs and 5-10 km 
south of the proposed mining site (Currell et al. 2017). They lie to the east of the coal seams 
and are believed to receive water from the sandstone in the Colinlea Sandstone or a permeable 
stone at the top of the Joe Joe Formation (Hydrocology Environmental Consulting, 2013). 
 
The Queensland Government’s Recovery Plan for the community of native species dependent 
on natural discharge of groundwater from the Great Artesian Basin states that critical habitat 
of the endangered plant Eryngium fontanum is the spring-fed wetlands with a groundwater 
source from the GAB within a 5 kilometre radius of Doongmabulla Springs (The State of 
Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management 2010a).  
 
Objections to the Carmichael Mine by the Land Services of Coast and Country Inc. (LSCC) 
were heard in the Queensland Land Court in September 2014 and heard in 2015 (see Chapter 
Three). LSCC argued that ‘If the mine proceeds, it will impact groundwater dependent springs 
and systems that are important for human use, agriculture and biodiversity, including but not 
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limited to: (a) the Doongmabulla Springs Complex – including Moses, Little Moses and 
Joshua; (b) the Mellaluka Springs Complex – including Mellaluka Spring, Lignum Spring and 
Stories Spring” (Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors 2015 
QLC 48). LSCC and Adani Mining prepared reports on the hydrogeological evidence presented 
in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) and Supplementary EIS (Bradley 2015; Merrick 
2015a, 2015b; Webb et al. 2015; Werner 2015).  
 
Adani’s EIS identifies that the Mellaluka Springs are likely to experience 0.7 to 0.8 metres 
drawdown due to mine dewatering at the peak intensity of the mine’s operation, in its sixtieth 
year (Adani Mining Pty Ltd, 2012a). The EIS further acknowledges that “further assessment 
of the ecology and hydrogeology of the springs themselves and of the area between the springs 
and the proposed mining area is required to better understand the potential for impact in this 
area” (Adani Mining Pty Ltd, 2012a: 113). Adani predicts that the mine will result in a 
drawdown of 5 metres at Mellaluka Springs (Adani Mining Pty Ltd, 2012a: 118). Adani’s EIS 
also acknowledges that the most intensive phase of the mining will also lead to “loss of a small 
area of vegetation, including species of conservation significance, along the outer boundary of 
the [Doongmabulla Springs] wetland as the volume of flow from the spring declines” (Adani 
Mining Pty Ltd, 2012a: 35). The hydrogeological model of the Doongmabulla Springs and the 
level of impact from mining on the model were contested. 
 
Prior to the Land Court hearing, in a joint report written by all groundwater experts, it was 
agreed that ‘the source of the Doongmabulla Springs is inconclusive and there are two potential 
sources that need to be considered; one a source from below the Rewan Formation, the other a 
source from above the Rewan Formation. Methods such as isotope sampling, in conjunction 
with analysis of existing data (water chemistry, water level, geology) would potentially assist 
in resolving the question’ (Webb et al. 2015). The source aquifer of the springs is essential for 
considering any potential impact of the mine (Currell et al 2017). If the source is the Colinlea 
Sandstone via a path through the Rewan Formation, depressurisation due to mining would have 
a significant effect on the water level of the springs. Alternatively, the base-case scenario and 
the argument adopted by Adani, is that the Doongmabulla Springs are fed from the Triassic 
strata (see Figure 4.5 below), which would only cause a minor drawdown since the Rewan 
Formation acts as a regional aquitard in this case.  
 
Figure 4.5 Galilee Basin Stratigraphy 
 
 
(McKellar and Henderson 2013; Allen and Fielding, 2007)  
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Surveys had been conducted on the eastern portion of the mining lease but no seismic surveying 
or drilling had been conducted to investigate faulting in the Rewan Formation (Currell et al 
2017), despite other evidence that faults exist in the hydrogeology of the Galilee Basins (Moya 
et al. 2014; Smerdon and Turnadge 2015). Figure 4.6 depicts an interpreted east-west 2-D 
seismic survey line showing probable fault (red line) offsetting top coal seams (thick black 
lines) in the Colinlea Sandstone (McClintock 2012). The Land Court’s decision did not 
consider these studies to be significant although the experts agreed that if the excluded 
scenarios were correct, the mine would lead to springs disappearing (Adani Mining Pty Ltd v 
Land Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors 2015 QLC 48)). 
 




The Federal Government has a statutory role in guaranteeing that large mining activities do not 
damage water resources. Despite the predicted impacts set out in the EIS, the Carmichael Mine 
has been approved without a complete understanding of the impacts. The Carmichael Mine has 
the potential to impact the water resources in the Great Artesian Basin, affecting the ecosystems 
and local populations reliant on this water for their livelihood. The state has not sufficiently 
addressed claims that the impacts of the Carmichael Mine will have on groundwater resources, 
leaving the levels of damage to remain unknown.  
 
Harms to Air: Climate Change Impacts 
 
The objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
is to avoid dangerous interference by humans with the climate system (UN 1992). To meet this 
objective, parties to the UNFCCC set a goal in 2009 to limit the increase in global temperatures 
to 2°C (Taylor and Meinshausen 2014). As one of the parties to the UNFCCC, Australia has 
pledged to reduce its GHG emissions by five percent below 2000 levels by 2020. This target, 
however, is based on net national emissions and does not include emissions associated with 
fossil fuels exported to be used by other nations. The majority of the coal produced from the 
Carmichael Mine is expected to be used in India, a country that has also pledged to reduce its 
emissions but has not pledged absolute emissions reductions or caps.  
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Reaching 2°C warming will have significant environmental impacts in Queensland, Australia, 
and globally. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5), published in 2014, represents the most comprehensive scientific assessment of 
climate change and its causes, impacts, and mitigation measures to date. The Commonwealth 
Government report, ‘The Critical Decade 2013: climate change science, risks and responses’, 
provides an overview of climate change science with an Australian national focus. The 2010 
Queensland Government report ‘Climate Change in Queensland: What the Science is Telling 
Us’ does this with a Queensland focus.  
 
It has been found that in Queensland, a 2°C warming will result in: a decline in environmental 
qualities, demonstrated by events such as the continued bleaching of corals in the Great Barrier 
Reef (IPCC 2014; The Commonwealth of Australia 2013b: 5 and 74; The State of Queensland 
Department of Environment and Resource Management 2010b: 2); increased flooding, erosion 
and damage in coastal areas due to increased numbers of severe tropical cyclones and sea level 
rise (The State of Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management 2010b: 
15, 25, 27, 38, 40); significant increase in heat-related deaths and diseases (The Commonwealth 
of Australia 2013b, 2013: 60-61; State of Queensland Department of Environment and 
Resource Management 2010b: 66); reduced water availability and increased frequency of 
droughts, affecting agricultural production (Climate Commission 2013: 65); and coastal 
erosion due to sea level rise, approximately 40 cm higher by the late 21st century (IPCC 2014). 
In Australia, a 2°C warming will result in: more frequent heat waves (IPCC 2014 and The State 
of Queensland Department of Environment and Resource Management 2010: 3) and more 
frequent and/or more intense droughts (IPCC 2014 and The State of Queensland Department 
of Environment and Resource Management 2010b: 3). 
 
In addition, reaching 2°C will amplify existing risks and create new risks for natural and human 
systems (Taylor and Meinshausen, 2014). What happens in Queensland is relevant to other 
places as well both in terms of production of greenhouse gases and the consequences of climate 
disruption. The risks arising from climate change are unevenly distributed and will have greater 
impacts on disadvantaged people and developing countries. Continuing high emissions would 
lead to negative impacts on biodiversity, ecosystem services, and economic development as 
well as amplify risks for livelihoods and for food and human security (IPCC 2014). Moreover, 
it is anticipated that climate change impacts will stifle economic growth, make poverty 
reduction more difficult, continue to erode food security, and prolong existing and create new 
poverty traps particularly in urban areas and ‘emerging hotspots of hunger’ (IPCC 2014).  
 
Cumulative greenhouse gas emissions 
 
Carbon emissions accumulate in the atmosphere. It takes hundreds to thousands of years for 
the Earth’s natural processes to remove CO2 that has been added to the atmosphere, oceans, 
and land biosphere from human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels (Taylor and 
Meinshausen 2014). It is therefore the cumulative – not annual – CO2 emissions of the 
Carmichael Mine that are most important when considering climate change impacts. Due to 
cumulative impacts of carbon emissions from this century alone – that is, without the emissions 
from the Carmichael Mine – global temperatures will not decrease and the sea level will 
continue to increase for at least a millennium. The additional carbon emissions from the 
burning of the Carmichael Mine’s coal and their impacts on climate change will thus be 
irreversible for the next millennium. In order to properly assess the Carmichael Mine’s 
emissions based on the science of cumulative emissions, the Mine cannot be viewed as 
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operating a vacuum and instead must be seen in terms of the change in global net emissions. 
In their joint expert report for the Land Court, Taylor and Meinshausen  (2014) observed: 
 
There is a net change to global emissions to the extent emissions associated with 
the Mine are not offset by a reduction in emissions elsewhere, or to the extent that 
they would otherwise occur even if the Mine were not approved. All emissions 
from the burning of product coal from this Mine will have a climate impact in the 
physical cause-effect sense. If those climate impacts are additional to what would 
have occurred in the absence of the Mine’s approval depends on the extent the Mine 
increases global coal consumption. The calculated cumulative emissions associated 
with the project, therefore, should be seen as a worst-case net change in global 
emissions.  
 
Mitigating climate change impacts and limiting warming to below 2°C requires zero net 
emissions of greenhouse gases by the end of the century and substantial emissions reductions 
over the next few years. It is through negative net CO2 emissions that remaining positive 
greenhouse gases could be offset by the end of the century. 
 
The cumulative emissions of the proposed Carmichael Mine account for approximately 0.53%-
0.56% of the carbon budget remaining after 2015 in order to have a likely chance of staying 
below 2°C of warming. Table 4.1 breaks down these emissions by their scope classification: 
 
Table 4.1: Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions associate with Carmichael Mine 
 
Scope Annual Average Emissions  
Life of Mine 
Emissions  
Scope 1 628,723 37,723,358 
Scope 2 808,898 48,533,904 
Scope 3 77,395,516 4,643,730,979 
Scope 1+2 1,437,621 86,257,262 
Scope 1+2+3 78,833,137 4,729,988,241 
  (Taylor and Meinshausen 2014: 8). 
 
In an individual report to the Land Court of Queensland, Meinshawsen (2015) wrote: 
 
Our Table refers to Annual average emissions of 77,395,516 tonnes of CO2-e scope 
3 emissions. I should note that this value has been derived simply by dividing the 
overall cumulative amount of emissions of 4,653,730,979 tonnes of CO2-e by 60 
years. Given that some parts of the mining proposal refer to higher coal production 
numbers per year (60 Mt product coal), the annual emissions over the initial project 
lifetime (30 years) could be substantially higher – e.g. almost twice as high – 
compared to the average 60 year value in our table (up to 121 MtCO2 per year). 
 
Assuming that there will not be any further growth in emissions, the current global carbon 
budget would be exceeded in approximately 20 years from 2034. However, the Carmichael 
Mine’s lifespan is stated as at least 60 years. This means that by the time less than one third of 
the calculated cumulative emissions associated with the Carmichael Mine would have 
occurred, the emissions necessary to limit warming to 2 degrees will have been surpassed. 
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The cumulative emissions related to the Carmichael Mine are the highest in the Southern 
Hemisphere and among the highest in the world for an individual project.  The annual 
emissions associated with the Mine would be equivalent to 14% of Australia’s base greenhouse 
gas emissions in 2000 (Taylor and Meinshausen 2014). Although the burning of the Carmichael 
Mine’s coal would not contribute to Australia’s national greenhouse accounts, the scale of the 
annual emissions associated with the burning of the coal would be equal to approximately three 
times Australia’s annual emissions reduction target of five percent below 2000 levels by 2020 
(Taylor and Meinshausen 2014). 
 
McGlade and Ekins (2015) indicate that a large proportion of coal must stay in the ground in 
the OECD Pacific region, including Australia, if the global target of staying below 2 degrees 
is to be achieved. More specifically, 83 gigatonnes of coal – equivalent to 93% of current 
resources – must be left in the ground to have a 50:50 chance of staying below 2°C warming. 
The higher the likelihood of staying below 2°C warming, the higher the fraction of carbon that 
has to remain in the ground (McGlade and Ekins 2015). Between 2011 and 2050, only 4.5 to 
6.3 gigatonnes of coal can be produced from OECD Pacific coal mines, implying that the 
Carmichael Mine’s projected 2.3 gigatonnes of coal would consume 37-51% of allowable coal 
production (if the mine were to produce and emit carbon until 2050) (Meinshausen 2015). It is 
therefore irrefutable that the Australian coal which the Carmichael Mine seeks to use is 
‘unburnable’ unless either the 2°C limit is reconsidered or the mining leases of other mines in 
Australia (totalling a similar amount of coal production to the Carmichael Mine) are ceased.  
 
Harms to the Great Barrier Reef 
 
The Great Barrier Reef is one of the world’s largest and most spectacular coral reef ecosystems. 
Lining almost 2,100 kilometres of the Australian coastline, the Great Barrier Reef is the largest 
continuous coral reef ecosystem in the world. It is home to an amazing variety of marine 
organisms including 6 species of marine turtles, 24 species of seabirds, over 30 species of 
marine mammals, 400 coral species, 4,000 species of molluscs and 1,500 fish species 
(UNESCO, 2017). New species are described each year, and some estimates suggest we are 
familiar with less than 50% of the total number of species that live within the ecosystem 
(Hoegh-Guldberg 2015). The Great Barrier Reef is considered to be one of the most pristine 
ecosystems as a consequence of a low human population pressure, compared to, for example, 
other coral reef ecosystems like Indonesia where tens of millions of people live directly 
adjacent to the coral reefs (Hoegh-Guldberg 2015). The Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
Authority (GBRMPA) is a state-of-the-art, science-based agency that is responsible for the 
environmental management of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park, which was established in 
1975 by the Federal Government and was declared a World Heritage Area in 1981.  
 
The Great Barrier Reef also contributes significantly to the Australian economy through four 
main sectors: tourism; commercial fishing and aquaculture production; recreational activity; 
and scientific research and management (Deloitte Access Economics 2017).  In 2015-2016, the 
Great Barrier Reef added $6.4 billion to the Australian economy – $3.9 billion within 
Queensland and $2.9 billion within Great Barrier Reef regions (Burdekin, Burnett Mary, Cape 
York, Fitzroy, Mackay Whitsunday and the Wet Tropics) (Deloitte Access Economics 2017). 
The total value added by each of the four sectors is shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
Figure 4.3: Economic Contribution of Great Barrier Reef in 2015-2016 
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(Deloitte Access Economics 2017: 26) 
 
In addition to $6.4 billion annually, the Great Barrier Reef also provides over 64,000 full-time 
jobs to Australia, making the Great Barrier Reef a larger employer than Qantas, Telstra, and 
other Australian corporations (Deloitte Access Economics 2017). The GBR’s enormous 
economic value alone should be enough for it to be considered ‘too big to fail’ by the Australian 
Government. Adding the social and cultural ‘icon’ value of the GBR to an assessment of its 
worth makes it clear that the Reef is priceless and irreplaceable. Yet, 50% of the corals in the 
Great Barrier Reef have been lost in the last 30 years, with the most severe bleaching taking 
place in 1998 and 2002 (Hoegh-Guldberg 2015).  The long-term sustainability of the Great 
Barrier Reef is threatened by local (e.g. water quality, coastal degradation, pollution, and 
pressures from fishing) and global (e.g. climate change, ocean acidification) factors. Of these 
factors, climate change is the most serious (Deloitte Access Economics 2017; Hoegh-Guldberg 
2015). 
 
Climate change impacts 
 
Currently, we are living above the thermal threshold for damage to reef building corals and 
coral reefs. This means the atmosphere has reached its ‘limit’ on the amount of greenhouse 
gases that it can contain without affecting the Great Barrier Reef. In other words, any additional 
CO2 emitted into the atmosphere will directly damage the Great Barrier Reef (Hoegh-Guldberg 
et al. 2007).  
 
Changes associated with climate change that affect the Great Barrier Reef include rising sea 
and air temperatures, ocean acidification, nutrient enrichment, altered light levels, more 
extreme weather events, changes to ocean circulation, and sea-level rise (Morrison and Hughes 
2016). Since the 1950s – the period during which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change identified human influence on climate change – the average sea temperature on the 
Great Barrier Reef has warmed by approximately 0.6°C (Morrison and Hughes 2016). Ocean 
warming triggered two major coral bleaching events in the GBR, in 1998 and 2002, affecting 
about 50% of the Reef. The third major coral bleaching event occurred in 2016, with bleaching 
expected to increase in frequency and intensity in the coming years. The oceans have absorbed 
nearly one-third of human-produced carbon dioxide released into the atmosphere in the past 
200 years, resulting in a more acidic ocean chemistry (Morrison and Hughes 2016). An average 
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global decrease in oceanic pH of 0.1 units have led to a decline in concentrations of aragonite, 
an essential mineral for the growth of corals (IPCC 2013).  
 
Severe tropical cyclones also damage coral reefs. The effects of Cyclone Yasi in 2011 saw 
broken corals reported across an area of the Great Barrier Reef exceeding 89,000km2 (Great 
Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority 2009). Droughts driven by El Niño events are expected to 
increase in frequency and intensity as a result of climate change, causing large freshwater 
plumes to also increase, which bring terrestrial contaminants to inshore and mid-shelf reefs 
(Morrison and Hughes 2016). Since 1990, sea level rises have been occurring at a rate of 1 to 
2 mm per year (Church et al., 2013). Under mid-to-high emissions scenarios, sea level in the 
central GBR could be 0.3 to 0.9 mm higher by 2100 (Hobday and Lough 2011). Heightened 
sea levels “compound the impacts of storm surges associated with tropical cyclones and king 
tides, posing substantial risks for GBR-dependent settlements and coastal infrastructure, and 
associated industries” (Morrison and Hughes 2016). 
 
The thermal coal that is expected from the Carmichael Mine is estimated to be in excess of 
2.326 gigatonnes; the direct and indirect greenhouse gas emissions (scope 1, 2, and 3 
emissions) expected from the mine are 4.74 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (Gt CO2) (Taylor and 
Meinshausen 2014). The global carbon budget after 2015 is 250 Gt CO2 for a likely chance 
(66% or greater) of keeping global mean temperature rises below 2°C (Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 
2007). The global carbon budget is based on increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2 to 
approximately 450 ppm, which will result in severe damage to the Great Barrier Reef, as 
depicted below in Figure 4.4. 
 
Figure 4.4: Effect of Atmospheric CO2 on the Great Barrier Reef 
 
 
(Hoegh-Guldberg et al. 2007) 
 
These figures depict the probability that the contribution of the CO2 emitted from the coal 
extracted from the Carmichael Mine represents a significant contribution – around 0.53 to 
0.56% – to the global carbon budget, and therefore climate change and ocean acidification.  
 




First, the former emphasis on conservation and protection must be reinstated, 
recognizing that it will not be possible to develop and operate the largest coal ports 
in the world along the edge of the Great Barrier Reef World Heritage Area over the 
next 60 years without causing permanent damage to the region. 
 
Second, Australia should play a more active role in transitioning away from fossil 
fuels to renewable energy, and rejoin the global community in tackling dangerous 
climate change. The era of thermal coal is coming to an end and efforts to prolong 
it by opening new coal mines are too risky for the GBR and for climate-sensitive 
ecosystems elsewhere. 
 
Third, a permanent legislative ban of sea dumping of dredge spoil within the World 
Heritage Area. 
 
Fourth, the environmental impact assessment processes for new developments 
should be reformulated to ensure that all options to avoid impacts are 
comprehensively and transparently evaluated and independently assessed, and that 
offsets are used only as a last resort. 
 
Fifth, the GBR Marine Park Authority needs to be reinstated as the lead agency 
responsible for all aspects of the GBR. The GBR Marine Park Authority should be 
expanded to include ports as a new type of zone, thereby providing more effective 
and integrated management over areas currently adjoining the marine park and 
fulfilling the mandate of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 for 
sustainable management of the Great Barrier Reef Region.  
 
Sixth, develop and adequately fund a 50-year plan for use of the catchment, 
designed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and agricultural runoff” (Hughes et 
al. 2015: 510). 
 
The approval and operation of the Carmichael Project is incompatible with the plan to save the 
Great Barrier Reef. Climate science has proven that it is either the Mine or the Reef. The 
Queensland and Australian governments have supported the mining project, despite these 
potential ecocidal outcomes. These are the facts. 
 
Interpreting the science 
	
So far, this chapter has demonstrated that objective harms of the proposed Adani Carmichael 
Mine and Rail Project – as studied and reported by the scientific community – do exist. 
However, these environmental issues do not exist separate from human society. Specific 
environmental harms will always be constructed as such through complex social processes of 
selection and affirmation (White 2008). Which harms come to public attention (versus which 
are hidden from public attention) depends upon the way in which information is mobilized.  
 
The critical role of science in bringing problems to the public’s attention, and in considering 
ways to monitor or minimise environmental problems depends on how scientists are integrated 
into the policy-making process. There are a number of factors that come into play. First, as 
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Silva and Jenkins-Smith (2007) found, scientists’ application of precaution as a policy 
recommendation is directly linked to the nature of the specific issue at hand – it is entirely 
dependent on context, even when there is consensus among scientists about what is 
scientifically correct. Popular understandings and existing policy initiatives shape how 
scientific knowledge is translated into judgments about appropriate policy (White 2008). 
Further, the relationship between scientific advice and institutional decisions means 
considerable variation in how different governments deal with the same issue, even if there is 
consensus among the nature of the issue. Irwin (2001: 116) has found that ‘institutions do not 
simply follow broad and established principles, but must instead tread a sensitive path between 
scientific evidence, social pressures and commercial anxieties’.  
 
White (2008: 34-35) summarises the social constructions of environmental problems: 
 
It is rare that scientific evidence is uncontested and that proof of environmental 
harm is simply a matter of ‘let the facts decide’. What counts as ‘science’, what 
counts as ‘evidence’, who counts as a ‘scientific expert’ and what counts as 
‘sensible’ public policy are all influenced by factors such as economic situation, 
the scientific tradition within a particular national context, the scientific standards 
that are used in relation to specific issues and the style and more of government. 
Science is one of the backbones of discovery, measurement and explanation of 
environmental harm, but it, too, is embedded in particular social processes and 
decision-making frameworks. In this respect, science is inherently social. 
 
So, while the problems – for example, those that may result from the building and operating of 
the Carmichael Project – may be real, but the way the problems are defined; their magnitude, 




This chapter has provided a detailed description of the scientific evidence available on the 
impacts of the Carmichael Project on the planet. The harms to land from the Carmichael Rail 
include the sterilisation of some of Queensland’s most fertile cropland, severe flood impacts, 
and the fragmentation of grazing and pastoral properties. The Carmichael Mine would need 
billions of litres of groundwater, which would permanently alter the groundwater reserves of 
the Great Artesian Basin. The Mine would also damage the wetland ecosystem of the 
Doongmabulla and Mellaluka Springs, the habitat of several at-risk species. Most notable, 
however, is the Project’s contribution of greenhouse gases. The Carmichael Mine’s coal would 
emit an amount of carbon dioxide that would be incompatible with the global carbon budget. 
Among the many severe impacts the emissions would produce, it would destroy the Great 
Barrier Reef. However, despite the availability of scientific research in these areas, it has not 
always been used or understood. 
 
The Queensland and federal governments’ approval of the Carmichael Project despite these 
impacts raises some serious questions, such as “how could this be allowed to happen?” The 
next two chapters provide a discussion of how these harms have been framed by the media; the 
governments; and Adani. My analysis has found that the severity and extent of the Carmichael 
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Project’s harms to land, water, climate change, and the Great Barrier Reef have not been 
accurately presented or misunderstood to the public by these stakeholders. Using techniques of 
neutralisation and denial, the Carmichael Project has been portrayed as beneficial, necessary, 
and harmless and those who have publically challenged this narrative have been subject to ad 
hominem attacks of their credibility. Unfortunately, in a post-truth era, presenting misleading 
statements as facts is commonplace. However, it should not be normalised. Following a 
discussion of the state and corporation’s techniques of harm minimisation is an investigation 













“Any one of us through [the] media may influence the attitudes and actions of our fellow 
citizens” (Bernays 1947: 113). 
 
“The art of PR is to ‘create news’; to turn what are essentially advertisements into a form 
that fits news coverage and makes a journalist’s job easier while at the same time 
promoting the interests of the client” (Beder 1997: 113). 
 
“Intellectuals can play a considerable role by making more troubling information 
available to more people…This information should be regular and accessible: rolling in 







‘Post-truth’, defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less 
influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’, was the 
Oxford Dictionary’s 2016 Word of the Year; selected as a symbol of the times in the US 
(Brevini and Woronov 2017). While ‘post-truth politics’ may have had its epicentre in the U.S. 
in 2016, the framing of a statement to benefit a group or agenda has been used in justifications 
and denials long before the Trump administration. This phenomenon has been studied in 
sociology and criminology as ‘techniques of neutralisation’.  
 
In fact, one of the issues in dealing with crimes of the powerful lies in the denial of the crimes’ 
existence by the perpetrators. How states and corporations cover up harmful and criminal acts 
and how they defer responsibility for these acts are important topics of investigation. 
Researching and understanding the scripts that allow for the culture of denial to exist in plain 
sight allows for the theorisation of potential avenues of addressing it. 
 
It is important to note that the exact thought processes behind the statements made by Adani 
and government stakeholders being analyzed are not actually known. As the discussion in this 
chapter will demonstrate, an assertion of denial could be true and made in good faith; the 
assertion of denial could be a deliberate lie told to deceive; or the assertion of denial could be 
neither a matter of telling the truth nor intentionally telling a lie (Sykes and Matza 1957). This 
suggests a possibility, where clear evidence to the contrary is lacking, that those who argue for 
the feasibility or benefits of the Carmichael Project believe that what they are saying is true. 
Human conceptions of what is true; what is right and wrong; and what is a benefit versus a cost 
are highly variable and thus someone who is “pro-Carmichael Project” may have a different 
understanding of the world as someone who is against it. For this reason, the following 
discussion of techniques of neutralisation and denial must be read as a sociological analysis – 
not a psychological one. 
 
Cognitive psychologists have dealt with the subject of denial. Of particular interest to them, is 
the “denial paradox”: “in order to use the term ‘denial’ to describe a person’s statement ‘I didn’t 
know’, you have to assume that he or she knew or knows about what it is he or she claims not 
to know (otherwise the term ‘denial’ is inappropriate)” (Cohen 1993: 105). This psychological 
focus of denial therefore is primarily concerned with questions of self-knowledge (i.e. in the 
ways they are protecting themselves from “true” knowledge of the harm they are causing) and 
self-deception (i.e the ways in which “deniers” are operating out of established cultural 
frameworks).  
 
However, this thesis is less concerned with matters of personal belief than structural interests. 
What individual government Ministers and Adani Executives ‘really believe’ is in fact 
irrelevant to analysis of their public actions. What is required is a theory of ‘interests’ (as 
reflected in the state-corporate crime paradigm) insofar as it is the organisational setting 
(whether government or corporation) which to a large extent dictates individual agency. As 
Bakan (2004: 50) astutely observes: 
 
The people who run corporations are, for the most part, good people, moral people. 
They are mother and fathers, lovers and friends, and upstanding citizens in their 
communities, and they often have good and sometimes even idealistic intentions. 
Many of them want to make the world a better place and believe their jobs provide 
them the opportunity to do so. Despite their personal qualities and ambitions, 
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however, their duty as corporate executives is clear: they must always put their 
corporation’s best interests first and not act out of concern for anyone or anything 
else (unless the expression of such concern can somehow be justified as advancing 
the corporation’s own interests). The money they manage and invest is not theirs. 
They can no sooner use it to heal the sick, save the environmental, or feed the poor 
than they can to buy themselves villas in Tuscany. 
 
The following analysis of techniques of neutralisation is not of the psychological dynamics of 
the problem – it does not locate the issue of denial of the Carmichael Project’s harms in the 
state of mind of the wrongdoers but rather in the public sphere. The facts regarding the 
Carmichael Project and its potential ecocidal harms are both private and public knowledge. 
Neutralisation comes into play when the potential harms are acknowledged – as the discussion 
will show they have been; in Adani publications, court documents, etc. – but either presented 
as justified or reframed. 
 
This chapter provides a discussion of Cohen’s concept of denial, which expands Sykes and 
Matza’s ‘techniques of neutralisation’ to include crimes of the powerful. A description of the 
various strategies employed by states and corporations to deny environmental problems such 
as climate change, stifle environmental discourse and counter environmental activism follows.  
 
 
Techniques of Neutralisation and State Denial Theory 
 
The concepts of ‘techniques of neutralisation’ were first developed in the 1950s and 60s. In 
their studies of juvenile delinquents, Sykes and Matza (1957) developed a classification of five 
methods actors employ to justify their morally questionable or illegal activities. Techniques of 
neutralisation can be understood as rhetorical devices used to deny or neutralise harm before 
the act in order to make delinquency possible and/or after the act, in order to shield the 
perpetrator from blame. Sykes and Matza’s analytical framework contains five types of denial, 
as described in Table 5.1: 
 
Table 5.1 Sykes and Matza’s Techniques of Neutralisation 
 
Technique of neutralisation Description 
Denial of responsibility The offender had no control over the action 
Denial of injury Despite its illegality, the action did not cause 
any harm 
Denial of the victim The injury is not wrong given the 
circumstances of the action; 
The victim was the original wrongdoer and 
the action was the rightful response 
Condemnation of the condemners The motivates and character of the critics are 
to blame for the action being deemed 
“wrong” 
Appeal to higher loyalties The action was justified based on allegiance 
to a cause, group, or other loyalty 
 
This framework has also been used to examine the actions and denials of ‘public and political 
atrocities’ committed by states (Whyte 2016). In his article, “Human Rights and the Crimes of 
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State: The Culture of Denial,” (1993) and later in his book States of Denial: Knowing About 
Atrocities and Suffering (2001) Cohen discovered these five accounts of denial presented by 
individuals are similar to accounts of denial presented by government representatives in official 
statements; thus linking individual denial to organisational denial.  
 
Statements of denial assert something either ‘did not happen, does not exist, is not true, or is 
not known about’ and contain a number of ‘elements’ (Cohen, 2001:3): organisation (i.e. 
personal, cultural or official denial); time (i.e. historical or contemporary denial); agent (i.e. 
victim, perpetrator or observer); and space and place (i.e. your own or elsewhere). 
 
Further, the psychological status of a statement of denial depends on whether the denial is 
conscious or unconscious: the assertion could be true and was made in good faith; the assertion 
of denial could be a deliberate lie told to deceive; or the assertion of denial could be neither a 
matter of telling the truth nor intentionally telling a lie. In the third instance, the assertion of 
denial is not wholly deliberate and the status of ‘knowledge’ of the truth is not wholly clear.  
 
Literal, interpretive and implicatory denial 
 
According to Cohen (2001) there are also three possibilities regarding the content of an 
assertion of denial or the what is being denied: literal denial, interpretive denial, or implicatory 
denial.  
 
‘Literal denial’ is the type of denial that is defined as ‘the assertion that something did not 
happen or is not true’ (Cohen 2001: 7). Literal denial rejects the fact or knowledge of the fact, 
but there is an ambiguity about how conscious or unconscious the knowledge is; “how much 
we are aware of what we say we are unaware” (Cohen 1993: 109). This, according to Cohen 
(1993) suggests the possibility of simultaneously knowing and not knowing. Literal denial is 
not a simple lie where the facts are accessible but the conclusion is knowingly evaded. It is the 
situation where “we are vaguely aware that we choose not to look at the facts without being 
conscious of what it is we are evading” (Steiner 1985: 161). Whether it is a child denying that 
he drew on the wall; a politician denying using public funds for a private vacation; a 
government denying an atrocity; or a corporation denying an environmental catastrophe, the 
script is always the same: ‘x is not true.’ These assertions that refuse to acknowledge the facts 
can be made in good or bad faith and can be true (‘genuine ignorance’, as Cohen calls it) or 
blatantly untrue (deliberate lies) or unconscious defence mechanisms (Cohen 2001). In the 
context of state-crimes, Cohen (1993: 103) writes: 
 
On one level, this [denial] is nothing more sinister than a Western ethnocentrism 
preoccupied with its own national concerns and secure in the great achievement of 
liberal capitalism; the separation of crime from the state. On another more 
interesting level, this stems from the universal tendency to see only what is 
convenient to see. 
 
‘Interpretive denial’, on the other hand, is the type of denial that involves admitting the facts 
(the act) but denying the interpretive framework placed on those facts (Cohen 2001). 
Interpretive denial reframes or declassifies a specific accusation of harm into something else. 
Multiple definitions of harm (for example, a legal definition of a harmful act versus a societal 




An example of interpretative denial can be seen in the controversy surrounding the CIA’s 
definition of water boarding as ‘enhanced interrogation’. In 2014 former US President George 
W. Bush had admitted the raw facts, i.e. the CIA uses “enhanced interrogation techniques” 
such as waterboarding, but denied the interpretive framework placed on these facts, i.e. that 
enhanced interrogation techniques such as waterboarding are torture and therefore illegal. He 
maintained that, “this government does not torture people” (BBC News 2014). Article 1 of the 
UN Convention against Torture defines torture as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, 
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person” in order to get information. 
While the US is a signatory of the Convention, its legal code defines torture as an action 
“specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering” and Amendment 
VIII of the US Constitution bans “cruel and unusual punishment.” Whenever human rights 
groups or foreign governments claimed the CIA programme included torture, the US 
government under President Bush emphasised the distinction between “torture,” which it 
accepted as banned in the US and by international law, and “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” (BBC News 2014). President Bush’s defence, as an exemplar of interpretive 
denial, can also be described as “arguing semantics”. 
 
The degree to which an act can be defined as harmful is negotiated (or interpreted) through 
four main methods, according to Cohen (2001).  
 
Euphemisms disguise harm with a more neutral label: torture becomes “enhanced 
interrogations.” 
Legalism allows for a harm’s illegality to be disputed, allowing for loopholes and defences 
based on interpretation of the law: “this is not an example of torture since torture is illegal in 
our country” or “standards of prison conditions under law x do not apply during interrogation.”  
Denial of responsibility for the harm, the most common, presents harm as something that “just 
happened;” a bi-product of following orders rather than a premeditated action.  
Isolation or the strategy of accepting responsibility for the harm but insisting on it being an 
isolated incident versus a systematic, routine, or repeated incident (Cohen 2001).  
 
The script of each assertion of interpretive denial is: ‘x is really something else.’ 
 
Lastly, ‘implicatory denial’ is the type of denial that involves the rationalisation of a fact or 
event through the denial of its psychological, political, or moral implications (Cohen 2001). 
Implicatory denial does not attempt to deny the facts or the conventional interpretation of them. 
Instead, implicatory denials can be understood as rationalisations (Cohen 2001). A fact’s or 
event’s significance or implications can be denied through detachment and unconcern (e.g. ‘I 
don’t care what is happening on Manus Island’). Implicatory denial involves doing the ‘right 
thing’ with the knowledge of a harmful event or action. It involves matters of mobilisation, 
commitment, and involvement as there is a strong sense of inaction associated with denial 
(Cohen 2001).  
 
One example of ‘implicatory denial’ occurs in the form of an attack on the victim’s innocence. 
Attacking a victim’s innocence can often be heard during sexual harassment or rape trials (e.g. 
sex workers are ‘asking’ to be harassed because of their promiscuity/attire/other personal 
choices) and victim-blaming occurs on a spectrum ranging from an appeal to righteousness 
(e.g. God’s ‘manifest destiny’ for the US justifies the eradication of Native Americans during 
the country’s westward expansion) to claims of necessity (e.g. if the police officer did not shoot 
the boy, he might have gotten shot himself). The script of each assertion of implicatory denial 
is: “x is ok’” 
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One of these modes of denial is always present in the accounts people give for their actions or 
lack of actions regarding a disputed or potential harm.  
 
Political perpetrator accounts  
 
The reasons people give to deny an event or to rationalise an action (or inaction) are themselves 
not without reasons. Accounts are ‘not just another defence mechanism to deal with guilt, 
shame or other psychic conflict after an offence has been committed; it must, in some sense, 
be present before the act’ (Cohen 2001: 58). Accounts can either be justifications or excuses. 
Justifications involve accepting responsibility for an act but denying its negative or immoral 
classification (interpretive or implicatory denial) while excuses involve denying responsibility 
but admitting the act was “wrong” (literal or implicatory denial). 
 
The value in these accounts, according to denial theory, does therefore not necessarily lie in 
the depicted events but in the way in which the person chooses to frame the events. As Maruna 
and Copes (2005: 239) state: the way in which an event is framed in an account bridges ‘the 
gap between action and expectation when an individual behaves in a way that is inconsistent 
with normative expectations’.  
 
Political accounts of denial are usually interpretive denials as they often dispute the 
conventional meanings attached to offences and ‘try to evade moral blame and legal culpability 
(Cohen 2001: 77). This is not unlike ordinary civilian accounts of denial which also, generally 
speaking, do not try to justify their actions. Table 5.2 outlines Cohen’s techniques of 
neutralisation for perpetrator and official accounts. Two additional techniques of neutralisation 
are added to Sykes and Matza’s original framework: denial of knowledge and moral 
indifference.  
 
Table 5.2 Cohen’s Techniques of Neutralisation 
 
Technique of Neutralisation Accounts given by state 
offenders 
Condition allowing for 
accounts 
Denial of responsibility: 
the offender had no control over 
the action 
 
Obedience to authority: 
 
“I was just following 
orders;” or “I couldn’t 
have refused” 
Authorisation of violence 
from legitimate authority,  
dehumanisation of victim, 
and routinisation of action 
Conformity: 
 
“You would have done 
the same thing in my 
situation;” or “Everyone 
else was doing it” 
 
Pressures and demands of 
the situation convey a 





“Someone had to do the 
dirty work” 





“My job is not a 




Denial of injury:  
despite its illegality, the action 
did not cause any harm 
Reframing injury and 
harm: 
 
“Look what they do to 
each other;” “This is the 
only language they 
understand;” or “I didn’t 
know they were 
suffering” 
Victims belong to 
devalued group; or 
 
claims of being unaware 
of suffering 
Denial of the victim: 
the injury is not wrong given the 
circumstances of the action; 
the victim was the original 
wrongdoer and the action was the 
rightful response 
 
Blaming the other / 
victim-reversal: 
 
“In a just world, innocent 
people do not get 
punished arbitrarily” 






“They got what they 
deserve because of who 
they are” 
Ethnic nationalism 
Condemnation of the 
condemners:  
the motivates and character of the 
critics are to blame for the action 
being deemed “wrong” 
Double standards: 
 
“The critics are biased” 
External critics 
No right to judge: 
 
“You have no right to 
interfere” 
It’s worse elsewhere: 
 
“Everyone is doing this – 
why criticise us?” 
Appeal to higher loyalties: 
the action was justified based on 





“The act was necessary to 
protect the state” 
Nationalism/ ideology 
Denial of knowledge:  




“I was unaware of what 
was going on” 
Attention is brought to 
the action but little notice 
is taken 
Not needing to know: 
 
“The action was not 




Not wanting to know 
refusing to know: 
 






“What you don’t know 
doesn’t exist” 
Mentally blocking the 
truth 
Moral ambivalence, 
moral indifference or 
moral blindspot: 
 
“I ought to have known 
but I didn’t know” 
Ambivalence between 
moral necessity to 
confront action and desire 
to deny knowledge of it 
Speak memory: 
 
“I suspected it but 
decided not to act or 
speak out” 
Sensing the harms of an 
action and ignoring them 
by choice 
Moral indifference: 
denial of moral codes’ legitimacy 
to justify an action 
None given, since the act 
is not seen as wrong in the 
first place 
 




An event or action can be presented as harmless in many ways, as illustrated by the nuances in 
the accounts of denial above. The techniques of neutralisation developed by Sykes and Matza, 
and later by Cohen, have developed from an analysis of accounts given by individuals and 
states to deny harm. However, as Cohen linked individual denial to organisational denial, it 
can be expected that corporate officials and corporations also use techniques of neutralisation 
to deny corporate wrongdoing (Whyte 2016).  
 
Corporate Personhood and Denial  
 
Developing the concept of techniques of neutralisation to the illegitimate activities of a 
corporation began in the 1980s and 1990s (e.g. Box 1983; Benson 1985; Coleman 1987; 
Braithwaite and Fisse 1990). This body of research acknowledged that theories of individual 
action can also be applied to corporate action because corporations, too, can act, have intentions 
and commit crimes. Later, the organising framework of Sykes and Matza and Cohen was 
applied to corporate wrongdoing (Rosoff et al. 1998; Heath 2008; Piquero et al. 2005; Vieraitis 
et al. 2012; Fooks et al. 2012). There are three scripts of denial that are particularly available 
to corporations and, by extension, corporate officials: denial of responsibility, condemnation 
of the condemners and denial of the victim.  
 
Corporate officials are primarily able to deny responsibility of their corporation’s activities due 
to the complexity of the corporate structure, which is designed to protect the human beings 
who run it from legal liability (Glasbeek 2002; Whyte 2016). By definition, the formation of a 
corporation refers to the creation of a legal entity that is separate from the people who make 
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up the corporation (Tombs and Whyte 2015). This allows the corporation as a whole to become 
the legal ‘person’ that is targeted by criminal prosecutions (Bakan 2004: 79).  
 
‘Corporate personhood’, the concept that shields a corporation’s owners and investors from the 
corporation itself, establishes limited liability for corporate officials. Tombs and Whyte (2015: 
84) describe how limited liability encourages risky business: 
 
Investors can only lose the value of capital that they invested in the first place, so that, if 
the company incurs losses higher than the value of the sum invested, then the owners or 
shareholders bear no responsibility for this loss. 
 
When a crime is committed, everyone working within the corporation can, to some extent, 
point their finger to shift the blame to someone else. The person who carried out the action can 
defer blame to the person who made the decision; the person who made the decision can blame 
the people who assessed the action, and so on (Heath 2008). In rare instances when there is a 
prosecution, this blame-shifting results in workers at the bottom being penalised while those at 
the top are able to keep their positions (and reputations) (Tombs and Whyte 2015). A 
corporation will also often cite the competitiveness of the marketplace as a reason for engaging 
in a harmful act. In order to “survive” the marketplace, the action becomes a “necessity,” 
mixing the denial of responsibility with a defence of necessity. For large-scale resource 
extraction projects such as the Carmichael, which require the cooperation of both corporation 
and government in order to proceed, state officials are also heard making this argument.  
 
Since corporate personhood diminishes the potential personal risks involved in engaging in 
harmful behaviour for its owners or shareholders, the potential benefits to the corporation that 
can arise from those harmful activities are increased. The corporation’s benefits are eventually 
distributed among its shareholders, which translates to a potential for increased personal gain 
through risky behaviour. This transfer of risks and benefits grants a unique legal loophole for 
the owners or shareholders of a corporation: Although they are able to make decisions on behalf 
of their corporation, they cannot be held responsible for the effects of those corporate decisions.  
 
Limited liability allows for the the corporation, rather than an individual or individuals, to be 
subject to criminal prosecutions. The ‘corporation person’ can ‘absorb the punishment, 
normally in the form of a fine, while its directors and senior managers are relatively rarely 
exposed to sanction’ (Tombs and Whyte 2015: 98). Responsibility is therefore evaded – legally 
– through the corporate structure. Adani's corporate structure is deliberately complex and 
opaque. There are 26 Adani subsidiaries registered in Australia; 13 of these are ultimately 
owned through the Cayman Islands. Adani’s structure aids in the corporation’s ability to evade 
responsibility and has proven to have devastating effects, particularly when the corporation’s 
behaviour produces environmentally harmful effects (as described in Chapter Three). 
 
Because of this denial of responsibility, harms that would result from a corporation’s actions 
are able to be externalised, or left out of the accounting of a project. Corporate officers are 
instructed to take account of short-term and long-term costs to the corporation, but not to 
anyone else, since a corporation must always act in ways that serve their own best interests, 
i.e., that maximize their shareholders’ wealth. Thus, the routine and regular harms caused to 
others—workers, consumers, communities, the environment—by the inevitable and acceptable 
consequences of corporate activity—are known as “externalities” (Bakan 2004). These side-
effects, absent from corporate accounting, can include costs related to: GHG emissions causing 
climate change; air pollutants and toxic substances potentially effecting health; leachate to soil 
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and water; and the impact of facilities on the local environment such as noise and smell (Tombs 
and Whyte 2015). Externalities do not need to be costed on the corporate balance sheet because 
only the profit is recorded, excluding the costs to others (Bakan 2004). The next chapter will 
demonstrate how the externalised harms of the Carmichael Project, identified as ‘scope 3 
emissions’, are the costliest. Since Scope 3 emissions do not have to be reported under 
Australia’s National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) scheme, mining projects such 
as the Carmichael can get away with claiming smaller amounts of GHG emissions than will 
actually be produced. 98% of GHGs from the Carmichael Project are thus legally left out of 
carbon accounting.  
 
Techniques of neutralisation and denial of harm have since been applied to corporate 
wrongdoing in literature on business ethics and corporate social responsibility (Piquero et al. 
2005; Heath 2008; and Fooks et al. 2012). Specific events that cause environmental harms – 
climate change in particular – also require justifications for the drift between deviant values 
and social norms (Enticott 2011). 
 
Corporate climate change denial 
 
Talbot and Boiral (2014) were among the first to explore the ‘justifications and impression 
management’ techniques that industrial (mining, aluminium, pelletizing, petrochemical, and 
metallurgy) companies use to rationalise their impacts on climate change. They outline six 
strategies used by companies, specifically large GHG emitters, for climate change impression 
management:  
 
Table 5.3 Corporate Techniques of Climate Change Neutralisation 
 
Technique of neutralisation Description 
Self-proclaimed excellence Company claims to be best in field in order 
to distance themselves from competitors’ 
practices 
Promotion of a systemic view Company claims it should be judged not only 
by environmental performance, cites 
economic and social contributions 
Denial and minimisation Company minimises its impact on GHG 
emissions by emphasising low contribution 
of industry to overall emissions; and/or 
comparing with larger footprint of another 
industry 
Denouncing unfair treatment and deceptive 
appearance 
Company claims condemners have 
insufficient knowledge of industry processes 
to evaluate company’s carbon footprint 
Economic and technological blackmail Company claims to be victim; threatened by 
government action to reduce GHG emissions 
Blaming others Company justifies its activities by 
emphasising other, “more polluting” sectors 
 
These techniques of neutralisation identify the communication strategies companies use to 
justify their impacts or poor environmental performance, specifically in relation to climate 
change. Talbot and Boiral (2014) found the promotion of a systemic view to be one of the most 
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frequently used climate change specific harm neutralisation technique. Companies that use this 
technique often cite their socio-economic contributions as a rationalisation for the harm they 
produce:  
 
Yes, we emit a lot of GHGs. However, there is more than just the question of the 
environment. This is the very principle of sustainable development. In judging our 
performance, one should not limit oneself to the environmental aspects. We 
contribute enormously to the economic development of the region.  
 
This script mirrors that of corporate social responsibility (CSR), or the idea that corporations 
will shift away from profit maximisation for shareholders within the obligations of law to 
responsibility to a broader range of stakeholders, including community concerns of 
environmental protection and ethical and legal accountability (Tombs and Whyte 2015). While 
there are opportunities for NGOs to work with companies to improve environmental practice 
(Gilmour 2002; White 2008), in practice, CSR involves the use of a ‘triple bottom line’ of 
economic, social, and environmental performance when considering a company’s or project’s 
sustainable development, allowing for environmental harm to be neutralised or devalued in 
light of social or economic benefits. The effects of a large-scale mining operation’s 
environmental harm, for example, can be (interpretively) denied as minimal in scope compared 
to the mine’s economic benefits.  
 
Multibillion dollar energy corporations have actively sponsored the voices of opposition to 
global warming (Goldenberg and Bengtsson 2016). These corporations rely on politically 
conservative think tanks to disseminate their claims via non-peer reviewed books and articles 
passed off as powerful ‘science’ in a persuasive attempt to control, censure and neutralize the 
overwhelming caucus of reputable science identifying the undeniable existence of global 
warming and its devastating effects (Dunlap and Jacques 2013). A number of influential ‘think 
tanks’, including the Cato Institute, American Enterprise Institute and the Heartland 
Foundation openly attack climate change research as the ‘climatism cartel’ accusing pro 
skewing government prioritizing and funding academic research for pro climate change 
outcomes (Bohr 2016).  
 
In order for the corporation’s desired image to reach the public, a means of relaying the 
message is required. The ‘mediascape’ – all of the institutionalised forms of media we use and 
create to communicate; the ‘global cultural flows’ of information and images that connect us 
and shape our understanding of the world – although not formally recognised as a part of the 
political system, has significant influence on society (Appadurai 1990; Clifford and White 
2017). The mediascape plays an active role in shaping the public’s beliefs on what is fact versus 
fiction through the stories they choose to report (versus the stories they choose to omit), how 
they report the stories, and the sources they rely on for these stories. For example, in the U.S., 
where approximately 70% of the public believe in human-induced climate change and 75% 
support laws to reduce carbon emissions (Marlon et al. 2016; Popovich et al 2017), the Trump 
administration has made it more difficult for climate change evidence to reach the public by 
deleting any reference to ‘climate change’ from the US Environmental Protection Agency 
website (Griffin 2017). Climate change denial is most threatening when it comes from powerful 
elites, since ‘global publics are unwittingly conditioned to comply and conform to governing 
authorities through historical, institutional and cultural notions of trust’ (Walters 2018).  
 
Corporations, governments, and environmentalists alike utilise the media’s position of trust 
and reach within a society in order to frame events and promote their agendas. The growth of 
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the public relations industry and its relationship with the media illustrates the evolution of 
corporate, government, and environmental strategies to communicate their views as reality to 
the public citizen.  
 
 
Public Relations and the Media 
 
Psychoanalyst Sigmund Freud first developed the concept of denial. His nephew, Edward 
Bernays, first developed public relations. For the purpose of this thesis, ‘public relations’ is 
defined as ‘the process of establishing and maintaining beneficial relations between an 
organisation and the publics on whom it depends’ (Hallahan 1999). Referred to in his obituary 
as ‘the father of public relations,’ Bernays believed it was possible to mould the public’s 
opinion through the use of public persuasion campaigns. In an essay titled ‘The Engineering of 
Consent,’ Bernays (1947: 114) described the relationship between democracy and public 
relations campaigns:  
 
Any person or organisation depends ultimately on public approval, and is therefore 
faced with the problem of engineering the public’s consent to a program or 
goal…The engineering of consent is the very essence of the democratic process, 
the freedom to persuade and suggest. (emphasis added) 
 
The essay describes two main ‘consent-engineering’ techniques that have subsequently become 
central in today’s public relations industry and were key in the debate surrounding the 
Carmichael Project: the press release and the use of ‘third-party experts’ (Herman and 
Chomsky 1994). When strategically released to the public, press releases and expert opinions 
can successfully influence how an issue is understood. The strategy, according to Bernays 
(1947), lies with the timing and content of these techniques. Public relations firms seek to plan 
events that are then projected through various communication systems to deliberately influence 
the public’s ideas and actions at a given time. In other words, public relations teams seek to 
create news. Therefore, in analysing a press release or statements made on behalf of a 
corporation (written by the corporation’s public relations team), it is important to keep in mind 
that no news story is coincidental in its timing – the when of the publication is an essential part 
of the what is being reported.  
 
Public relations firms have been increasingly focusing on environmental public relations, or 
greenwashing, according to Beder (1997), to advance their clients’ eco-friendly image and 
counter environmental activism. Greenwashing developed in the 1960s as the corporate 
response to an increase in public awareness of environmental issues, resulting from three 
factors. First, the dissemination of images depicting industrial accidents and environmental 
disasters through the media tilted public perceptions towards green advocacy. Second, 
information such as emissions data were – for the first time – legally required to be made 
public, which further threatened a corporation’s reputation. Third, polls revealed a majority of 
the US population considered themselves environmentalists who were generally distrusting of 
business to protect the environment (Beder 1997). 
 
Environmental public relations involves the use of online and print media, grassroots 






The main avenue of communicating information to the public has always been through the 
commercial media. While print newspaper readership has declined in recent years as a result 
of the proliferation of social media and other online news sources, newspapers still remain in 
high circulation. In Australia, for example, the Australian Bureau of Circulations (ABC) Paid 
Media Audit Data reported over 1.3 million paid media distributions of the weekday print of 
twelve newspapers (The Australian Financial Review, The Australian, Canberra Times, The 
Daily Telegraph, The Sydney Morning Herald, Northern Territory News, The Courier-Mail, 
The Advertiser, The Mercury, The Age, Herald Sun, and The West Australian) between July 
and September 2016. Of these twelve newspapers, four are owned by Fairfax Media, seven by 
News Limited, and one by Western Australian Newspapers, demonstrating that the gate-
keepers of Australian communication are concentrated between a small number of 
corporations.  
 
These corporations, with a monopoly over communication, are able to reach millions of people 
– both in Australia and across the world – every day. It is their role, as the public’s source of 
information, to filter information in order to present it in the form of a news story for an 
audience. According to Cohen (2011: 170-171), there are three filter ‘models’ that the 
commercial media follows when it absorbs information, processes it, and then represents it to 
the public: correspondence, arbitrariness, and pattern: 
 
In the correspondence model, selection is rational and objective. It provides an accurate 
and reliable reflection of reality, selecting events only according to their seriousness. 
 
In the arbitrariness model, selection is wholly irrational and unpredictable. The end result 
is determined by chance and contingency.  
 
In the pattern model, selection is structured by criteria extrinsic to the event’s seriousness: 
for example, the victim’s ethnic group, the perpetrators’ identity, or our social distance 
from the event. 
 
Each of the models allows for the selection of a story to be based on an unwritten list of criteria, 
based on what is proven to bring in the highest ratings to the news corporation. After all, as a 
corporation the end goal is maximising profits. Stories that are more likely to be selected are 
those that concern Western and American interests; are negative, graphic, and sensational in 
nature; whether the event matches the society’s political interests; and whether or not the story 
is already a story (Beder 1997).  
 
The relationship between public relations firms and these news corporations is one in which 
the PR firms aim to control – if not become – the media’s filter. Framing, a property of a 
message, limits or defines the message’s meaning by shaping the inferences that individuals 
can make about the message. Through processes of inclusion, exclusion, and emphasis, framing 
helps shape the perspectives through which people see the world (Hallahan 1999). Framing is 
also connected to the psychological reasons that people use to examine information, make 
judgements, and draw inferences around the world around them. For example, describing 
illegal drug use as a ‘public health issue’ versus a ‘criminal justice issue’ shapes the way the 
problem is and will be discussed (Altheide 1997). Framing choices can thus limit the 
information available to audiences who are trying to understand something they have not 
personally experienced (Clifford and White 2017).  
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There are a number of different types of news framing, according to Hallahan (1999).  For this 
thesis, the focus will be on valence-framing, semantic framing and story framing, as these will 
be shown to be the most prevalent amongst coverage of the Carmichael Project (see next 
chapter).  
 
Valence-framing involves the use of frames that represent alternative valencing of information 
(i.e., putting information in either a positive or negative light). A study by Bizer et al. (2011) 
revealed valence-framing appears to be a low-effort way to impact multiple features associated 
with strong attitudes. For example: 
 
Simply framing a person’s attitude negatively (i.e., in terms of a rejected position 
such as anti-Democrat) led to more resistance to an attack on that attitude than did 
framing the same attitude positively (i.e., in terms of a preferred position such as 
pro-Republican) (Bizer et al. 2011: 59).  
 
Valence-framing thus influences the ‘attitude certainty’ and behavioural intentions that are 
consistent with a given attitude. In the environmental debate, valence-framing can be found in 
news stories that put Green political candidates or environmental activists in a negative light 
(i.e., as ‘anti-jobs’). 
 
Semantic framing on the other hand, involves a simple alternative phrasing of terms and is used 
to focus on particular attributes that might be flattering or derogatory in order to ‘be 
advantageous or disadvantageous to message sponsors in persuasive communication’ 
(Hallahan 1999: 212). This type of framing relies on semantic differences related to making 
what is fundamentally the same choice, such as describing beef as ‘75% lean’ or ’25% fat’. 
 
Story framing involves first selecting key themes or ideas that are the focus of the message 
and, second, incorporating a variety of storytelling or narrative techniques that support that 
theme (Hallahan 1999). This type of framing subtly suggests how a text or event should be 
interpreted and can include the presence of hypotheses that explain relationships; metaphors 
and similes; provocative language; and catchphrases. 
 
Valence, semantic and story framing operate by biasing the cognitive processing of information 
by the audience. Contextual cues guide decision making and inferences made by the receiver 
of the message. At its core, framing aims to provide the context of the information. This 
emphasis allows framing to be used in multiple situations, summarised in Table 5.4 below: 
 
Table 5.4 Framing in Public Relations 
 
What is framed Description 
Situations Relationships between individuals in 
situations found in everyday living and 
literature.  
Attributes Characteristics of people, places, and things 
are accentuated while others are ignored, 
thus biasing the processing of information in 
terms of focal attributes. 
Choices Posing alternative decisions in either 
negative (loss) or positive (gain) terms can 
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bias choices in situations involving 
uncertainty, sometimes creating false 
dilemmas. 
Issues Social problems and disputes can be 
explained in alternative terms by different 
parties who vie for their preferred definition 
of a problem or situation to prevail. 
Responsibility  Individuals attribute cause of events to either 
internal or external factors. People portray 
their role in events based on their self-image 
in ways that maximize benefits and minimize 
culpability. People usually attribute causes to 
personal actions rather than systemic 
problems in society. 
Actions In persuasive contexts, the probability that a 
person will act to attain a desired goal is 
influenced by whether alternatives are stated 
in positive or negative terms. 
News Media reports use familiar and culturally 
resonating themes to relay information about 
events. Sources vie for their preferred 
framing to be featured. 




The concept of ‘risk’ provides a good illustration of the relationship between the media and PR 
firms. How risk is constructed by the corporation and communicated as truth by various 
journalists depends on how the concept is framing to fit a specific agenda and audience. Risk, 
as defined by the PR firm, is the chance of regulation and lawsuits to the company, rather than 
health and environmental hazards to the community. Communicating risk is the explaining of 
findings in company experts’ risk assessments as a way of correcting and shaping the public’s 
view of a proposed project’s risks. This is done through the use of a ‘risk communicator.’ 
 
A PR firm’s risk communicator’s main concern is to present a company’s endeavour as low- 
or no- risk to the press. In order to reduce the public’s fears and to gain acceptance for a 
company’s hazardous projects, concerned citizens are included into the decision-making 
process through the use of advisory boards with local residents and environmentalists. 
Company experts can then attend these meetings to ‘explain’ complicated risk studies as well 
as newspaper headlines to make their case. Risk communication also consists of putting a 
positive spin on any negative aspect of a company’s practices. Offering an alternate 
interpretation of a company’s bad environmental practices emphasises its positive practices. 
For example, if a corporation paid fines to the state’s environmental protection authority in an 
amount less than the previous year, it can claim a “positive trend in compliance.” Similarly, a 
company’s claim to the “levelling off of emissions” can be its way of reporting no improvement 
from the previous year’s emissions (Beder 1997).  
 
A symbiotic relationship between PR firms and journalists is established out of the firm’s desire 
to create news and the media’s desire for access to relevant and exciting stories. Public relations 
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firms, through press releases given to journalists on behalf of corporate clients, can control how 
and when an incident is reported, shaping the public’s agenda and opinion of the corporation.  
 
Journalists are saved hours of time in investigation for a story to write about as the press 
releases offer regular and reliable information directly from the company itself. Not only do 
the press releases form the foundation of the journalists’ articles, but they are often published 
unaltered and unaugmented with commentary. Studies have shown that the practice of passing 
a company’s press release as a newspaper’s own article does not vary among large and small 
papers; press releases are the basis for up to fifty percent of the news content of US newspapers 
(Beder 1997: 113). The PR firm benefits from this practice in three ways. By using the media, 
with its profile of ‘independent truth seeker,’ to put forward the corporate view, an otherwise 
blatant self-promotion is granted credibility with the public. By providing the press releases to 
journalists, PR firms turn journalists away from investigative reporting to a reactionary type of 
reporting. Journalists are less likely to look for their own stories if they are given content to 
report. By putting journalists in touch with ‘experts’ who offer ‘impartial’ authority, PR firms 
control not only the way in which the story is reported but who the public hears the story from 
as well (Beder 1997: 113). Together, news and PR firms are responsible for the construction 
of social reality. Media framing can be viewed as ‘a tool of power that can be used in the 




Painting a corporation as ‘green’ or environmentally conscious allows merely the promise of 
reform – without plans on how the change will be carried out – to be one of the key public 
relations scripts. Earth Day, for example, provides corporations with a yearly opportunity to 
publicize the future direction of their environmental contributions and reforms. Similar events 
such as awards ceremonies and fairs allow for the corporation to showcase their green 
credentials while building a relationship with environmentalists and the local community. 
Pearse (2012: 64) highlights the greenwashing of these events with his analysis of “Earth 
Hour,” an initiative launched by the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) that emphasises the savings 
generated by everyone turning off the lights for an hour:  
 
In Australia, WWF even made Anna Bligh, then premier of Queensland, an official Earth 
Hour Ambassador. When Bligh was not dimming the lights for Earth Hour, she ran the 
most coal-friendly jurisdiction on Earth, and boasted about how she was helping to 
‘supersize’ the coal industry. 
 
The PR industry categorises environmental activists into different groups based on how 
“radical” their views and actions are, in order to determine the proper way of dealing with 
them. For example, the PR firm Mongoven, Biscoe, and Duchin categorise activists as either 
radicals, opportunists, idealists, or realists. Their formula for engineering consent, in Bernays’ 
terms, is to, “isolate the radicals, turn the idealists into realists, co-opt the realists to support 
industry solutions and the opportunists will go along with the final agreement” (Beder 1997: 
134). The most crucial part of this strategy, from the perspective of the PR firm is the isolation 
of the radical environmentalists in order to ‘divide and conquer’. Beder (1997: 135) illustrates 
how climate change scientists are able to be dismissed:  
 
[I]f a NASA scientist concludes that global warming is underway and another scientist 
questions this, the NASA scientist is seen to be the more extreme of the two, even if her 
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assumptions are more conservative, because her conclusion ‘deviates from normative 
expectancies’.  
 
Advertisements can also advance a corporation’s image as one that is green; one that can be 
trusted in local communities to carry out a project without harm to the environment (Bouwer 
2016. “Advocacy advertisements” sell political beliefs, appealing to the public as citizens 
rather than consumers (Beder 1997: 185). Corporations can use advocacy advertisements to 
claim that their business practices align with the public’s interest. Environmentalism, a major 
theme of advocacy ads, takes three distinct forms, according to Beder (1997: 187). 
Advertisements can exaggerate industry efforts in controlling environmental harms such as 
pollution. For example, a company may boast of ‘voluntary’ efforts that in reality may have 
been government mandated or compare their pollution to other ‘more harmful’ industries. 
Advertisements can also minimize the adverse consequences of pollution while overstating 
negative economic consequences on jobs. This type of claim is often seen in the beginning 
stages of a project (for example, a mining project) to dispel arguments that the project would 
do more harm than good and at the end of a project’s term, to congratulate the company on its 
successes. Advertisements may also suggest that individual consumers can solve the problem 
through their voluntary actions. This strategy is often seen in Earth Day and similar campaigns 
promoting ‘conscious consumerism’.  
 
Advocacy ads appear on all forms of media and make up what Newt Gingrich called a 
“Communications Plan” in 1991. The Communications Plan’s goal was to “create a 
propaganda machine for widespread distribution of broadcast, print, and computer 
communications to supply our activists and potential followers with ideas, information and 
rhetoric” (Beder 1997: 196). This has resulted in a right-wing media network that influences 
the mainstream national media’s agenda by ensuring the people whom journalists seek for 
interviews, statements, and broadcasted appearances are corporate-funded. A study of the 
Public Broadcasting Service in America, which has been criticized by conservatives for its 
liberal slant, revealed that the majority of its programming used corporate sources and 
government spokespersons, rarely inviting activists such as environmentalists to state their 
views. Another study on US media coverage of environmental issues revealed that mainstream 
environmental reporting did not ‘take its cue’ from environmentalists but instead relied on the 
government, corporate, and non-scientific academic establishments (Beder 1997: 198). In 
Australia, a journalist’s career is likely to evolve into a career as press secretary to politicians. 
This revolving door between media and government and media and public relations firms 
severs the possibility of news reporting that is objective in nature and critical of the 
establishment. As a result, environmental problems are reported inaccurately (Jain 2012). 
Media outlets, in seeking to provide entertainment while also attracting viewers for advertisers, 
ignore issues that most concern those in lower socio-economic classes who lack purchasing 
power. Environmental issues such as global warming disproportionately affects the global poor 
and working classes, yet is reported superficially: the focus is placed on individual events rather 
than the systematic causes of the problems, with an emphasis on the costs of environmental 




Every year thousands of lawsuits totalling millions of dollars are filed against individual 
citizens and environmental groups for speaking out against corporations (Beder 2004). The 
targets of these suits are, in effect, penalized for utilizing their democratic rights—the right to 
organize, petition, and engage in public discourse and peaceful demonstrations—because 
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powerful corporations see this behaviour as detrimental to their business and profits. Pring and 
Canan (1996) have labelled these law suits SLAPPs: Strategic Lawsuits Against Public 
Participation. Corporations, knowing that they cannot sue people for exercising their 
democratic rights, file SLAPPs on the basis of technical legal grounds (such as conspiracy) in 
order to stifle discourse and deter future opposition on a local public issue (Pring and Canan 
1996; Ogle 2009). It is the cost of the court case, in both time and money, which is most 
detrimental to the individual or environmental group. The defendant finds him or herself having 
to take a hiatus from speaking out against the corporation or proposed harmful act in order to 
hire a lawyer, prepare arguments, and appear in court. Although these cases are rarely argued 
successfully by the corporation that filed the writ, the corporation still “wins” if the defendant 
stops engaging in the so-called “detrimental” activism. Even if the SLAPPs do not go to trial, 
the objective of scaring off potential opponents can be achieved merely by the threat of the 
court case (Beder 2004).  
 
One example of a SLAPP in Australia is the 2004 Gunns Limited writ. Gunns Limited was 
Australia’s largest forest products company at the time, owning more than 175,000 hectares of 
land. The main contributor to the $606 million company was the export of woodchips—most 
coming from old growth forests—to Japan to be made into paper products. Recognising the 
scope of the environmental damage caused by this trade, activists from different environmental 
organisations throughout Australia and Japan collaborated in a strategy of dissent to prevent 
future destruction of old growth forests by Gunns. The Wilderness Society, Japan Tropical 
Forest Action Network, and Greenpeace Japan, among others, launched a multi-pronged 
campaign against turning old growth forests into woodchips. Through sit-ins and protests at 
the logging sites, for example, the activists disrupted “business as usual” (Salama and White 
2017). 
 
While the categorisation of activists allows PR firms and corporations to engineer the public’s 
consent for a project, SLAPPS work to stifle the public’s dissent. Intimidating civilians from 
taking advantage of their democratic right to protest and criticise government benefits the 
corporation and government, in that both entities can claim little to no resistance and 
widespread support for their endeavours. Gunns responded with a 216-page writ that referred 
to the direct action taken to stop logging as ‘‘guerrilla activities’’ (Gunns v Marr 2006) The 
‘‘Gunns20’’—that is, 20 targets ranging from individual activists that included Green MPs Bob 
Brown and Peg Putt through to environmental groups such as The Wilderness Society, were 
accused of con- spiring to injure and damage Gunns by interfering with the company’s trade 
and business through unlawful means (Salama and White 2017). The company argued the 
multiple direct and ideological campaigns launched by these 20 individuals and groups were 
detrimental to the company. The timber company sued this group of environmentalists, 
protesters and Green MPs for AUS$6.3 million.  
 
The targets of these lawsuits are rarely radical environmentalists or citizens with an activist 
history but rather ordinary middle-class citizens who are concerned about their local 
environment. This is intentional, as ordinary citizens do not have the support from large 
environmental organisations (in finances or ideological commitment), have the most to lose 
from the threat of a lawsuit (in the form of assets that can be seized), and are therefore easily 
intimidated by the possibility of legal actions. For a small amount of money, anyone is able to 
put up a statement of claims against another person, whether or not there is any evidence to 





From an activist perspective, a number of protest techniques can be used to inform the public 
about the disastrous consequences of a corporation’s or government’s actions, such as public 
displays of dissent, litigation and investigation of corporate wrongdoing (Salama and White 
2017). Corporate bodies and governments, emphasising threats to jobs or to ‘national security’, 
label some of these protest activities as ‘ecoterrorism’ and those who participate as ‘extremists’ 
or ‘ecoterrorists’ (Hasler et al. 2019). For example, the United States’ FBI released a memo 
titled ‘The Threat of Eco-Terrorism’, in which Domestic Terrorism Section Chief James F. 
Jarboe defined eco-terrorism as ‘the use or threatened use of violence of a criminal nature 
against innocent victims or property by an environmentally-oriented, subnational group for 
environmental-political reasons, or aimed at an audience beyond the target, often of a symbolic 
nature’ (FBI 2002). This definition is contradictory to a leading internationally accepted 
definition by the International Policy Institute for Counter-Terrorism, which emphasises that 
the ‘targets of terrorism are civilians’ and terrorism ‘is an act purposely directed against 
civilians’ (Gristmill 2005).  
 
A state’s usage of terms like ‘eco-terrorism’ and ‘eco-terrorists’ is linked to its level of 
development.  Countries with large military presences such as the US and the UK present the 
issue of global security as an imperative. Environmental harm issues are therefore subsidiary 
considerations. Activists that oppose the legitimated and legal actions of powerful elites in such 
affluent nations are thus more likely to be targeted as eco-terrorists. The label attached to these 
protestors mark them as threats to capital accumulation and the interests of the powerful and 
subject them to spying, threats, and legal action against them (Hirsch-Hoefler and Mudde 
2014).  
 
Along with classifying environmentalists into various groups, local residents are also 
categorised by PR firms in order to target those that can be persuaded and isolate those who 
cannot. Scheduling public meetings to discuss a proposal allows the PR firm to provide a 
structured environment for public involvement, one in which they control the form and 
discussion that takes place. Environmental allies are often invited to the meetings while 
dissenters are labelled as ignorant or having vested interests.  
 
The rise of the public relations industry and its concentration on environmental issues has 
ushered in an era of unprecedented state-corporate collusion, as facilitated by the media. 
Through the media’s regurgitation of press releases and advertisements written by PR firms 
claiming their corporate client’s green credentials, environmental harms are neutralised and 
denied to the public. The greenwashing of the public agenda can be countered through the 




Criminologists are not alone in studying techniques of neutralisation. As this chapter has 
shown, governments and corporations have also studied and utilised the many scripts of denial. 
When a controversial project, such as a large-scale mining proposal, faces public scrutiny, 
those in favour of its approval have at their disposal a set of response strategies to combat 
arguments against the proposed action. This list is composed of narratives, modelled on 
successful neutralisation techniques, that have utilised by previous corporations faced with 
similar challenges. While it is difficult to completely deny the harm caused by coal mining in 
a world that has become increasingly aware of the dangers of climate change, the use of these 
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techniques of neutralisation and denial present a false debate: scientific facts, such as those 
surrounding fossil fuels’ contribution to climate change, are appealed with emotional claims, 
suggesting that facts are merely opinions by the ‘opposing side.’ Adani and the Australian 
Government use these tactics to rationalise the approval of the Carmichael Project, neutralise 
the Project’s harm, and maintain their corporate image at the expense of those whom they cast 
as the other; environmental activists. 
 
What follows is an analysis of the specific accounts that Adani representatives and members 
of the Australian government have made to promote and defend the benefits and environmental 
sustainability of the Project and to deny the environmental harms that would result from the 
Project. The quotations evidencing neutralisation and denial were taken from legal submissions 
made under oath by Adani and the Australian government, interviews and reports by various 
online newspaper articles, and the websites of the stakeholders. An analysis of the language 
used in these accounts confirms that the denials follow the same scripts as previous denials for 
mining projects and suggests that those who use these scripts are aware of the harm that claim 
not to recognize. 
 
	 111 
Chapter Six  
 




“But the coal will come from different countries without our environmental record, coal that is 
of lower quality … that will burn more carbon-dioxide emissions. This project is not just pro-
development, it’s not just anti-poverty, it’s also pro-environment as well. – Matt Canavan” 
(The Australian 2016). 
 
“With regard to the impacts of the emissions caused by the use of the coal from the mine, 
recipient nations will need to meet their obligations under the United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change” (Department of Energy and the Environment 2015). 
 
“The project is over 300 kilometres inland from the Queensland coast in a dry and dusty region 
of outback Queensland. Mining will not have any direct impacts on the Great Barrier Reef” 






A decision to build a mega-mine should depend on the facts, with an analysis of the known 
harms weighed against potential benefits. Yet the corporate stakeholders and government 
officials who publicly support the building of the Carmichael Project have used a particular set 
of scripts to deny the Project’s environmental harms, skewing the conversation from one of 
fact vs. fiction to one of rhetoric and emotionally-charged allegations. 
 
The 2016 Lowy Institute poll shows that Australians generally agree that the use of fossil fuels 
is in decline and the use of fossil fuels should be reduced in order to combat climate change 
(see Figure 6.1). Regardless of this shared sentiment, however, Australians would also most 
likely agree with Senator Canavan, who defended the coal mining industry against 
environmentalists who ‘don’t live in the real world’ by stating that mining is ‘just what we 
need to do to make a buck’ (Stevens 2019). 
 
Figure 6.1 Lowy Institute Poll on fossil fuels 
 
(source: Lowy Institute 2016) 
 
The mixed views as to the role Australians should play with regard to the use fossil fuels raises 
questions as to what the Australian public believes to be true regarding the relationship between 
fossil fuels and climate change and fossil fuels and their relationship to a country’s economy. 
To understand why this confusion exists, this chapter examines the ways in which a 
demonstrably harmful project has been defended by those who stand to benefit from its 
approval and operation. 
 
In the last chapter, techniques of neutralisation, the concept of denying harm, and greenwashing 
were discussed through the research of Sykes and Matza’s, Cohen, and Beder. Using those 
concepts, this chapter provides an analysis of the scripts used to frame, neutralise and deny the 
harms associated with the Carmichael Project. Statements made by representatives of the 
Queensland state and Commonwealth governments and Adani stakeholders in legal 
submissions, media statements, and press releases are discussed. in order to answer the 
question: What techniques of neutralisation are employed by Adani and each level of 
government to deny/minimise/externalise the harm that will result from the approval and 
operation of the Carmichael Project? 
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Justifying the Carmichael Project  
 
The ways in which the Carmichael Project is defended and championed by Adani and some 
Australian politicians at the state and federal levels takes many forms. There are instances of 
denial (i.e., of environmental harms such as contributions to climate change); and necessity 
(i.e., arguing the Project must be built not because it is not harmful to the environment but 
because of its various benefits to society); and claims of unfair treatment by those who 
condemn the Project (i.e., the environmental activists who have ‘shady’ motives or incomplete 
facts). This section organises these claims by the frameworks described in the previous chapter. 
 
Defence of Necessity  
 
Defence of necessity makes use of the “we have no choice” narrative in order to deem the 
proposed action obligatory, due to some outside variable. Defence of necessity assumes that 
the act will occur regardless of what any individual, corporation, or government chooses, 
thereby making it necessary in some metaphysical sense (Heath 2008). In defending the 
necessity of the Carmichael Project, the script is: ‘if we don’t get the necessary approvals for 
this project, someone else will.’ As former Australian Environment Minister Greg Hunt once 
stated, “If the Project is inevitable, Australia should benefit”. Adani Australia chief executive, 
Jeyakumar Janakaraj mirrored this claim when he said, ‘India is a large consumer of coal either 
way. If Australia doesn't produce and give India high quality and highly sustainable mining, it 
is going to rely on coal that comes from less reliable geographies.’ 
 
As is the case for most infrastructural projects, the argument for the Carmichael Project began 
with the claim of economic prosperity (i.e., the promise of jobs for the jobless and the economic 
growth of impoverished communities). A defence of economic necessity aims to turn the focus 
of the debate on the positive effects of the Project; and away from the criticisms involving the 
Project’s environmentally harmful effects. After this script was scrutinised by activists and 
politicians who oppose the Carmichael Project, the defence of (economic) necessity became a 
defence of moral necessity; arguing a moral imperative as the Project would not only bring 
jobs to Queensland, but also lift Indian people out of electricity-poverty.  
 
Defence of necessity – both economic and moral necessity – in this case, are complementary. 
Together the scripts allow for the Carmichael Project to appear not only harmless, but also 
beneficial and inevitable. Framing the Project in such a positive light also sets up the possibility 
for the denial of responsibility of the harmful action later on: It cannot be proven that the 
corporation or individual “caused” the harm without causality. In other words, had the 
corporation not engaged in the harmful (but necessary) act, the harm would have still occurred 




Beginning in 2010 with Adani’s Initial Advice Statement, stakeholders (among them Minister 
for the Environment Greg Hunt, the Queensland Palaszczuk government, and Adani 
representatives) have claimed the Carmichael Project would bring thousands of jobs for 
Australians living near the proposed mining site. “Jobs will return to these small regional 
mining communities”, Anastasia Palaszczuk stated (ABC 2016a). In a time when 77% of 
Australians believe that ‘the economy’ is an important issue facing Australia (Lowy Institute 
2016), the promise of thousands of jobs – especially to those living in rural communities – 
makes any project enticing for community support. Advertising large job numbers also makes 
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it difficult for politicians or citizens who are against the building of any new mines to justify 
rejecting the project. Speaking out or voting against the Carmichael Project becomes difficult 
to do without coming across as insensitive to the rural Australians who are told would benefit 
from the Project’s approval and operation. 
 
Although the number of jobs promised to Queenslanders by Adani gradually decreased, going 
from 10,000 to “over 5,000,” and later to a low of 1,464 jobs, the strength of the defence of 
necessity technique lies in the belief that these (inevitable) jobs from the (inevitable) project 
should not go elsewhere. For the people living in the communities surrounding the proposed 
mining site, the actual number of jobs is not as important as making sure that they are not ‘taken 
away.’ In fact, 10,000 is still the number of jobs promoted by Adani spokesmen – contrary to 
the findings in the Land Court of Australia in 2015 – and the number most often cited in relation 
to the Carmichael Project’s economic benefits. Figure 6.2 shows the heading of the Adani 
Australia page boasting the creation of 10,000 jobs over a year after the court found the figure 
to be misleading: 
 




(source: Adani Australia 2016) 
 
Once again, the argument is that in order to survive the competitiveness of the marketplace – 
in this case the Australian, but also more broadly the global economy – Queenslanders should 
benefit from the jobs from the Carmichael Project. Otherwise, people elsewhere in the world 
will, to Queensland’s detriment.  
 
Yet, there is another component to the economic discussion that has been largely ignored by 
the state and corporation: the damage to the Great Barrier Reef as a result of the Carmichael 
Project will cost Queensland thousands of jobs in tourism and millions of dollars in tourism 
each year. There are currently 70,000 jobs directly related to the Reef, some of which will be 
lost if the Reef is significantly damaged by the Carmichael Project (Kenny 2016). According 
to a study conducted by The Australia Institute, 3.7 million international tourists visited 
Australia in 2015 – 1.6 million of these tourists spent most of their time in Queensland. The 
Great Barrier Reef also attracted 2.4 million Australians that same year (Kenny 2016). If the 
reef areas continue to bleach, surveyed potential visitors stated that they would be likely to 
decide to consider travelling to another country entirely, costing Australia an estimated $1 
billion per year in overseas income (Kenny 2016).  
 
It is difficult to ascertain exactly how many jobs the Carmichael Project will bring for 
Australians for a number of reasons. First, news articles report disagreeing figures as a result 
of the ongoing debate between Adani and government representatives and environmental 
organisations. The issue with debating the economic economic benefits of the mine (through 
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job creation figures) is it allows for the underlying assumption that the Carmichael Project will 
not only be approved but will also bring some economic benefit to go unchallenged. The 
dialogue is focused on the degree of economic benefits, when it is not certain that the Project 
will be operational or beneficial in the first place. This is one example of how Adani and the 
Australian state can semantically frame and control the debate surrounding a Project to its own 
benefit.  
 
An ABC article from December 2016 argues there is another reason why the job figure remains 
unknown: the use of automatic machinery on mining sites (Briggs and Riga 2016). After 
mining corporation Rio Tinto began the practice of using remote-controlled trucks in Western 
Australia, driverless trucks have increasingly been used at mining sites similar to the Galilee 
Basin. Adani has publically admitted to planning to use this technology to transport coal should 
the Carmichael Mine be approved. The announcement, not receiving much media coverage, 
was not well received by the The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (CFMEU) 
in Queensland. Individuals who hope to benefit from the Carmichael Project’s jobs and had 
organised to petition for the mine in the past have lobbied the Queensland and federal 
governments to end their tax rebate on diesel fuel for driverless trucks, hoping to force Adani 
to reconsider Queensland truck drivers instead. The conversation surrounding automated 
machinery strips the economic defence of necessity of another layer, revealing it to be merely 
a technique of neutralisation by the Project’s stakeholders. Once all of the sides of the story 
have been considered and facts are separated from rhetoric, it instead becomes economically 
necessary for Australia not to permit the Carmichael Project from operating. The Project’s 
actual economic effects include hurting the Queensland and federal tourism sector through 
destruction of the Great Barrier Reef and threatening more jobs involving the Great Barrier 
Reef than would be created through the mining of the Galilee Basin. Ben Oquist, the Australia 
Institute’s executive director, states that the Queensland economy is ‘modern and diverse,’ with 
four in five people working in the service industry compared to only one per cent who work in 
the coal industry. Therefore, ‘policies such as a moratorium on new coal mines can be 
implemented with a minimal effect on the Queensland economy’ (Kenny 2016). 
 
In addition to automated machinery replacing workers adding uncertainty around the actual 
number of jobs that the Carmichael Project would provide, the Australia Institute also found 
developing new coalmines in the Galilee Basin would cost approximately 12,500 jobs in 
existing coalmining regions: 9,000 jobs in the Hunter Valley in NSW; 2,000 jobs in 
Queensland’s Bowen Basin; and 1,4000 jobs in Queensland’s Surat Basin (Smee 2018b). “Put 
simply, new mines, in new coal basins, destroy jobs in existing coal regions,” the institute’s 
director of research, Roderick Campbell stated, adding that is a view shared by many in the 
resources sector, with existing miners believing their interests are ‘best served by restricting 
supply and maintaining near-record export prices’ (Smee 2018b).  
 
The International Energy Agency (IEA) has predicted the global demand for coal will be halved 
by 2040 and the ‘boom years’ for coal have passed. The Institute for Energy Economics stated 
that in light of the IEA’s prediction, ‘any moves to develop new coal resources would hurt 
existing miners’ (Smee 2018b). Tim Buckley, an energy market analyst at the Institute for 
Energy Economics, said: 
 
It’s in our national interest to have an orderly retreat from coal. Ironically, it’s in 
the interest of the incumbent industry too. It’s in Queensland’s interest not to flood 
the market…because the only result is it will drive prices down. That maximises 
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the royalties to the Queensland government. It maximizes the profits to coal 
companies. It also allows decent wages to the workers (Smee 2018b). 
 
Once scrutinised, the argument for the economic necessity of the Carmichael Project is shown 
to be baseless. This argument represents a method of justifying the building of a new mine in 
order for the Queensland region to financially benefit through the creation of thousands of new 
jobs. However, as evidenced by the Land Court in Queensland and a number of independent 
studies, due to the increased use of automated machinery on mining sites; decline in coal value 
and demand; and threats to jobs in the Great Barrier Reef tourism sector and workers on 
existing mines in Australia, the Carmichael Project is not only not economically beneficial, but 




As the purported economic benefits are revealed to be inflated or false, the Carmichael 
Project’s stakeholders provided another type of justification. Moral necessity ‘upgrades’ the 
defence of the Project from an economic endeavour to one that is also philanthropic in its intent. 
Since the Project is ultimately measured by a triple bottom line that includes a social element, 
a moral defence of necessity helps stakeholders depict the Project as a ‘sustainable 
development.’ This was once stated by the chief executive of Adani Australia, who claimed 
the Carmichael mine “is mine is primarily aimed at bringing electricity to 100 million people 
in India, to improve their quality of life and indeed provide them with better health, education 
and employment opportunities”. However, this argument has been mostly made by Australian 
Energy Minister Josh Frydenberg, who framed the Carmichael Project as an Australian 
humanitarian effort to lift millions of Indian people out of energy poverty. Both economic and 
moral defences share the strategy of shifting the conversation away from whether or not the 
mining endeavour should be approved to whether or not the job and electricity figures have 
been accurately reported – effectively denying the Project’s harms.  
 
Josh Frydenberg became Australia’s Minister for Environment and Energy after Greg Hunt in 
July 2016. Unlike Hunt, who often cited the Project’s economic necessity, Frydenberg instead 
chose a more emotional appeal; one that focused on the good the mine could bring beyond 
monetary profits. Frydenberg’s frequent response to critics of the Carmichael Project involved 
the claim of a “strong moral case” for its approval – one that arguably mimicked former Prime 
Minister Tony Abbott’s infamous “coal is good for humanity” line. Depicting the Carmichael 
Project as a humanitarian effort that would provide electricity to some million Indians for the 
first time can be understood as an example of valence-framing (i.e., the one-sided portrayal of 
the Project as good).  Frydenberg was quoted describing the Carmichael Project by saying, 
“Most importantly of all it will help lift hundreds of millions of people out of energy poverty, 
not just in India but right across the world… I think there is a strong moral case here” (Kelly 
2015). At another time, he stated, “I think there's a strong moral case here - I've just been at the 
G20 and at the APEC energy ministers' meeting and they pointed out that over a billion people 
around the world don't have access to electricity.” Scrutinising the elements of this claim in 
order to separate fact from rhetoric reveals that attempting to repackage coal as the new 
industrial revolution is a technique of neutralisation and denial of harm.  
 
First, the ‘global poor’ is the socioeconomic group that has been and will continue to be the 
first to suffer the effects of climate change. The situation taking place in India’s neighbouring 
country of Bangladesh illustrates how climate change is already affecting the most 
marginalised people in the world. Over half a million people have been forced to move to the 
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country’s capital city, Dhaka, after the flooding of their lands and homes. One-fifth of 
Bangladesh, which is located on the delta formed by some of Asia’s largest rivers, is expected 
to be covered in water if sea levels rise by just 3.2 feet, less than 1 kilometre (Nikitas 2015). 
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that in the next five years, 
20 million people will be victims of climate-induced displacement and migration. This is more 
than the population of Los Angeles, Chicago and New York City combined (Shachi 2015). Not 
only is this mass migration of people from the outskirts of the country to the the already 
overpopulated and increasingly hostile capital city unsustainable for Bangladesh, it also has 
potential impacts for the rest of the world. Bangladesh is proof climate change is not something 
that future generations will face but a real issue for real people living today. The Carmichael 
Project’s contribution of 79 billion tonnes of GHG emissions into the atmosphere would be 
disastrous for countries such as Bangladesh; millions of people will become climate change 
refugees, something the world is ill-prepared to handle. Frydenberg’s claim is one-sided. He 
ignores the damage that the process of mining the coal – through GHG emissions and 
contribution to climate change – would have on the very population he claims will benefit from 
the mined coal.  
 
Upon examining Frydenberg’s claim further, it is found that the people he argues would benefit 
from the mined coal would actually not receive any benefits from the Project at all. Frydenberg 
suggests that there is a certain population (first, ‘hundreds of millions,’ then ‘over a billion’) 
of Indians living without electricity that will receive electricity from the coal mined in the 
Carmichael Mine. While it is true that there are many people living without electricity in India, 
Greens Senator Larissa Waters responded to Frydenberg’s moral defence of the mine by 
pointing out that “four out of five people without electricity in India are not connected to an 
electricity grid so they can’t access coal-fired power” (Aston 2015). The infrastructure needed 
to connect these people to electricity does not exist and, therefore, they will not be able to 
benefit from the mine’s coal. The government of India has not made any statements in support 
of Frydenberg’s claims. It has not announced the construction of any new electricity grids, 
specifically not in time for the Carmichael Project to benefit those who are living without 
electricity. Although Waters’s statement suggests one out of five people without electricity in 
India is connected to an electricity grid, and therefore may benefit from the coal produced by 
the Carmichael Project, it remains unclear how the Indian government plans to use this coal. 
Furthermore, Indian analysts have found that expensive coal imports, such as those brought to 
India from Australia, increase the price of power due to the rise in electricity tariffs (Financial 
Express 2018). It is therefore unlikely that those living in energy poverty – those among India’s 
lowest socioeconomic status – would be able to afford the high price of electricity even if the 
Indian government were to build an electricity grid and connect them in time for the 
Carmichael’s coal to be burned on their behalf. These findings cast a shadow of doubt on 
Frydenberg’s claim that the Carmichael mine’s coal would help Indian people.  
 
The moral defence of the Carmichael Project also has a dangerous side-effect. The script 
perpetuates the labelling of environmentalists as the ‘other side’. In this sense, the moral 
defence of necessity is similar to the economic defence of necessity, which, when consistently 
repeated, makes it awkward for politicians and activists to reject at the risk of ignoring the 
economic needs of rural Australians. Large-scale resource extraction disguised as foreign aid 
is a way for the government to seem as though they value human life over nature (Wilson 
2015). Following this line of thinking, environmental groups and others who have critiqued the 
government’s approval of the Carmichael Project due to its harms to the environment or 
endangered species are also opposed to helping eradicate poverty. Not only is this a false 
dichotomy (protecting humans and non-human nature is not mutually exclusive), the logic is 
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flawed – the argument equates fossil fuels with human prosperity. Coal is given a feel-good 
narrative which presents it as a national saviour in an appeal to the emotions of the audience 
(Brevini and Woronov 2017). As former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott declared: “Coal is good 
for humanity, coal is good for prosperity, coal is an essential part of our economic future, here 
in Australia, and right around the world” (ABC 2014). The script is essentially: “coal has 
always lifted people out of poverty and we [the government and corporation] support investing 
in coal mining projects that will lift people out of poverty!” The moral defence of necessity 
thus places the burden of proof on environmentalist groups. Even though the claim of ‘lifting 
millions of people out of energy poverty’ is untrue, by repeating the script in statements to the 
media, this statement becomes a part of the (storytelling) framing of the Project. The 
Carmichael Project, Adani, and those politicians who approve of the endeavour are associated 
with positive news (eradicating energy poverty or bringing new jobs to Queensland). By the 
same token, environmentalists and those who disprove of the Carmichael are associated 
negatively.  
 
The final indicator that the moral case for coal is merely a technique of neutralisation is found 
in the language used to make the defence. Assuming that the Carmichael Project would truly 
“lift millions of people out of poverty,” it would follow that Josh Frydenberg, Adani 
representatives, and other stakeholders would be able to provide further details as to how this 
would be achieved and express this argument in a variety of ways. Yet when Frydenberg spoke 
about the moral case for the Carmichael Project to ABC’s Insiders in October 2015, he used 
the same phrase twice - “There is a strong moral case” – in the span of a few minutes, before 
making some emotionally charged statements. Host Barrie Cassidy suggested Frydenberg’s 
argument was making it appear that selling coal overseas was a foreign aid effort, to which 
Frydenberg responded: 
 
There is a strong moral case here. Over a billion people don’t have access to 
electricity. That means that more than 2 billion people today are using wood and 
dung for their cooking…I’ve just been at the G20 and at the APEC energy ministers 
meeting and they pointed out over one billion people around the world don’t have 
access to electricity. This means that more than two billion people today are using 
wood and dung for their cooking…Now the World Health Organization says that 
this leads to 4.3 million premature deaths. That’s more people dying through those 
sort of inefficient forms of energy than from malaria, from tuberculosis and HIV 
AIDS all combined. There’s a strong moral case that the green activists sometimes 
don’t comprehend (ABC Insiders 2015, emphasis added). 
 
“Strong moral case” serves as a memorable catch phrase – an element of storytelling framing 
– in support of the Carmichael Project. “Strong moral case” has appeared in numerous media 
headlines since the Insiders interview, alluding to the revolving door between PR firms and the 
media. Frydenberg has repeated this phrase, as Palaszczuk has repeated the claim of the 
Carmichael mine bringing’10,000 jobs to Queensland” as justification for the project. Yet the 
Carmichael Project will bring neither jobs for Australians nor electricity for Indians.  
 
Once the defence of economic and moral necessity scripts are scrutinised it is clear that they 
are methods of denying the harm that the mine would bring while also a way to create a story 
that benefits those who seek the Project’s approval. In fact, the Carmichael Project would not 
only threaten thousands of jobs in the tourism industry of the Great Barrier Reef, but it would 
also provide few – if any – jobs for human Queenslanders, giving the Australian government 
has an economic reason to reject the proposal. On the same token, the mining project would 
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not lift a single person out of poverty but instead contribute to climate change in a way that 
threatens those living in poverty most severely and immediately – a moral reason for the 
Australian government to reject the proposal. Former Greens Senator Larissa Waters concludes 
there is “a strong moral case for Australia to help develop the renewable energy technology 
that will safely provide people in developing countries with power” (Aston 2015). 
 
Engineer consent for the Project from the Australian public, however, requires complex and 
multi-faceted arguments that are not solely about necessity. The defence of necessity, via 
economic or moral arguments can be debunked through the investigation and reporting of 
statistics that represent the real number of jobs, economic contribution, or environmental harm. 
These statistics can, in turn, revoke the Project’s label of ‘necessary’ in the minds of the public. 
For this reason, stakeholders interested in advancing the Carmichael Project have also utilised 
the the technique of neutralisation known as ‘denial of injury.’ Thus, the ‘necessary’ 
Carmichael Project evolves to a project that is both ‘necessary and harmless.’  
 
Denial of Injury and Responsibility 
 
In order to argue that the mega-mine should be approved to operate, Adani stakeholders and 
several Australian politicians have suggested that the mine would not cause any significant 
environmental damage. These stakeholders have also stated that any potential damage is either 
not the responsibility of the Australian government or has been considered with a plan for its 
minimisation. To consider the potential harms of the Carmichael Project, an Environmental 
Impact Statement was required of Adani by the government. This document was shown by 
several environmental organisations (among them Greenpeace; the Australian Conservation 
Foundation; and the Mackay Conservation Group) to have inadequately addressed the concerns 
that the Carmichael mine would cause harm to vulnerable species living on the proposed 
mining site as well as emit an amount of greenhouse gases that would immensely contribute to 
climate change, threatening ecosystems such as the Great Barrier Reef. Regardless of the EIS’s 
lack of environmental safeguards, however, the Project has been consistently granted 
environmental and mining approvals from the Queensland state and Australian federal 
governments. The Project’s ability to gain government approval is due in part to the way in 
which the environmental harms have been denied or minimised by Adani representatives and 
pro-Carmichael politicians using existing federal legislation. 
 
Throughout the timeline of the Carmichael Project’s approval, there have been several 
examples of denial of injury and denial of responsibility by the state and corporation. Harms 
associated with greenhouse gas emissions, as demonstrated by the Australian Conservation 
Foundation’s federal court case, have been interpretively denied through the government’s 
classification of emissions.   
 
Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions 
 
Once the Carmichael Project received its second approval under the EPBC Act (Adani Mining 
Pty Ltd v Land Services of Coast and Country Inc [2015] QLC 48), the ACF brought a judicial 
review application to the Federal Court in Brisbane. The environmental group argued that the 
Minister did not comply with his obligations under the EPBC Act when he approved the mining 
project, specifically citing Australia’s obligations to protect the Great Barrier Reef under both 
the World Heritage Convention and EPBC Act. Under the division of powers between the 
Australian Government and the states, as stated in the Australian Constitution, states have the 
primary responsibility for environmental protection. However, the EPBC Act gives the federal 
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Environmental Minister authority over nine defined matters of national environmental 
significance: 
 
• world heritage properties; 
• national heritage places; 
• wetlands of international importance; 
• nationally threatened species and ecological communities; 
• migratory species; 
• Commonwealth marine areas; 
• the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park; 
• nuclear actions (including uranium mining); and 
• a water resource, in relation to coal seam gas development and large coal mining 
development. 
 
Aside from nuclear actions, eight of the nine matters are relevant to the Carmichael Project. As 
such, the ACF argued the Minister, in his Land Court decision to approve the mine, should 
have considered these environmental matters in the broader context of Australia’s social and 
economic needs.  
 
The Land Court case also revealed that after the first approval under the EPBC Act was set 
aside by consent, the Minister received new data regarding the impact of GHGs on the Great 
Barrier Reef (Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the 
Environment [2016] FCA 1042). Among the data the Minister received was the expert report 
of Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg, Director of the Global Change Institute at the University 
of Queensland and expert on climate change impacts on coral reefs. Hoegh-Guldberg’s report 
stated the mean global temperature rises of 3°C above pre-industrial levels ‘would result in 
scenarios where any semblance of reefs to the coral reefs of the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park 
today would vanish.’ The Minister also received a joint expert report of Dr. Chris Taylor and 
Associate Professor Malte Meinshausen, environmental scientists. This report stated: 
 
• At current global rates (and assuming no further growth in emissions), the global 
emissions budget to limit mean global temperature rises beneath 2°C above pre-
industrial levels would be exceeded within 20 years, which would still be a very 
dangerous level of warming for the Reef; 
 
• In order to limit warming to beneath 2°C above pre-industrial levels, no more than 850 
billion tonnes (Gt) with carbon dioxide equivalent greenhouse gas emissions (CO2-e) 
could be emitted globally after 2015; 
 
• the combustion emissions would be about 4.64 Gt of CO2-e (joint expert report in the 
Land Court) or about 1/183 of the total available global emissions if warming is to be 
limited to 2°C; and 
 
• the combustion emissions (4.64 Gt of CO2-e) would be about 54 times greater than the 
mining emissions from the coal mine directly (0.086 Gt of CO2-e) (Australian 




The Minister claimed to have evaluated this new data, focusing on the question of what 
constitutes a ‘relevant impact’ on the Great Barrier Reef with regards to the Carmichael 
Project’s predicted environmental impacts in light of the EPBC Act. Section 527E of the EPBC 
Act defines an event or circumstance as an impact of an action if ‘the event or circumstance is 
a direct consequence of the action; or for an event or circumstance that is an indirect 
consequence of the action…the action is a substantial cause of that event or circumstance’ 
(EPBC Act). Thus, in order to prove that the Carmichael Project would have significant impacts 
on the Great Barrier Reef, the link between the mine’s GHG emissions and the warming of the 
Earth’s atmosphere would have to be established. Conversely, in order to prove that the 
Carmichael Project would not impact the Great Barrier Reef an argument denying the injury 
and thus neutralising the harm would have to be established.  
 
In order to unpack the decision, which denied the environmental harm that the Project would 
cause through its GHG emissions, it is necessary to understand the types of emissions defined 
in the Australian Government’s National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting (NGER) scheme. 
There are three different types, or scopes, of GHG emissions: Scope 1, Scope 2, and Scope 3. 
The establishment of these three categories was intended to aid organisations interested in 
pursuing industrial projects in two ways. First, the categories allow the organisations to manage 
and report their GHG emissions to stakeholders, who often request this data as a part of their 
sustainability performance indicators, in an organised manner. The separation of GHGs into 
three categories also helps organisations visualise their emissions into those they have control 
over and those they can only influence. However, the categories have also worked to 
externalise emissions of industrial projects; making them appear less harmful on paper than 
scientists believe. 
 
The Australian Government’s 2016 Clean Energy Regulator defines scope 1 emissions – 
sometimes referred to as ‘direct emissions’ – as ‘the emissions released to the atmosphere as a 
direct result of an activity, or series of activities at a facility level’. Scope 1 emissions are 
specified under NGER legislation and therefore must be reported. Examples of scope 1 
emissions include: emissions produced from manufacturing processes, such as from the 
manufacture of cement; emissions from the burning of diesel fuel in trucks; fugitive emissions, 
such as methane emissions from coal mines; or production of electricity by burning coal 
(Australian Government 2016b). 
 
Scope 2 greenhouse gas emissions – sometimes referred to as ‘indirect emissions’ – are ‘the 
emissions released to the atmosphere from the indirect consumption of an energy commodity’ 
(Australian Government 2016b). Indirect emissions may sometimes come from the use of 
electricity produced by the burning of coal in another facility. Scope 2 emissions from one 
facility are often part of the Scope 1 emissions from another facility. For example: 
 
A power station burns coal to power its generators and in turn creates electricity. 
Burning the coal causes greenhouse emissions to be emitted. These gases are 
attributed to the power station as Scope 1 emissions. If the electricity is then 
transmitted to a car factory and used there to power its machinery and lighting, the 
gases emitted as a result of generating the electricity are then attributed to the 
factory as Scope 2 emissions (Australian Government 2016b). 
 
Scope 2 emissions are specified under NGER legislation and must also be reported. Scope 3 
emissions, unlike Scope 1 and 2 emissions, are not reported under the NGER scheme, but can 
be referred to under Australia’s National Greenhouse Accounts in documents such as a 
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project’s Environmental Impact Statement. Scope 3 emissions are defined as ‘indirect 
greenhouse gas emissions other than Scope 2 emissions that are generated in the wider 
economy. They occur as a consequence of the activities of a facility, but from sources not 
owned or controlled by that facility’s business’ (Australian Government 2016b). Some 
examples of Scope 3 emissions include the emissions from extraction and production of 
purchased materials; transportation of purchased fuels; use of sold products and services; and 
flying on a commercial airline by a person from another business (Australian Government 
2016b). 
   
Out of the potential 4.7 billion tonnes of GHGs from the Carmichael Project, 98% are Scope 
3. These emissions would would result from burning the coal from the Carmichael mine in coal 
fired plants in India. Table 6.1 provides a breakdown of the projected emissions of the 
Carmichael Mine. 
 
Table 6.1: Projected emissions of the Carmichael Coal Mine 
 
Measurement Annual average emissions (Mg CO2-e) 
Lifetime emissions  
(Mg CO2-e) 
Scope 1 628,723 37,723,358 
Scope 2 808,898 48,533,904 
Scope 3 77,395,516 4,643,730,979 
Total 78,833,137 4,729,988,241 
(Taylor and Meinshausen 2014) 
 
Even though the coal from a mining project is guaranteed to be eventually burned and will 
therefore contribute GHGs to the atmosphere, Adani was not required to report the Scope 3 
emissions in any of the project’s planning applications. Instead, the corporation only reported 
Scope 1 and 2 emissions, i.e. those produced by the process of mining itself. Excluding Scope 
3 emissions on legal documents that influence the Australian government’s decision on 
whether or not to approve the Project denies 98% of the mine’s contribution to global GHG 
levels – a substantial impact on climate change.  
 
The ACF submitted that Scope 3 emissions should be considered to be ‘impacts’ as defined in 
section 527e of the EPBC Act. The Minister for the Environment, however, disagreed, arguing: 
 
While the proponent has identified a quantity of overseas GHG emissions that may 
result from burning the coal, these emissions are not a direct consequence of the 
proposed action. The actual quantity of emissions that is likely to be additional to 
current global GHG emissions depends on a range of variables. They include: 
whether the coal replaces coal currently provided by other suppliers, whether the 
coal is used as a substitute for other energy sources, and the efficiency of the coal 
burning power plants. The international multilateral environment agreements, the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, 
provide mechanisms to address climate change globally. Under these agreements, 
the nations responsible for burning the coal produced from the proposed mine 
would be expected to address the emissions from transport by rail, shipping and 
combustion of the product coal in their own countries (Adani Mining Pty Ltd v 
Land Services of Coast and Country Inc [2015] QLC 48). 
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The appeal was eventually dismissed by the court. Justice Griffiths found that Adani and the 
Australian government successfully argued the impossibility of identifying a causal effect 
between the mining project and any relevant impact on the Great Barrier Reef. Through this 
judgement, the Australian government had denied and externalised the GHG emissions from 
the burning of the mined coal into the environmental costs resulting from the Project. The 
justification for this decision included the fact that the coal would not be burned in Australia, 
and therefore Australia could not be responsible for the GHGs’ effect on climate change. 
 
The Australian Government’s National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting scheme categorises 
greenhouse gas emissions into three categories: Scope 1, 2 and 3. While the scheme was 
intended to aid corporations in their reporting of emissions, it has also made it possible for the 
government to justify approving large scale industrial projects, such as the Carmichael mine, 
even though the project’s coal would emit millions of tonnes of carbon dioxide into the 
atmosphere. By splitting GHGs into categories that are ranked in terms of seriousness and 
ability to be managed, the harms of a project’s emissions are once again able to be legally 
denied. Regardless of which scope the gases are placed in under Australian legislation, they 
are the same gas and are therefore equally harmful. The atmosphere of the Earth, due to global 
winds, does not recognise national borders. Thus, the “if the GHGs are not emitted in our 
country it is not our country’s issue” is illogical. When a government considers approving the 
mining of its coal reserves, it should consider the entire lifetime of the mining project – from 
excavation to burning. In allowing the coal in the Galilee Basin to be dug up, the Australian 
government should not be able to evade responsibility for the harms the coal would cause 
simply because it will not be burned on Australian ground. Yet, the differential treatment of 
each emission provides a legal loophole for the assessment of an industrial project’s 




When the ACF argued to the Federal Court of Brisbane that the Minister of the Environment 
failed to properly consider the impacts of climate change pollution from the Project on the 
Great Barrier Reef, the Minister’s submissions also made several references to ‘net emissions.’ 
The net emissions argument, along with the scope 3 emissions argument, allow the government 
and Adani to deny the responsibility for the Carmichael Project’s GHG emissions.  
 
Put simply, the concept of ‘net emissions’ implies that in order to prove that emissions from 
the Carmichael Project will result in higher global GHG levels (thus raising the global 
temperature, contributing to climate change and destroying ecosystems such as the Great 
Barrier Reef) it must be proven that the emissions from the mine will not be offset by a carbon-
reducing initiative elsewhere in the world. In other words, there needs to be a net increase in 
global emissions in order for the Carmichael Project to be held responsible for impacting the 
Great Barrier Reef. This argument is summarised by Minister Greg Hunt: 
 
Sea temperatures are on the rise and this trend is expected to continue, leading to 
an increased risk of mass coral bleaching; gradual ocean acidification will 
increasingly restrict coral growth and survival; and there are likely to be more 
intense weather events. The extent and persistence of these impacts depends to a 
large degree on how effectively the issue of rising levels of greenhouse gases is 
addressed worldwide (Adani v Land Services of Coast and Country). 
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Citing net emissions, the Minister had suggested that it is impossible to tell whether the 
Carmichael Project would lead to an increase in global GHG emissions since it is impossible 
to calculate an increase or decrease in GHG emissions from future projects around the world. 
Once investigated, this statement is revealed to be untrue. The argument that Australia’s GHG 
emissions are negligible compared to the rest of the world was continually cited among pro-
Carmichael politicians. For example, as late as 2018, Senator Ian McDonald stated to 
Parliament: 
 
Australia emits less than 1.3 per cent of the world’s carbon emissions. If we shut 
Australia down [from coal mining] completely, it would mean virtually nothing to 
climate change…Australia does its bit. We’ve reduced our emissions as good 
corporate citizens of the world…Already, there are other countries opening up 
coal-fired power stations. As Senator Williams so finely and accurately pointed 
out, the amount of carbon we emit in Australia as a nation is less than what these 
new power stations are already emitting. Look after the jobs of workers… (The 
Commonwealth of Australia 2018). 
 
While predicting the number of coal mines throughout the world that would either begin or end 
their operation throughout the duration of the Carmichael Project is impossible, it is also 
irrelevant. This argument relies on an incorrect view of how GHG emissions impact the Earth’s 
atmosphere. Once carbon dioxide from the burning of fossil fuels is released into the 
atmosphere, it is trapped there and increases the Earth’s temperature. The Carmichael Project’s 
contribution to GHG emissions is therefore unrelated to the GHG emissions of other mines. 
The Carmichael’s emissions cannot be “offset” by a large-scale carbon cut elsewhere, yet 
environmental offsets are considered to be a compensation for ‘unavoidable impacts on 
significant environmental matters’ by the Australian government (The State of Queensland 
2018a).  
 
Therefore, the question of whether or not the Carmichael Mine will impact climate change 
pollution and the Great Barrier Reef has already been answered by multiple climate change 
scientists, as depicted previously in Table 6.1. Regardless of any other mining projects or 
‘green initiatives’ that will add or subtract to the carbon equation, there currently (at the time 
of the debate surrounding the Project’s emissions contribution in court) facts that can be 
considered. According to the Australia Institute, Adani’s Carmichael Project will be the largest 
coal mine in Australia. Its estimated average annual carbon emissions of 79 million tonnes are 
three times those of New Delhi, six times those of Amsterdam and double Tokyo’s average 
annual emissions, as shown below (Amos and Swann 2015) 
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Figure 6.3: Annual CO2 emissions of major cities and Carmichael Mine 
 
(Amos and Swann 2015) 
 
At that rate, the Carmichael Project’s GHG emissions, which will remain trapped in the 
atmosphere, will irrefutably contribute to global warming. 
 
In order for Adani and the Australian government to claim that it would not responsible for the 
GHG emissions that result from the Carmichael Project, they must deny or minimize the 
impacts of the mine. This denial of injury is facilitated through the Australian Government’s 
National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting scheme, which separates GHG emissions into 
types, or scopes, that are then subject to differing levels of scrutiny. Assessing the GHG 
emissions of a project according to this classification system allows emissions to be treated 
differently – based on the government’s definition of them – even though all emissions are the 
same (in this case, carbon dioxide) and therefore are equal in environmental effect. This in turn 
allows for misleading emissions figures to be reported and publicised. Merely reporting Scope 
1 and 2 emissions, for example, leaves out (or denies) the majority of the Carmichael Project’s 
potential ecocidal GHG emissions. 
 
Adani’s submissions to the ACF’s appeal for judicial review made reference to other cases in 
which the concept of net emissions had been regarded as relevant, in order to defend the 
Minister’s decision that the combustion emissions from the Carmichael Project were not a 
“substantial cause” of environmental harm (as defined by s527E of the EPBC Act). The 
overseas combustion emissions were effectively externalised due to the “range of variables” 
that made a determination of the quantity of GHG emissions “speculative at the time” 
(Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v Minister for the Environment [2016] 
FCA 1042). 
 
The argument for the Carmichael Project, combining the defence of necessity and denial of 
injury with a denial of responsibility, thus takes the following form: 
 
Premise 1: This mining project is necessary (economically and morally).  
 
Premise 2: Since it is necessary, other countries will want to seize this opportunity from 
Australia if Australians do not approve it – it will be constructed and operated somewhere. 
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Premise 3: The GHG emissions that result from the necessary project will therefore occur 
regardless of whether the mine operates in Australia or elsewhere and are speculative at this 
stage. 
 
Conclusion: We (the Australian government and/or Adani) cannot be held responsible for the 
resulting harms of the mine. 
 
Since Adani is a transnational corporation based in India, the proposed development and 
operation of the Carmichael Project would take place in Australia, and the mined coal would 
subsequently be transported to and burned in India, the responsibility for the resulting harm 
(via carbon emissions) is able to be legally evaded (via Australian legislation). The state and 
the corporation are able to approve an ecologically destructive mining project, while 
maintaining that all legislation has been followed – including that which sets out to protect the 
environment.  
 
There has been another instance of the government’s denial of injury and responsibility for the 
harms of the Carmichael Project. Through the legal framework for environmental offsets in 




Harms associated with vulnerable species, as demonstrated by the Mackay Conservation 
Group’s federal court case, have been literally denied through the government’s requirement 
of environmental offsets and imposing of responsibility for biodiversity protection measures 
on Adani. This method of addressing concerns of biodiversity loss in the mining area has 
allowed the Australian government (specifically the Department of the Environment) to deny 
injury to threatened species and to deny responsibility if injury were to occur, as responsibility 
has been legally passed on to Adani. 
 
The Project’s first approval under the EPBC Act was set aside by consent in 2015, with both 
the Mackay Conservation Group and the Environmental Minister agreeing that the effects of 
the mine on two vulnerable species – the yakka skink and the ornamental snake – were not 
properly considered. Two months later, the Minister reapproved the mine with 36 new 
conditions for Adani. According to the Department of the Environment, these conditions 
addressed the concern over the two species by ordering ‘at least 135 hectares of ornamental 
snake habitat and at least 5600 hectares of yakka skink habitat’ to be protected and managed 
by Adani (Australian Government 2015b). The Department of the Environment has not 
published any further information, including a detailed prescription on how it will monitor or 
enforce these conditions, suggesting that Adani has full discretion over how these habitats will 
be protected. Given Adani’s previous record of environmental harm, this decision may prove 
to be ecocidal in its effect. 
 
The Minister also had to address the Project’s impacts on another threatened species living in 
the proposed mining area, the black-throated finch. To do so, according to the Department of 
the Environment, further conditions have been placed on Adani (Australian Government 
2015b). These conditions include: Adani must identify and implement measures to avoid 
impacts to threatened species and their habitat outside of the areas subject to clearing or 
underground mining; Adani must use fauna spotters to and during all vegetation clearing 
activities to ensure no animals are harmed during clearing; and Adani must rehabilitate all areas 
of black-throated finch habitat once mining is finished. Again, further details on what Adani 
	 127 
must do to comply with these conditions have not been released, giving Adani full discretion 
on implementation of these protective measures.  
 
The Australian Government (2015) further stated: 
 
Where impacts could not be avoided, offsets are required to compensate. 
Importantly, a detailed Biodiversity Offset Strategy is required of the proponent for 
approval by the Minister for the Environment before mining can commence. At a 
minimum the offsets must include: Protection and improvement of 31,000 hectares 
of southern black-throated finch habitat. 
 
The legal framework for environmental offsets in Queensland includes the Environmental 
Offsets Act (2014), ‘which coordinates the delivery of environmental offsets across 
jurisdictions and provides a single point-of-truth for offsets in Queensland;’ the Environmental 
Offsets Regulation (2016), ‘which provides details of prescribed activities regulated under 
existing legislation and prescribed environmental matters to which the Act applies;’ and The 
Queensland Environmental Offsets Policy (2008), ‘which provides a single, consistent, whole-
of-government policy for the assessment of offset proposals to satisfy offset conditions’ (The 
State of Queensland 2018b). In addition, the EPBC Act (1999) incorporated a federal 
Environmental Offsets Policy (2012). The Policy utilises several principles to determine 
whether an offset is a suitable compensation for adverse impacts of an action on the 
environment. In the Carmichael case, this addition represents the legal loophole that allows the 
Minister for the Environment to approve a project while admitting it will undermine the EPBC 
Act’s objective of biodiversity protection. 
 
Adani had published its ‘Environmental Offset Package for the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail 
Project’ report in 2013. In it, Ecofund, the company who researched a ‘preferred offset 
package’ and wrote the report for Adani, stated: 
 
The preferred offset package, composed of five properties, is expected to acquit the 
offset requirements…The preferred offset package have yet to be ground-truthed 
to determine the actual extent and suitability of environmental values on the ground 
and the figures represented in this package are based on a desktop assessment and 
spatial analysis. 
 
Details of the package have not been released to the public, with pages 29-43 of the report 
removed for ‘confidentiality’, and the report cites ‘unpublished’ reports by Adani in its 
references (Wickson 2013). Yet the Australian Government has continued to cite the Minister’s 
‘conditions of approval’ for the Carmichael Project as evidence that the Project should be built. 
In 2018, the ‘Galilee Basin (Coal Prohibition) Bill’ was presented by Queensland Greens 
Senator Larissa Waters. The bill cited climate change as reason to leave coal in the ground, and 
would prevent the Carmichael Mine from going ahead. Senator Ruston followed the script: 
 
The government is applying the most vigorous assessment under the 
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 to this project. 
The Carmichael mine has been assessed and approved under the process and is 
subject to over 180 environmental conditions from state and Commonwealth 
regulators… (The Commonwealth of Australia 2018).  
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While offsets are mandated by courts when the environmental harms are understood to be 
unavoidable, the EPBC Act grants the Minister for the Environment the right to deny the 
approval of a project if it threatens endangered species. Therefore, offsets – which are 
authorised for ‘unavoidable’ environmental consequences – legally allow for the neutralisation 
of even those harms that warrant refusal of approval under the EPBC Act. Neutralisation occurs 
when something is acknowledged or admitted to, but either the category of the acts to which it 
is assigned (i.e., “crime”) is refused or the act is presented as justified (Cohen 1993: 107). The 
state had acknowledged that the Carmichael Project would impact the black-throated finch 
while neutralising the severity of the harm by suggesting offsets would be sufficient to protect 
the species from harm. By providing an alternative to rejection under the EPBC Act, offsets 
undermine the very protection against environmental harms the EPBC Act was created to 
provide. 
 
The Environmental Defenders Office of Queensland (EDO Qld) (2014) has stated that while 
offset areas are a common response to legal objections from environmental groups regarding 
harm towards non-human victims, they are usually arbitrary and not well-researched. Unless 
the precise environment and lifestyle of a native species is studied, offset areas will not be 
successful in ensuring a species’ survival. The prescription of offsets as a condition for a project 
allows the government to appear to meet the objectives of environmental conservation and 
economic development simultaneously. Yet offsets operate on the assumption that there is a 
need to accept environmental losses in return for uncertain gains (EDO Qld 2014).  
 
In the case of the Carmichael Project, if the state was to legitimately seek the preservation of 
the animals (while also approving the Carmichael Project), the native habitat of the yakka skink 
and ornamental snake would have to be studied prior to its destruction, in order to build an 
offset habitat that provides identical conditions. Research into the native habitat had not been 
ordered by the Federal Minister – only a list of the number of hectares allotted for each species 
was published – nor does such research already exist.  
 
The harms groundwater have been similarly denied. In a document describing the Carmichael 
Mine published by the Australian Government (2015), the government states, ‘Approximately 
six per cent of the water needed to operate the mine will come from the Great Artesian Basin. 
This usage is offset by the requirement that at least 730 mega-litres must be ‘repaid’ to the 
Great Artesian Basin each year for five years’. Not only is it unclear whether this figure 
represents a complete replenishing of the Great Artesian Basin, it also does not state how this 
figure was reached or how this will be implemented. Instead, the government has required 
Adani to complete ‘research plans’ on the groundwater in order to limit impacts from the 
mining. 
 
If not properly researched and implemented, as in the Carmichael case, offsets can be 
understood as a technique of neutralisation, rarely contributing to environmental protection 
while allowing the government to maintain the pretence of providing a thoughtful response to 
an environmental issue. Such denial grants Adani the ability to continue its claims of being 
environmentally conscious and allows the government to appear environmentally conscious 




The media and, more generally, the Internet are critical tools for the investigation of the truth 
behind a company’s claims of environmental conduct. Adani’s public relations team has 
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utilised both of these tools during the debate over the Carmichael Project. Press releases on 
behalf of Adani have sought to promote a holistic image of the company and Project as 
providing economic opportunities in the form of permanent jobs and social benefits to 
communities involved with its projects. Before analysing Adani’s promotion of its self and 
systemic view through the corporation’s website and press releases, the PR team that is 
responsible should be investigated.  
 
Adani’s public relations team 
 
It is often difficult to find out who exactly is behind a company’s image, as this information 
would challenge the belief that the media (as an unbiased presenter of information) reports 
what it thinks is true, without promoting some other agenda. After searching the Internet, the 
only mention of PR and Adani Mining or the Carmichael Project that I was able to locate was 
on the Facebook page of a Brisbane-based public relations firm – Republic. 
 
Republic describes themselves as a ‘Brisbane-based public relations and communications firm 
that has helped companies such as Adani Mining, Ratch Australia, ARC Well Equipment and 
Queensland Coal Corporation to make the most of their story’ (Republic PRa).  
 
This single sentence is the only mention of Republic’s business with Adani on the PR firm’s 
Facebook. Republic’s Facebook page also stated that it began operating in April 2016. The PR 
firm that handled Adani before this point remains unknown.  
 
Upon studying Republic’s website, several pieces of incomplete information were discovered. 
First, the site does not include Adani in its main “clients” tab (Republic PR, n.d.). The reason 
for this is unknown, as the company’s Facebook clearly states that it worked for Adani and 
there is a separate page devoted to the firms work on behalf of Adani. The website also cites 
Gareth Quinn as its principal and Bianca Shurman as its creative director, excluding the second 
principal of the firm, Peter Young. The firm’s ‘Capability Statement,’ which is provided as a 
PDF through a hyperlink on the website, is the only official document that seems to be available 
to the public.  
 
Figure 6.4 is a screenshot of Republic PR firm’s team, which evidences the close relationship 
between PR firms, corporations, the media, and the government. The Principal of the firm, 
Gareth Quinn, has clear connections to fossil fuel and mineral industries. The second Principal 
of the form, Peter Young, has clear connections in the media and government. Shurman, as the 




















The screenshot depicted in Figure 6.5 below was taken from Republic’s website’s ‘success 
stories’ tab (Republic PR, n.d.). Here, Adani is listed as one of Republic’s clients among other 
energy and infrastructure companies. This suggests Republic has had experience in 
representing similar clients to Adani and has been able to achieve some success in doing so. 
However, this also calls into question the firm’s Facebook page’s claim that it had only begun 















You need to understand how to 
engage with stakeholders. 
Meaningfully. 24/7. We know 
how. We provide the strategy. 
The creative ideas that make 
your messages resonate. 
 
Expertise: Communications 
Strategy, Copywriting, Corporate 
Relations, Social Media, Media 
Relations, Community Relations, 








Gareth is a seasoned writer and 
communications strategist. He’s 
spent the best part of 20 years 
getting the message across for 
clients across a range of industries 
including mining, oil and gas, 
construction, hospitality and 
government. Gareth has been 
engaged by both public and private 
companies including Arrow Energy, 
Xstrata Copper, Queensland Coal 
Corporation and the Department of 
Primary industries to manage 
effective relationships with a diverse 




Bianca is an experienced graphic 
designer and web developer having 
worked in leading graphic design 
and advertising agencies for more 
than 10 years in both Australia and 
in the United States. Her expertise 
spans the full creative spectrum 
from the graphic design of 
brochures, advertisements and 
annual reports to website 
development, digital campaigns 
and photography. She has worked 
for many well known Australian 
brands including St George Bank, 






As the former founder and 
manager of leading 
communications consultancies in 
Brisbane and Jakarta, Peter has 
worked around the clock and 
around the world for clients such as 
Telstra, BHP Billiton, Coca Cola, 
British Airways, Visa International 
and the Indonesian Government. 
Peter started his career as a radio 
broadcaster and political reporter 
with Channel 9. As a former 
ministerial advisor and press 
secretary in the Queensland 
Government, Peter has brushed 
shoulders with Premiers and Prime 
Ministers and built a wide network 
of relationships with elected 
representatives at local, State and 
Federal levels. 
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Lastly, Figure 6.6 is a screenshot of the firm’s page dedicated to showcasing the work it had 
done for Adani (Republic PR, n.d.). The page includes newspaper clips of newspapers that 












Nothing can tell our story better 
than our past work. The following 
case studies represent some of the 
public relations and communications 
campaigns we have created over 
the past few years. Although our 
clients come from different 
industries, each has a similar story 
to tell – exceptional results follow 
the creative execution of a sound 
strategic platform. 
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All of the newspapers in Figure 6.6 appear with the iSentia logo. Further investigation revealed 
iSentia is a media intelligence group based in Sydney and listed on the Australian Securities 
Exchange. Founded by Neville Jeffress, an Australian advertising executive, iSentia has 
locations in South-East Asia and China and won the Communications Research and Evaluation 





Adani’s plans to deliver three 
major mining infrastructure 
projects in Queensland are 
threatened by environmental 
activism. With more than 10,000 
future jobs on the line, it has been 
important to solicit and 
communicate third party support. 
 
Solution 
Republic has engaged with 
opinion leaders, government and 
business leaders in Bowen, 
Mackay, Townsville, Moranbah, 
Clermont and Emerald before 
taking advantage of our strong 
media relationships to articulate 
their support for Adani. 
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Communication awards (ISentia, n.d.). ISentia’s awards raise the company’s perceived 
reputation and elevate the status of the news articles which contain their “seal of approval.” 
Together, Republic and iSentia make up at part of the known team behind Adani and the 




Talbot and Boiral’s study (2014) found that the strategy of self-proclaimed excellence, in which 
a company focuses on its environmental commitments and awards in order to promote an 
idealised green image, was often cited among the mining sector as a commonly utilised method 
of impression management. Compared to other techniques (such as condemnation of 
condemners, for example), self-proclaimed excellence is an “optimistic” neutralisation 
technique that focuses on elevating the company-in-question’s “green” status. Instead of 
attacking the credentials of other companies or industries directly, self-proclaimed excellence 
allows for the company to imply their superiority over competitors by claiming awards and 
maintaining a consistently positive image in the media. Adani, as well as the Australian 
government, have used this technique neutralise the environmental harms that would result 
throughout the lifetime of the Carmichael Project: ‘The Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail 
Infrastructure project has been approved in accordance with national environment law subject 
to 36 of the strictest conditions in Australian history’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2015a); 
‘Adani Mining Pty Ltd is an environmentally responsible company that is committed to 
protection of the environment and to the sustainable management of its operations and 
activities’ (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012b) 
 
Self-proclaimed excellence and impression management techniques work to establish a 
connection between company x (in this case Adani) and the image of an environmentally, 
morally, and economically responsible company in the minds of the consumer. In other words, 
the aim is for the company to become a symbol of (or synonymous with) the virtues of what 
consumers believe to be “good business practices” through storytelling framing. The question 
of whether or not the Carmichael Project should be permitted to operate dissolves into a 
discussion of Adani and the Australian Government’s resume of green credentials. 
 
Adani applies this technique in two ways. First, self-proclaimed excellence allowed the 
company to claim superiority as a corporation in the field of large-scale coal mining operations. 
The narrative is:  
 
We are one of India’s largest corporations. 
We achieved this level of success because we are trustworthy. 
We are trustworthy because we consider the environment in all of our business practices. 
 
The Adani Australia website (shown in Figure 8.4) demonstrates this sentiment in their 
“History” section, which mentions its revenue and refers to the its trustworthiness regarding 








Figure 6.7 Adani’s self-proclaimed excellence 
 
 
(Adani Enterprises (n.d. a ) 
 
This reasoning also allows the corporation to distance themselves from their competitors, who 
are arguably less successful and trustworthy than Adani due to their bad environmental 
practices, leading to the implied conclusion: 
 
We can therefore be trusted to execute the Carmichael Project with consideration for the 
environment. 
 
Promoting an idealized green image is one of Adani’s strategies of greenwashing. In his book 
“Greenwashing,” Pearse (2012: 70) discusses how the coal mining industry is notorious for its 
aggressive greenwashing since coal – and the process of burning coal to produce energy – is 
as dirty as it gets: 
 
The company that owns the coal mine, the contractor that digs up the coal, the 
companies that handle freight and electricity generation, and their various lobby 
groups and industry associations – all are busy selling the industry that contributes 
the most to climate change as clean and green. 
 
Adani Enterprises consists of almost all of the companies named by Pearse in his investigation 
into the greenwashing techniques of various business sectors. Adani Mining, the company that 
is involved with and initiated the approval of the Carmichael Project, is merely a subsidiary of 
its parent company, Adani Enterprises. Adani Enterprises is the flagship company of Adani 
Group, the Indian multinational conglomerate that has diversified businesses, including energy 
sectors. Some part of “Adani” is therefore present from the beginning stages of coal extraction 
to the final stages of coal burning, making the corporation one of the most dependent on 
greenwashing. Self-proclamation of excellence techniques become necessary in order for the 
company to maintain a positive image with the public and continue to sign new business 
contracts.  
 
Typical to greenwashing campaigns of the mining industry (e.g. ‘clean coal’), Adani also 
makes the claim that its technology sets them apart from others in the industry by producing 
less environmental harm. Adani’s website claims Adani Power is the ‘of super-critical 
technology in thermal power plants in India which lowers the carbon footprint of our thermal 
power plants’ (Adani Enterprises n.d. b). The basis for this claim remains unclear as the website 
does not include information on how Adani Power’s technology is able to do so. The website 
also offers two subsections, “Mangroves,” which briefly discusses the company’s “mangrove 
afforestation activity at various locations of Gujarat;” and “Terrestrial,” which highlights their 
“conducted successful research” which allowed the company to preserve “87+ species in 
terrestrial biodiversity and 4 species in marine biodiversity (mangrove) in highly saline soil 
and other sea soils.” The company’s environmental harms and outstanding criminal 
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investigation of its stakeholders as detailed in Chapter Three are not countered or mentioned 
on the website.  
 
Awards and recognition assist a company’s self proclamation of excellence. Typical to public 
relations campaigns that showcase a company’s achievements, the Adani website also features 
a specific example of its success and also refers to a recent award on behalf of its ‘green’ status. 
Adani specifically cites its work in India, where the group’s new Department of Horticulture 
has ‘has pioneered the implementation of the latest Iso-Dutch technique in India where a green 
zone has been developed in highly saline sandy soil and water (35000-45000 TDS)’(Adani 
Enterprises n.d. b). The Port company of Adani, APSEZ, is cited to have been internationally 
recognized as a ‘World port for a better climate’ due to its implementation of ‘green port 
ideology’ and for ‘better environment control in desert conditions’ and winning the “IAPH 
Busan Open Award for its successful strategies for making a ‘Green Port’ (Adani Enterprises 
n.d. b). The criteria for the award; the details of APSEZ’s ‘green ideology and environmental 
control’; and the awarding body remain unclear.  
 
While Adani frequently recalls its environmental record abroad, specifically with its 
commitment to the latest “cleaner and greener” technologies, the corporation does so vaguely 
– never outlining its environmental contributions in detail in order to avoid scrutiny. 
Environmental contributions are mentioned due to the trendiness of appearing “green,” and, in 
the case of Adani, do not facilitate a public discussion of a project’s environmental harm or the 
company’s environmental record.  
 
Complementary to its self-proclamation of excellence as a technique of neutralising the 
Carmichael Project’s environmental harm, Adani promotes its own ‘systemic view.’  
 
Promotion of a systemic view 
 
As described by Talbot and Boiral (2014), the promotion of a systemic view occurs when a 
company makes the claim that it should not be judged solely on the record of environmental 
practices. Instead, its argued that the company’s total contribution – including the economic 
and social – to the communities involved in their projects should also be taken into account 
into their reputation. This differs from the strategy of self-proclaimed excellence in that the 
focus is on the “bigger picture,” which – just like the triple bottom line – insinuates that 
economic matters and social issues precede environmental harms in importance and priority.  
 
Once again, an insightful source into a company’s self promotion is its website. Company 
websites are usually the first point of reference for anyone wanting to learn more about the 
corporation (in this case Adani) or the corporation’s endeavours (in this case the Carmichael 
Project). Well-aware of the critical role its website has in influencing the public’s first 
impression, Adani’s offers its online guests selective information on its past activities, current 
business model, and corporate board. The difficult-to-navigate design of its websites and the 
rhetoric used to describe its practices make Adani.com (and its sister sites) a useful tool in 
denying harm and promoting its pro-business, yet “green” image.  
 
Of the six main tabs on the site’s homepage, “Sustainability” is centred between “Businesses” 
and “Investors.” There, the corporation emphasises its efforts in good environmental practice: 
“As a responsible corporate citizen, Adani adopts and follows the best industry practices for 
minimal impact on the environment and long term sustainability of the mining endeavour” 
(Adani Enterprises n.d. b). The page continues to list a selection of past actions the company 
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took in order to fulfil its promise to follow the best industry practices: ‘Ecofriendly 
Reforestation: India’; ‘Online Ambient Air Monitoring System: India, Indonesia, Australia’; 
‘Land Reclamation: India’; and ‘Water Reservoir: Indonesia’.  
 
The Adani website’s “Sustainability” tab also has a section titled “Environment”, which makes 
a number of goals, such as ‘to create plantation and greenery not only to reduce CO2 emission 
but also to become responsible corporate citizen and to create environment friendly/Sustainable 
setup’ (Adani Enterpsises n.d. b). The page states that since the infrastructure industry depends 
on natural resources, it is ‘the responsibility responsibility of the industry and the organisations 
that constitute it to preserve and conserve the environment around their operations and as a 
responsible corporate citizen, Adani has undertaken multiple initiatives and innovations for the 
best protection and preservation of the environment in and around our sites and communities’ 
(Adani Enterpsises n.d. b).  
 
Also under the “Sustainability” tab is a tab for “The Adani Foundation.” The Adani 
conglomerate has created the Adani Foundation, a foundation run by Dr. Priti Adani – wife of 
Guatam Adani and who is described as “treading a path hitherto less travelled in Corporate 
Social Responsibility” on the Foundation’s site – that focuses on four areas: education, 
community health, sustainable livelihood, and rural infrastructure (Adani Enterprises n.d. c). 
This addition links the concept of ‘sustainability’, as Adani interprets it, to both concepts of 
environmental and social responsibility. 
 
The Adani Australia website, which is specifically devoted to the Carmichael Project, contains 
a tab titled “Environmental and Social Governance.” Here the company promises to undertake 
its projects in a way that not only meets regulatory requirements as set out by the Australian 
government, but also to “engage and contribute to the communities in which we operate” 
(Adani Australia n.d. a). It is not specified how they plan to “engage and contribute,” however.  
 
Focusing on economic benefits, Adani entices further business deals. Social benefits allow the 
company to maintain its wholesome image. The script becomes: “We need to look at more than 
just the environment. We need to look at sustainable development as a whole. In judging our 
performance, it should also be considered that we contribute to the economic and social 
development of the community/state/country.” Only when environmental issues are raised, the 
script includes: “[Yes, mining does produce carbon emissions, but] our state-of-the-art 
technology allows for a new, clean coal that is less harmful than our competitors’.”  
 
This technique perpetuates the image of the corporation as a wholesome one and the 
environmental issues (and the environmentalists who raise them) as purposely fault-finding, 
which allows for other techniques of neutralisation (such as condemning of the condemners) 
to be used. The goal of these techniques is to influence how the mental cost-benefit analysis of 
the Carmichael Project is computed by consumers and citizens. If Adani can successfully place 
environmental issues below economic and social issues in importance through the publication 
of the Carmichael Project’s job numbers and the company’s previous successes, it can 
guarantee the public’s coming to a conclusion that the Project should be given approval to 
operate. This complements the company’s denial of injury and responsibility for harm. When 
environmental harms are brought to the media’s attention, for example, by environmental 
groups, they are already ranked as less important to the economic and social benefits of the 
Project. The economic and moral necessity is once again alluded to. 
 
	 137 
All websites are designed with self-promotion in mind. Yet this should not exempt Adani’s 
claims from scrutiny. Corporate public relations and corporate social responsibility have 
themselves become industries. Corporations such as Adani set aside millions of dollars each 
year towards greenwashing marketing strategies in order to maintain a green image and 




The Australian government has engaged with its own type of greenwashing. In this case, 
policies and opinions of certain politicians are applauded as good by referring to their authority 
on what is good. This can be achieved through a member of the government’s winning of an 
international award for work in his or her department. 
 
The representation of the state and federal politicians as experienced and excellent in their 
respective roles works to establish trust in their decisions. It is thought that a politician or 
government that is believed to be honest, trustworthy, and acting in the best interest of its 
citizens is less likely to have its decisions criticised by the public. In the case of the Carmichael 




The Australian government promoted its green image by citing then Environment Minister 
Greg Hunt’s acceptance of an award: Best Minister in the World. However, further 
investigation into the criteria for the selection of the winner as well as the institution that carries 
out the award suggests that this was a strategically-timed public relations stunt.  
 
In February 2016, Greg Hunt was named Best Minister in the World at the World Government 
Summit of Dubai (Ireland 2016). The award was created by Reuters, which then commissioned 
the World Bank, the OECD, Ernst & Young, and Strategy and Co. to create a series of criteria 
and draw up a list of nominees. This resulted in 100 nominations, which Reuters then narrowed 
down to 10, from 80 countries, assessed based on four criteria: 
 
• Innovation and leadership: the solution that was introduced by the candidate will have 
revolutionised the utilisation of government services by its citizens. This work of true 
innovation will have increased productivity, reduced costs and improve the citizen’s 
opinion of the government; 
 
• Quality and impact: the solution should address the needs of the citizens and must 
demonstrate a significant social impact. Significant social impact includes but is not 
limited to easily accessible government services for all citizens, efficiency in execution, 
human development impact, job creation, etc; 
 
• Replication: the solution must have the quality of being easily replicated in multiple 
geographies. The solution should demonstrate propensity for impact beyond the local 
level, either nationally, regionally or globally; and 
 
• Reputation: the candidate must be highly credible amongst his peers and the general 
public. The candidate must have a proven record amongst his peers of developing 
innovative solutions that have positively impacted the citizens (Taylor 2016). 
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Minister Hunt’s win sparked a backlash from the Greens, who attacked his “brazen audacity” 
over accepting the award (Taylor 2016). Hunt was chosen for a number of reasons, according 
to the World Government Summit, including his “work on the Great Barrier Reef policy” 
(which allowed the Reef to avoid an “in danger” listing by the UN’s World Heritage Committee 
through the ban of dumping dredge spoil in the marine park) and his international work 
negotiating of the phasing out of synthetic greenhouse gases (Ireland 2016).  While the 
avoidance of an “in danger” listing by UNESCO was framed as an achievement, it was 
achieved through lobbying – not rehabilitation or protection of the Great Barrier Reef (see 
Chapter Three). In fact, an “in danger” status could have helped to prevent the potentially 
ecocidal consequences of the Carmichael Project. In addition, December 2015, a few months 
before Minister Hunt won the award, it was revealed that Australia’s GHG emissions had 
increased by over 1% during his time in office.  
 
The “the best minister in the world” award exemplifies a political advocacy advertisement. It 
provides the media with a slogan – or story, as this news typifies story-telling framing – that 
can be used to describe Minister Hunt. Whenever scepticism of his environmental intentions 
arise, this self-proclaimed excellence is an appeal to (Hunt’s) authority. This is summarised by 
the following script: 
 
Premise 1: The Environment Minister’s role includes approving projects that comply with 
Australian environmental legislation.  
 
Premise 2: The Environment Minister received an award naming him “Best Minister in the 
World” because he is good at his job (approving projects that comply with Australian 
environmental legislation). 
 
Conclusion: If the Environment Minister, the best minister in the world, approves the 
Carmichael Project, it must therefore be in everyone’s best interest (and comply with 
Australian environmental legislation). 
 
This logical reasoning makes explicit the need for positive self-promotion in order to argue that 
one knows best with respect to running a country’s environmental matters. Yet when 
juxtaposed with the data regarding Australian GHG emissions and Hunt’s “work on the Great 
Barrier Reef policy” as discussed in Chapter Three, it is revealed that the award is another 
technique of denying the harm of the Carmichael Project and can be seen in the larger scope of 
the “promotion of a systemic vision” of Australia. 
 
The establishment of an image of excellence through its self-promotion of awards and 
credentials also allows for the credentials of the person who critiques the government to be 
critiqued. In other words, the citizens speaking out against the Carmichael Project (whether 
they are environmentalists or not) are subject to ad hominem attacks while the content of their 
criticisms is left unaddressed.  
 
Condemnation of Condemners  
 
The Carmichael Project’s various harm have also been neutralised with an attempt to attack the 
credibility and intentions of those who criticise the government’s approvals for the Project. 
This strategy – condemnation of the condemners – has been used within some of the other 
neutralisation techniques analysed so far whenever the state or corporation responded to a 
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criticism of the Project with an ad hominem statement against whoever posed the critique. For 
example, scientists have been condemned as inaccurate or biased in their reports on the 
Carmichael Project’s emissions and politicians who have objected to the government’s 
approval of the Project have been condemned as insensitive to the (economic) needs of rural 
communities. Condemnation of the condemners can and has also been used to justify the 
Project in another way, as exemplified by two stakeholders.  
 
When the Mackay Conservation Group launched a challenge to the Environment Minister’s 
approval of the mine under the EPBC Act on the grounds that he did not consider the two 
vulnerable species (the yakka skink and the ornamental snake) and the approval was set aside 
by consent, the backlash against environmental activists was severe.  
 
Queensland Resources Council Chief Executive Michael Roche and States Mines Minister 
Anthony Lynham were among the most vocal in expressing their disappointment in the Federal 
Court’s decision. Roche accused anti-coal advocates of using “legal loopholes” to delay a 
significant economic investment in Australia (ABC 2015). Perhaps the most noteworthy 
reaction, however, came from Attorney-General George Brandis, who proposed a change in 
section 487(2) of the EPBC Act in order to prevent “vigilante litigation” and “lawfare by radical 
green groups” (Clark 2015). Brandis described the lawsuit as brought upon by groups that 
“have no legitimate interest other than to prosecute a political vendetta against development 
and bring massive developments … to a standstill” (Clark 2015). News of the court case’s 
outcome travelled to the highest office in Australia; former prime minister Tony Abbott co-
signed the attorney general’s comments, calling environmental groups’ litigation of the 
Carmichael Mine “a sustained campaign of harassment through the courts” (Medhora and 
Robertson 2015). Abbott then sought to clarify that he was not suggesting that people should 
not be able to exercise their legal right, nor was he criticising the courts, but merely being “very 
critical of the tactics of some elements of the green movement and their apparent ability to play 
games and to game the system” (Medhora and Robertson 2015).   
 
The response from various politicians in the aftermath of a single court ruling that was not in 
favour of Adani or the mining project; that was set aside by consent in order to allow for the 
Minister to reassess the mine after considering new evidence and information regarding the 
project, is not to be understated. The proposal led by the Attorney General to amend existing 
environmental legislation in order to remove citizens’ legal rights is far more serious than a 
SLAPP. The senate refused to pass the proposal; once Malcolm Turnbull became prime 
minister it was indicated that the proposal would be shelved (Taylor 2016). 
 
However, the act of publicly suggesting such change in legislation is a hostile response 
disproportional in scope to the purported “offense.” Should this amendment have passed, it 
would have profoundly restricted the avenues of citizens to challenge government decisions 
regarding the environment, an entity that cannot stand up for itself and therefore relies on the 
democratic process to survive. Furthermore, the language and rhetoric utilised by the 
politicians cannot help but taint the way in which environmental organisations are viewed and 
dealt with in the future, beyond the initial media report’s release. Accusatory remarks linking 
environmental activists with the destruction of ten thousands of jobs through their cheating of 
the system further perpetuate the script that environmental activism and economic interests 
cannot coexist. The derogatory remarks, especially when the source is the highest political 
figure in the country, strengthen the beliefs of those who are predisposed to have a negative 
view towards environmental activists, such as locals in the rural communities that expect to 
benefit from the mining project’s job creation.  
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If there is a chance that the balance between corporate, or economic, interests and the 
environmental sustainability can be reached, critical debate in an open democracy is crucial. 
This is impossible unless the “game” is equal for all players. When prominent figures use their 
media time to insult activists and seek to close democratic avenues of dissent – especially when 
their loud claims also happen to be “post-truth” – the burden of evening the playing field once 
again falls on the environmental activists. Through investigation of claims such as “ten 
thousand jobs have been destroyed by activists” the public is made increasingly aware that 




State and corporation learn the art of rationalising their offending by “learning a set of scripted 
responses” (as Sykes and Matza (1957: 667) found offending juveniles do). The arguments 
made in support of Adani’s Carmichael Project have been demonstrated to involve Adani and 
the Australian government’s use of these scripted responses.  
 
This chapter has identified and analysed the techniques of neutralisation and denial of harm 
used by Adani and the government in order to investigate how the Carmichael Project was able 
to be legally approved for operation in Australia. It has demonstrated how Adani and the 
government have attempted to control the public’s perception of the Project as immensely 
beneficial and minimally harmful through how it is framed. Throughout the Carmichael 
Project’s timeline, the same story has been persistently told, using techniques of neutralisation 
such as defence of necessity, denial of injury, denial of responsibility, greenwashing, and 
condemnation of the condemners. 
 
In this culture of post-truth politics, the Carmichael debate has been framed by logical fallacies 
(such as appeals to emotion). Factual, scientific details regarding the Project’s harms; 
conversations surrounding the inadequacies of Adani’s environmental plans for the Project; 
and challenges to the implementation of environmental policy have forced to counter the catchy 
(and untrue) claims to economic prosperity; moral necessity; and condemners’ bias.  
 
The Carmichael Project has proven techniques of neutralisation are factually untrue statements 
- whether they are used intentionally to deceive or not. The powerful, who have interests in the 
approval of the potentially-ecocidal Project, have used these lies in portraying the Project in a 
positive light to gain public support and trust. Techniques of neutralisation and denial are 
common features of crimes of the powerful. Crimes that are immensely harmful in nature and 
committed by a state and/or corporation, sometimes against its own citizens, must be portrayed 
as non-crimes or non-harmful actions. The next chapter discusses the approval of the 
Carmichael Project as a crime of the powerful; a result of the collusion between the Australian 
state and the Adani corporation.  
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Chapter Seven  
 
CRIMES OF THE POWERFUL 
	
	
“Only one thing was wanting: an institution which not only secured the newly acquired riches 
of individuals against the communistic traditions of the gentile order, which not only sanctified 
the private property formerly so littler valued and declared this sanctification to be the highest 
purpose of all human society; but an institution which also set the seal of general social 
recognition on each subsequently developing new method of acquiring property and thus 
amassing wealth at continually increasing speed; an institution which perpetuated not only this 
growing cleavage of society into classes but also the right of the possessing class to exploit the 
non-possessing, and the rule of the former over the later. And this institution came. The state 
was invented” (Engles 1884: 127). 
“We may not have a word for this type of crime yet, but the international community should 
find a way of classifying extraordinarily irresponsible scientific claims that could lead to 
mass suffering as some type of crime against humanity” (Brown 2010: 2) 
“They [governments and the mining industry and lobbyists] are all in the same game. The 
system is geared to override human rights, first nation rights and democratic rights. It’s 
geared toward … powerful interests and they govern the system. And they don’t think its 






Large industrial coal mining projects such as the Carmichael Project will always result in 
considerable environmental and social harms (see Chapter Four; Bricknell 2010). Yet these 
projects and the states and corporations that approve the projects despite the harms predicted 
by the scientific community and evidenced previous projects are rarely referred to as criminal. 
The Carmichael Project has received the support and approval from both state and federal 
governments in Australia. This support, as the previous two chapters have demonstrated, has 
been predicated on the denial of scientific studies on the resultant environmental harm, 
including climate change, and acceptance of the trade-off of some ecological degradation for a 
presumed economic benefit. From the point of view of green criminology, this type of 
government partnership with Adani can be considered criminal – as a form of state-corporate 
crime.  
 
The two previous chapters described the scripts used by states and corporations to deny, 
neutralise, or justify the harms that would result from the operation of the Carmichael Project. 
The next two chapters frame the Carmichael Project as a crime of the powerful, i.e. a state-
corporate crime. This chapter provides an analytical discussion of the crimes of the powerful – 
state crime, corporate crime and state-corporate crime, as well as a summary of mining in 
Australia.  
 
The State and State Crime 
	
Crime is generally framed by a problem of disadvantage. Most of ‘mainstream’ media sources’ 
coverage of crime involves violent or street crimes committed by the working class. A 
perpetrator’s criminality is usually portrayed as deviating from the rest of society’s norms, 
involving behaviours and actions that are extraordinary and uncommon. On the other hand, the 
destruction of the environment, corporate crimes and state crimes do not receive the same 
mainstream media attention or agency resources (Clifford and White 2017). Powerful 
individuals and institutions of power are able to normalise their activities in a way that allows 
their crimes to be portrayed as acceptable, sometimes even necessary, for the continued 
economic growth of a business and/or a state. Resource extraction, and in particular coal 
mining, can potentially produce an immense amount of wealth for a number of stakeholders in 
the state and mining corporation, at the cost of human and non-human victims and the 
environment. The activities that produce these costs – or harms – associated with coal mining 
can be studied as ‘crimes of the powerful’. 
 
Crimes of the powerful are linked to both ‘a personal desire to augment one’s wealth, and a 
structural imperative to get an edge in the overall capitalist economic competition’ (White and 
Haines 1996: 97). Although often perceived as ‘victimless’ crimes, crimes of the powerful can 
affect millions of people, ecosystems, and future generations. They include economic crimes 
such as fraud and environmental destruction and state crimes such as the misuse of public funds 
and corruption. Crimes of the powerful are thus linked to the operation of the system as a whole. 
These crimes are inseparable from who has power and how they exercise their power to pursue 




There are several ways that ‘the state’ can be defined and understood. At a concrete level, it is 
apparent that the state is an expansive network of various institutions that incorporate both 
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elected and non-elected officials, and has the capacity to create and enforce rules and 
regulations. In Australia, for example, there are three tiers of government – Commonwealth, 
state and local – that all have the power to make laws and issue sanctions. Yet treating the 
government as synonymous the state itself is problematic since the government is only one part 
of the system that makes up the state. Miliband (1969: 46) argued this point: ‘‘the state’ is not 
a thing,’ it does not exist as such but what ‘the state’ stands for is ‘a number of particular 
institutions which, together, constitute its reality, and which interact as parts of what may be 
called the state system’. According to Miliband (1969), the state system can be understood as 
composed of six institutions, as presented in Table 7.1: (1) political sector; (2) the 
administrative sector; (3) the military and police forces; (4) the judiciary; (5) the units of sub-
central government; and (6) the representative assemblies. 
 
Table 7.1 The institutions of the state system 
 
Institutions  Examples 
Government Presidents, prime ministers 
Administration Civil servants and state administrators 
Military and police Top military personnel and local police 
Judiciary Judges of the higher courts 
Sub-central government Political and administrative leaders of sub-
central governments 
Parliamentary assemblies Congress, Parliamentarians 
 
It is in these institutions that state power lies, and it is through these institutions state power is 
exercised in different ways by the various people who occupy positions within the institutions. 
Mitchell and colleagues (1979: 64) summarize this point: 
 
The state, then, is not just an institution. It is a form of social relations, a class 
practice. More precisely, it is a process which projects certain forms of organisation 
upon our everyday activity, forms of organisation which do not pose any threat to 
the reproduction of capitalist social relations…Therefore we can distinguish 
between two senses of the word 'state', between the state apparatus, and the state 
considered as a form or process of social relations.  
 
More recently, Tombs and Whyte (2015) have called attention to the state’s facilitating of 
power relationships in society through key institutions such as workplaces and the family, and 
can thus be understood as a nexus of mechanisms and apparatuses that organises relations of 
power, rendering it inaccurate to conceptualize ‘the state’ as separate from the rest of society.  
 
The view that the capitalist state has relative autonomy, or can act separately from capitalist 
relations, belongs to the debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas (Kennedy 
2016).  
 
Miliband (1969) held a view of the state as an instrument of the ruling capitalist class, with 
relative autonomy of capitalist social relations of production in order to execute that rule. This 
‘instrumentalist’ view suggests the state functions to serve capitalist interests because of the 
social origins of members of state government and the personal ties and influence between 
members of the state government and the ruling class elites. Despite functioning in the overall 
interests of the capitalist class, the capitalist state, Miliband (1969) argued, has a degree of 
autonomy in a capitalist society. He argued that people in power are often compelled by their 
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own self-interest to maintain their positions of power, which can conflict with the interests of 
the capitalist economy. Similarly, executives of a state can be divided over political direction 
and exert their autonomy to act in ways that conflict with the interests of the capitalist economy. 
In addition, capitalists must often ‘seek accommodation with the state and the executive to 
secure their interests, while agents of the state may be driven by perceived national interests, 
which may contract those of capitalist accumulation’ (Kennedy 2016: 183). Miliband (1969: 
65) concludes that the state and the capitalist form a partnership ‘between two different forces, 
linked to each other by many threads, yet each having its separate sphere of concern’. 
 
Poulantzas (1969) suggested a different view of the state – one that is not reducible to the 
relationships between the members of the institutions that make up the social apparatus. 
Instead, he argued that the relative autonomy of the state can be understood by the Marxist 
theory of capitalist social relations of production. In other words, the state’s autonomy lies in 
its role as the integrator of the political, economic and social structures of a capitalist society. 
In this ‘structural’ model of the capitalist state, the state is perceived as external to capitalist 
relations; an objectively capitalist entity with an overarching function of sustaining the 
capitalist mode of production.  
 
While Miliband reduces the relative autonomy of the state to ‘the act of social agents’, 
Poulantzas reduces the relation to the ‘ensemble of impersonal social structures, abstracted 
from capitalist social relations of production’ (Kennedy 2016: 184). Both acknowledge that the 
state has relative autonomy, however, and this is an important point in the analysis of the 
potential criminality of the Carmichael Project, as the next chapter will demonstrate. 
 
The state (through the government) must publicly show that it is neutral entity in the midst of 
class dynamics, as obvious partiality would lead to class conflict and maintaining peace is 
required for the growth of capitalism. Obvious partiality also threatens the perceived legitimacy 
of the state. The state’s ‘neutral image building’ leads to its pursuit of independent policies, an 
example of the relative autonomy of the state (Schwarzmantel 1987). Class cohesion therefore, 
paradoxically, requires the integration of conflicting interests by a seemingly-neutral state.  
 
In sum, the state’s power lies in the power of the forces acting within and through the state 
(Jessop 1990) but the state is also, as Coleman et al. (2009: 14) put it, ‘site (or series of sites) 
where claims for social justice and ‘progressive’ politics are forged, fought over, resited and 
sometimes implemented’. 
 
While the basic premise of rule of law is that laws must apply to all citizens equally, the debate 
over the Carmichael Project’s approval has provided numerous examples the interests of the 
state executive threatening equality of law.  In other words, the interests or concerns of 
particular individuals within a state can skew the laws of a state (or the interpretation of the 
laws of a state) in their favor. This may result in an over-regulation of the poor and non-
regulation of the powerful. 
 
Non-regulation of the powerful can be traced back to the moment in which criminal courts saw 
the punishment of the wealthy or ruling class as beyond their sphere of activity. Tombs and 
Whyte (2007) describe the process of law reform and law implementation as guided by a logic 
of social ordering; the state mediates over conflict in a way that will not and does not disrupt 
the status quo. In the last three decades, the form of the state has developed in a way that 
exacerbates this differential law enforcement. Under neoliberal conditions, the agenda for law 
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and justice turned from one of punitive enforcement to a compliance-oriented approach. In this 
model, moral panics are able to be created around the crimes of the powerless, leaving the 
crimes of the powerful un-moderated – a product of the creation of un-panics with regard to 
the lack of state concern over its own harm (Tombs and Whyte, 2007). The structures that 
emerge to regulate capital, according to Whyte (2018: 4), can thus be understood as ‘unequal 
structures of representation’ that handle – by absorbing or dissolving – conflicts between 
opposing interests. These structures are both legal and administrating and can be found in 
financial institutions and workplaces.  
Differential law implementation and enforcement are the natural outcome of a society in which 
the state exercises power in almost every aspect of its citizens’ lives. In his writings on private 
property in the 1884s, Engles predicted the differential law enforcement that would necessarily 
result from the state. 
Because the state arose from the need to hold class antagonisms in check, but 
because it arose, at the same time, in midst of the conflict between these classes, it 
is as a powerful, economically dominant class, which, through the medium of the 
state, becomes also the politically dominant class and so acquires new means of 
holding down and exploiting the oppressed class (Engles 1884: 208). 
The Western conception of property rights – and more broadly, the concept of ownership – 
begets a society fuelled by commodity production; one where, as Walters (2011: 266) points 
out, ‘you can use land but don’t have responsibility to others to care for it’.  The modern-day 
state is one in which commodity production on has been transformed into capitalist production, 
allowing a state to claim legitimacy as long as it acts in accordance with the rules it sets for 
itself. As Green and Ward (2004: 1) argue, if the states define what is criminal, a state can only 
be criminal on those ‘rare occasions when it denounces itself for breaking its own laws’.  
The next section discusses the concept of state crime, where motivation is implicitly or 
explicitly related to larger goals and objectives of governments or its agencies (Faust and 
Kauzlarich 2008).  
State crime  
 
With the authority and power that is granted to the state comes the capacity – and opportunity 
– to do harm. Measuring the harm done by a state presents a challenge: defining state crime is 
intrinsically linked to issues of legitimacy, as descriptions of state crime cannot rely upon strict 
legal definitions that have been derived from the state itself (White 2008). For the purpose of 
this thesis, state crime will be referred to broadly as the crimes involving a state acting against 
its own citizens.  
 
There are a number of key elements that are often included in crimes of the state, as identified 
by Kauzlarich et al. (2003). State crime: 
 
1. Generates harm to individuals, groups, and property; 
2. Is a product of action or inaction on behalf of the state or state agencies; 
3. The action or inaction is related directly to an assigned or implied trust/duty; 
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4. Is committed or omitted by a governmental agency, organization, or representative; and 
5. Is done in the self interest of (a) the state itself or (b) the elite groups controlling the 
state. 
 
Most people recognise and accept genocide, war crimes and terrorism as state crime but state 
crimes can be seen as occurring on a continuum (Rothe and Kauzlarich 2016). At one end, state 
crimes such as genocide result from the conscious goal-oriented activity of the state, while at 
the other end they result from a failure to act against preventable harm such as the acceptance 
of inequality and the associated social problems that result from this (Kauzlarich et al. 2003).  
Michalowski (2010: 23) has arranged this continuum into three tiers, as depicted below in Table 
7.2. 








• War-related death injury and illness to combatants and civilians 
• Torture 
• Human consequences of embargoes 
• Juridogenic crimes 
• Brutal punishments 
 
Structural violence 
• Injury, illness or death due to preventable, state-facilitated forms of: 
o Poverty and inequality 
o Workplace hazards 
o Consumer risks 
o Environmental pollution 
o Sexism, racism and ethnic ‘othering’ 
• Loss of life, health, economic resources and autonomy due to: 
o Neo-colonialism 
o Neo-imperialism 
o Neo-liberal globalization  
 
 
State crime can be argued to be inseparable from human rights violations, since the state has 
taken on the role of institutionalizing human rights. However, the institutionalization of human 
rights provides the state with an opportunity to claim that their actions did not constitute a 
human rights violation. Violations of human rights, or harmful actions perpetrated against 
citizens of the state or international community, are justified by states using techniques of 
neutralization, as discussed in the Chapters Five and Six. For example, a common script utilised 
by a state is the claim that a particular action serves the “national interest” and was therefore 
necessary, regardless of the resulting harms. Another is the denial of responsibility for the 
action’s resulting harm through the reference to the state’s intricate bureaucratic structure, 
which is similar to that of a corporation’s. The dissolving of ‘the state’ as a concept is essential 
to its denial of responsibility for a harmful action. If a state permits a coal mine to operate and 
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that coal mine contributes to the warming of the atmosphere, which then harms entire 
ecosystems, for example, which part of ‘the state’ – or who – is to blame? 
 
In sum, the state is a complex political apparatus composed of people working in various 
institutions of the state, and at various levels (see Poulantzas and Miliband’s debate in the 
previous section). Crimes committed by the state can be both acts or omission of an action by 
any actor within the state that results in harm, done in the name of the state regardless of 
motivation or interests. State crimes may also involve collusion with corporations. 
 
The Corporation and Corporate Crime 
	
Corporate criminality is perhaps the most predominant form of crimes of the powerful. Yet, 
like state crime, it is under-reported and largely absent from public discourse (White and 
Perrone 2015). This ‘invisibility’ is due to both the ubiquitous nature of the crimes and the way 
in which the resulting harms are characterized. Typically, corporate crimes that result in 
environmental harms, for example, are presented by news coverage in a manner that 
emphasizes the unusual circumstances surrounding catastrophic ‘accidents’ (such as the BP oil 
spill in Mexico), as Walters (2013: 137) observes: 
[Environmental harms are] often presented in media and political discourses as 
‘accidents’ associated with high risk commercial industries. This categorization 
serves to imbed a discursive public consciousness about the origins, practices and 
out-puts of ‘necessary’ industries. As a result, ‘accidents’, ‘spills’, ‘leaks’, and 
‘meltdowns’ perpetuate a social and political tolerance that accepts environmental 
harm and human injury as an unfortunate bi-product of essential capitalist 
enterprise. Such catastrophic events become part-and-parcel of industries that 
provide the essentials of our daily. 
The costs of corporate crime are enormous, outweighing the costs of traditional crimes and can 
potentially affect millions of people, the environment and future communities (Rothe and 
Kauzlarich 2016). Corporate crimes are linked with the corporate structure as a whole, just as 
state crimes are often linked to the state system. Chapters Five and Six demonstrated how 
corporations can deny harms and using the corporate veil and how this was done with the 
Carmichael Project’s harms. The following discussion will further elaborate on how powerful 
corporate interests can perpetuate great harms as well as obscure the nature of harm production, 
and how these actions can be studied from a criminological perspective as corporate crimes. 
The corporation 
 
Whyte (2018: 6) argues that the corporation, from its beginning, can be understood as the 
‘ingenious invention for the property owning class’. Corporations are no longer simply legal 
instruments through which the private business transactions of individuals are processed and 
performed. Although the corporation is still used in this way, the larger ‘corporate form’ has 
evolved into a form of property tenure and way of organising economics (Berle and Gardiner 
1933). The evolution of the (now) major social institution has been due to the characteristics 
of the corporation, which grants it several advantages.  
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First, incorporation assures that the business would not ‘die’ – unlike individuals who have to 
pay dues from their estate upon death, the corporation is exempt from such death duties 
(Spencer 2004). A corporation is also legally separate from its partners or shareholders. If a 
partner becomes bankrupt, the corporation’s assets cannot be used to pay their debt. As 
previously stated, this corporate personhood creates an organisation of individuals who are 
protected from liability for any of their activities. Much like the state is composed of numerous 
social relations and institutions, giving it an omnipresence that clouds liability, the corporation 
is also referred to as something that is separate from the real people and relationships that make 
it up – the managers, workers, etc. Through its existence as an autonomous entity in the legal 
realm, the corporation is able to claim ‘that ‘it’, as a ‘corporate person’, is responsible and 
therefore liable for the consequences of ‘its’ actions’ (Glasbeek 2002), leaving executives and 
directors with the guarantee of immunity. ‘Corporate veil’ describes this protection that shields 
shareholders of the corporation from liability for the harms caused by the corporation 
(Matheson 2009; Bainbridge 2001; Milton 2007; Tombs and Whyte 2015). 
 
Investors of a corporation also benefit from this corporate veil. Since the ‘employer’ in a 
corporation is the corporate person (rather than an actual person), the owners are not held 
responsible for any of the working conditions that their employees face (Whyte 2018). Workers 
have been prevented from seeking compensation in tort cases involving their multinational 
corporation employer due to this effect of the corporate veil (Anderson 2001; Khoury and 
Whyte 2017). In addition, any corporate subsidy granted from the state to the corporation is 
effectively granted to investors (Tombs and Whyte 2015). While it is argued (e.g. ‘the 
economic defence’ in previous chapters) that corporations are important to capitalist economies 
due to their production of goods and jobs, further investigation into the corporate structure 
suggests that this is a deception (Whyte 2018). The social relationships contained within a 
corporation are such that the workers or ‘stakeholders’ generate the value for a corporation (for 
the owners and shareholders of a corporation) but do not receive proportional benefits, in the 
form of dividends for example, from the corporation. Thus the corporation is a mechanism that 
at the same time grants the property owning class immense privilege and conceals these 
privileges in ‘a process of abstraction’ (Glasbeek 2002). This process of abstraction is also a 
process of self-regulation and, from an ‘outsider’ perspective, acts as the foundation for the 





Corporations have been granted a legal personhood by states and use the ‘corporate veil’ to 
evade financial liability and social responsibility. Corporations are also able to escape 
responsibility due to the incompatibility of criminal law that is written for individual criminal 
actions. The key concept in attributing criminal liability is mens rea, which focuses criminal 
law on the psychological state of the individual in the moment they commit the act.  Tombs 
and Whyte (2015: 87) argue the ‘distinction between intention and other categories of mens 
rea (knowledge; recklessness; or criminal negligence)’ result in crimes involving negligent 
behaviours being treated to less harsh penalties than crimes involving intent – and that this has 
direct consequences to corporate crime, which usually involve recklessness or criminal 
negligence. The effect is that corporate crimes are regarded as less serious (Reiman 1995). 
Mens rea also prioritises criminal acts over criminal omissions in terms of seriousness (Tombs 
and Whyte 2015). It is often more difficult to identify the omission or series of negligent acts 
in a corporation that is organised in a hierarchy than it is to identify a single act committed by 
an individual (Slapper and Tombs 1999).  
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The causes of corporate crimes can often be linked to the corporation’s ‘cost-driven’ 
management practices and are committed in order to advance financial goals, unfolding over a 
long period of time (Green and Ward 2004). Some examples of corporate crime include 
restraint of trade (e.g. antitrust violations and price fixing); fraud in advertising and sales (e.g. 
misrepresentation of a product in an advertisement); and savings and loan failures (e.g. the 
selling of risky loans) (Rothe and Kauzlarich 2016). Although corporate crimes are devastating 
to victims and the community at large, they are regarded as less serious than blue-collar crimes 
like murder, due to the categorisation of mens rea and ease of finding ‘the smoking gun’ but 
also due to the way in which they are policed:  
 
Corporate crimes are dealt with by specialist agencies that are not generally 
recognised as part of the criminal justice system. The regulation of corporate crime 
is normally the responsibility of quasi-autonomous, publically funded agencies. 
Those agencies may be responsible for regulating particular types of offending, 
they pay be responsible for particular industries (Tombs and Whyte 2015: 92).  
 
In Australia, for example, the EPA is responsible for safety and waste offences, while other 
regulatory agencies and associations like the Australian Banking Association monitor banking 
and financial conduct. Offenses that occur within or by corporations are thus able to be labelled 
as administrative errors, accidents or scandals. The legal concept of strict liability, which 
imputes liability to a person regardless of their culpability, is able to remove the mental element 
of the offense and hold a company (the corporate person) liable for its crimes. Strict liability is 
an important concept in the prosecution of corporate crimes, especially when the natural 
environment is the victim. 
 
Corporate violence to the environment has harmful effects on humans as well as non-human 
animals and plants (Hasler et al. 2019). As with most corporate crimes, this victimisation is an 
outcome of the cost-cutting practices and the pursuit of profit. Often, the costs associated with 
compliance with state regulations are greater than the costs of paying fines associated with 
breaching the regulations (Rothe and Kauzlarich 2016). An infamous example of a corporate 
crime that had devastating effects on the environment is the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. 
210 million gallons of oil were spilled, caused by inferior cement walls and malfunctioning 
valves. BP was fined $12 billion after it pled guilty to 11 charges of manslaughter, one felony 
count of obstruction of Congress, and two environmental misdemeanours (Rothe and 
Kauzlarich 2016).  
 
Corporate crimes are caused by the pursuit of profit and the consequences of these crimes are 
profound. Corporations are powerful actors, controlling large amounts of wealth and 




While states and corporations perpetrate serious crimes, they do not always act alone. Deviant 
state actions often intersect with criminal actions of corporations, resulting in human rights and 
environmental violations (Green and Ward 2004). State-corporate crime involves the 
convergence of these two powerful groups in the pursuit of some collective benefit. For the 
purpose of this thesis, the concept of state-corporate crime refers to the definition given by 
Kramer and Michalowski (2006: 20): 
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Illegal or socially injurious actions that result from a mutually reinforcing 
interaction between 1) policies and/or practices in pursuit of the goals of one or 
more institutions of political governance and 2) policies and/or practices in pursuit 
of the goals of one or more institutions of economic production and distribution. 
 
Criminologists and scholars of crimes of the powerful have identified three explanations for 
the occurrence of state-corporate crime: organisational motivation or goals, opportunity, and 
social control (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000).  
Matthews and Kauzlarich (2000) have further identified two forms of state-corporate crime: 
state-initiated and state-facilitated. State-initiated state-corporate crime occurs when 
‘corporations, employed by the government, engage in organisational deviance at the direction 
of, or with the tacit approval of, the government’ (Matthews and Kauzlarich 2000: 283). State-
facilitated state-corporate crime occurs when there is a failure of governmental regulatory 
agencies ‘to restrain deviant business activities, because of direct collusion between business 
and government, or because they adhere to shared goals whose attainment would be hampered 
by aggressive regulation (Kramer and Michalowski 1990: 6). Lasslett (2010) expanded on these 
sub-categories by identifying ‘corporate-initiated state crime’ as occurring when corporations 
use their economic power to coerce states into taking deviant actions; and ‘corporate-facilitated 
state crime’ to include situations where corporations provide the means for a state’s criminality 
or when they do not alert the community (domestic or international) to the state’s criminality 
because the deviance benefits the corporation.  
Close personal connections between individuals within states and corporations ‘motivate and 
facilitate many instances of state-corporate deviance’ (Green and Ward 2004: 42). Kramer and 
Michalowski’s (2006) model of state-corporate crime proposed that criminal or deviant 
behaviour at the organisational level contain three characteristics: 
1. Deviant organisational outcomes are not discreet acts of institutional wrongdoing, but 
rather the product of the relationships between different social institutions pursuing 
different goals and responding to different sets of pressures;  
2. Horizontal and vertical relationships between economic and political institutions 
contain powerful potentials for the production of illegal and other socially injurious 
actions; and  
3. The relationships between government and business allow for the flows of information, 
data, and money to be shaped; facilitate or inhibit deviant organisational behaviour; and 
shape opportunities and rewards for both socially harmful and socially responsible 
behaviours.  
 
Varela (2001: 161) argues that the ‘systematic institutionalised failure to apply a nation’s laws 
justly’ – in state-initiated or state-facilitated state-corporate crime – ‘is a violation of the human 
rights of its people’. In many cases, state-corporate crime results in environmental degradation 
(Green and Ward 2004). In the example of mining, once a land permit is granted, the investors 
of the corporation treat the land as their own private property, despite only having rights to 
land use. The next section introduces the Australian state’s relationship with the mining sector 
through its legislation. The next chapter will provide more specific details of legislation in 
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Queensland and a discussion of Adani’s navigation of the mining legislation in attempting to 
obtain the legal rights to build and operate the Carmichael Project. 
The state and mining corporations 
 
Although states have the ability to create and enforce legislation on the environment that 
addresses global warming and other environmental harms, the emission of carbon dioxide and 
other greenhouse gases is not currently considered a crime in any state legislation. Kramer and 
Michalowski (2013: 47) have described how this inaction on – and denial of – climate change 
by states can itself be labelled as criminal: 
 
The orchestrated denial of global warming and climate change, despite the 
extensive evidence to the contrary, can also be labelled a state corporate crime. It 
is a deliberate attempt to thwart efforts to respond in an effective and just way to 
the emerging problems resulting from the heating of the planet…It consists largely 
of corporate propaganda built around lies and deceptions masquerading as science, 
which is then disseminated by ideological and political forces in conservative think 
tanks, industry trade associations, the corporate media and some government 
officials. 
This inaction on climate change by the state produces environmentally, socially and 
economically harmful consequences (see chapter four); so does the state’s position on harmful 
industries such as mining. 
 
On mining as a particular example of state-corporate crime, Tsing (2005) argues that the 
harmful effects can be studied at the moment in which global processes (such as globalisation 
and capitalism) become localized in a specific context by means of interactions between 
objects, environments, institutions, and people. The principles guiding international relations 
and the goals of foreign policy can shed light on the main forces that drive state-corporate 
interaction at the national and local levels (Zaitch and Gutiérrez Gómez 2015). The relationship 
between the Australian state and Adani must therefore be widely influenced by the neoliberal 
economic policies of the Global North and South. Neoliberalism, beginning in the 1970s with 
the strong economies of countries such as the U.K. and U.S., implemented a series of political 
and economic reforms in order to address the crisis regarding ‘over-accumulated capital.’ Open 
markets, liberalised trade, protected private property, and the promotion of entrepreneurial 
freedom offered investment opportunities for unused capital. The liberalisation of the markets 
in the Global South would ‘free up new profitable assets that idle capital from the developed 
nations’ and allow them to be able to ‘seize and exploit, thereby solving the crisis’ (Zaitch and 
Gutiérrez Gómez 2015: 391).  
 
Mining was influenced by this neoliberalisation process: between 1985 and 2001 more than 90 
countries modified or implemented for the first time their mining codes in order to attract 
foreign direct investment. As discussed in Chapter Three, India implemented its first 
comprehensive Export-Import Policy in 1985, with the goal of controlling the export of its 
resources in the interest of the country. Later in 2000, India modified its economic policy to 




One of the global process behind state-corporate interaction involving mining is described as 
‘accumulation by dispossession’, or the process by which a state strips the public of its 
commons in an attempt to tackle the over-accumulation of capital surplus (Harvey 2003). 
Accumulation by dispossession occurs in twenty-first century societies when states mandate 
‘the removal of common goods, such as the environment, from the public sphere, by selling 
them to over-accumulated private capitals, which are found, more often than not, in the Global 
North’ (Zaitch and Gutiérrez Gómez 2015: 390). 
 
A state’s commodification of public property in the form of natural resources for private, 
corporate use occurs through the legal framework surrounding the use of those natural 
resources. By codifying mining into a set of laws and regulations, a new and marketable asset, 
targeted at foreign investors, is created. The way in which the legal code is implemented forms 
‘the basis on which state-corporate interaction is built’ (Zaitch and Gutiérrez Gómez 2015: 
391). The result of these interactions by state and corporations through a state’s legislation 
results in the loss of public goods, or accumulation by dispossession. This concept will be 




This chapter provided the foundation for discussions of the Carmichael Project as a state-
corporate crime by discussing the actors (the state and the corporation) and the offenses (state 
crimes, corporate crimes and state-corporate crimes).  
The state is a complex institution. It is both an ensemble of the diverse groups that constitute 
the state apparatus and a series of social structures and relations. It is both the interpersonal 
relations of the members of the groups of the apparatus and a capitalist entity. The state as an 
institution is composed of elected and non-elected officials with a duty to represent their 
citizens and to carry out the rule of law. Miliband correctly pointed out that personnel within 
the state will have conflicting interests with regards to the role of the state in relation to a 
capitalist economy. This provides the state with relative autonomy to make decisions. 
Poulantzas further identifies that the state’s relative autonomy lies with its unifying role in 
integrating the economic, political and social relations of capitalism. The people working 
within the institutions of the state, as well as the institutions themselves, thus operate with some 
autonomy. This autonomy contains the space for crimes to be committed on behalf of or by the 
state.  
Corporations are powerful actors, controlling large amounts of wealth and influencing political 
activities. Corporate stakeholders lobby state institutions and people within them to manipulate 
regulations in their favour, resulting in the state acting against its citizens – or in favour of a 
particular group rather than as a neutral entity. The corporate structure allows the corporation 
to be treated as a person under the law. This ‘corporate veil’ shields stakeholders from legal 
responsibility for any harmful acts done on the corporation’s behalf. Corporate crimes are 
caused by the pursuit of profit and the consequences of these crimes are profound, especially 
when committed in collusion with states. 
Crimes committed by states, by corporations and with collusion between these two actors 
sometimes involves the misuse of public lands and results in environmental harm. Mining is 
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one example in which the state commodifies public property for private, corporate use through 
the state’s legal framework surrounding the use of the natural resources found within these 
properties. As previous chapters have demonstrated, the Queensland and Australian 
governments have ignored climate science and environmental harms to pursue the building of 
the Carmichael Project.  
In sum, the state is a sight of struggle between classes and opposing interests. The next chapter 
will identify the ways in which the proposed Carmichael Mine and Rail Project can be 
understood as a state-corporate crime, involving collusion between the Australian state and the 
Adani corporation. Chapter Eight will build upon the discussion of private property, rule of 
law and capital to demonstrate the ways in which these elements were manipulated in order to 









The influence of miners in the [Queensland] state was such that it resembles what some analysts 
refer to as a ‘shadow government’. Used across a range of contemporary examples of 
corruption scandals, a ‘shadow government’ is said to exist when politicians and selected, 
influential business figures facilitate private control over public resources, causing institutional 
decay of formal government structures’ (Campbell 2015). 
Pro-development forces argue strenuously at the top government level for approvals, 
leveraging the fact that their aims coincide with the government’s needs for revenue and jobs. 
In contrast, anti-development forces lack serious government access, instead using science … 
appeals to sustainability … [and lobbying] the UNESCO World Heritage Committee 
(Beresford 2018: 125).  
If a mining magnate does want to relay money to a particular political party because of some 
favour that might be granted at some future date, they can do that without being traced through 
a whole range of funds and associated entities that the major political parties currently have. 
This is an issue that needs to be explored very closely, because we could be moving towards 
an American system where money does buy favour and where money does lobby for particular 





This chapter discusses the Carmichael Project as a state-corporate crime by first describing the 
legislative process for mining projects in Australia and then analysing particular examples of 
the Project’s approval as instances of collusion. So far, this thesis has described the ways in 
which stakeholders in government and Adani have denied the harms of the Carmichael Project 
and falsely cited its benefits. The manipulation of the script surrounding the Project by the state 
and corporation in order to deceive the public will be shown to exemplify one example of state-
corporate collusion. This thesis has also discussed how Adani was able to secure the permits 
and other necessary approvals for the Project in ways that evade standard procedures. In a 
number of instances throughout the Project’s timeline, Adani has utilised loopholes in 
Australian environmental legislation that has resulted in a lack of thorough government 
investigation before granting the corporation the licences necessary to pursue the mining 
project. This manipulation of legislation and protocol by Adani facilitated by the government 
will be shown to be another example of state-corporate collusion. This chapter illustrates the 
suitability of the concept of collusion and state-corporate crime for examining government and 
corporate denial and greenwashing and the manipulation of environmental regulation.   
This chapter also presents one further example of collusion. The government will be shown to 
have played a role as an enabler for industry despite its duty to act as the keeper of public 
spaces and protector of the environment through an examination of The White Paper on 
Developing Northern Australia. This document, published in 2015, contains the foundation for 
NAIF, which potentially could have led to the government funding the Carmichael Project. The 
White Paper, written by members of the Australian Government and others who have ties to 
mining and infrastructure industries, explicitly defines how the government should support and 
assist industry in developing Northern Australia through the building of infrastructure such as 
mines. This demonstrates what Miliband’s discussion of the state in the previous chapter 
described: individuals within the state having conflicted interests regarding serving the 
capitalist state. The greenwashing and denial of harms of the Project, along with the 
manipulation of environmental regulations and the government’s role as an industry enabler as 
shown by the White Paper attest to criminality of the Carmichael Project’s approval.  
Australian Mining Legislation 
 
The Australian Government has created legislation that regulates mining, global warming, the 
Great Barrier Reef and other matters of environmental significance such as water management, 
species protection, and emissions standards. The Government also decides how to enforce these 
regulations. Through the state’s power of both legislation and enforcement, the state can take 
on the role of either industry enabler or environmental protector.  
 
The Australian Government’s legal framework for public spaces, or the global commons 
dictates who can use public land and how they can do so. Chambers & Company, a Melbourne-
based commercial law firm that specialises in international transactions including mining and 
construction projects published a report in 2013 titled ‘Investing in Australia’s Mining 
Industry.’ This report, written primarily for the law firm’s potential mining clients, describes 
Australian mining legislation and licensing scheme as benevolent towards overseas mining 
investors (Chambers 2013: 15): 
 
The licensing system provides a clear means through which ownership of the 
minerals is transferred from the State as the owner to the private miners who are 
then able to engage in mining operations. This system is an important cornerstone   
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of Australia’s open mining system. Provided that license conditions are complied 
with, a miner is given a degree of certainty as to its rights over a deposit. Such 
certainty is important to enable investment in a project (with funding often being 
provided by third parties). 
 
This transferring of ownership of minerals from state to private miners exemplifies what Zaitch 
and Gutiérrez Gómez (2015) described as ‘accumulation of the global commons’. In other 
words, in the requirement to obtain an authority to use natural resources (such as land, minerals 
and water) is a state’s relationship with nature that allows for the commodification of nature. 
In the Australian case, those who hold positions of power within the state in government, the 
judiciary and Parliament have authority over these natural resources and are thus able to dictate 
the terms of the exploitation of public spaces.  
 
The legal framework for mining in Australia, and particularly in Queensland, determines the 
interactions between the state and corporation with regard to approving mining projects like 
the Carmichael. The mining laws of Australia and Queensland encompass the entirety of 
possibilities for all aspects of a mining project, including: the possible relationship between the 
state and corporation, the exchange of capital between them, the likelihood for any harms that 
may occur and the rectifying such harms. 
 
Responsibility for making decisions on whether or not to approve foreign investment proposals 
– such as the Carmichael Project – lies with the Australian Treasurer, who is advised by the 
Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) when making these decisions. FIRB was established 
in 1976 as a non statutory body to advise the Government on all proposals to establish new 
businesses that require an investment of $10 million or more; investments into existing 
businesses worth at least $50 million; and some acquisitions of Australian land. ‘Australian 
land’ refers to four separate categories of land: agricultural land; commercial land; residential 
land; and mining or production tenements (Commonwealth of Australia 2015b; Allens 2017).  
 
Adani, as a foreign investor, had to obtain an approval for its acquisition of Australian land, 
i.e. a ‘mining or production tenement’. FIRB’s definition of a ‘mining or production tenement’ 
includes “a right (however described) under a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory 
to recover minerals (such as coal or ore) …” and “an interest in a right or lease”, which includes 
interests in profit or income sharing agreements (Commonwealth of Australia 2015c). Each 
state’s mining legislation includes a mining act (the Mineral Resources Act 1989 in 
Queensland) and a state agreement for large mining projects.  
 
Mining in Queensland 
 
The mining acts cover the entitlements to mine on state-owned and/or private land and 
prescribe the necessary conditions to acquire mining interests. State governments have adopted 
a common licensing system for the administration of mineral deposits. The type of license or 
permit issued by the state depends on the stage of the mining process. In Queensland, mining 
investors must obtain five permits, depending on the stage of the mining development.  
 
The first permit is the Prospecting Permit, which allows the holder to prospect for minerals and 
gives priority for a grant of a mining or general purpose lease. A Prospecting Permit can be 
sought for any mineral other than coal and allows the holder to prospect, hand-mine (mining 
using hand-operated tools such as jackhammers or shovels) and peg a mining lease or mining 
claim (The State of Queensland 2017a).  The second is the Exploration Permit, which allows 
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the holder to explore for minerals and gives the miner priority for a grant of a mining or general 
purpose lease. Exploration Permits in Queensland allow the holder to use ‘more advanced 
exploration methods to determine the quantity and quality of minerals present’ in an area. For 
coal, an Exploration Permit Coal (EPC) allows the holder to prospect, conduct geophysical 
surveys, drilling, and sampling and testing of materials and can be applied for only through a 
call for tenders (The State of Queensland 2018c). Environmental authorities are not required if 
the proposed activities meet the criteria for small-scale mining activities. Notably, native title 
requirements do need to be addressed before an exploration permit is granted. 
 
The third permit, the Mineral development licence (MDL), is issued in order to evaluate the 
development potential of the defined resource and can be granted if the applicant holds an 
exploration permit where there is a “significant mineral occurrence of possible economic 
potential” (The State of Queensland 2017b). MDLs in Queensland allow for the conducting of 
geoscientific programs such as drilling and seismic surveys, mining feasibility studies, 
metallurgical testing and marketing, and environmental, engineering, and design studies. An 
environmental authority must be granted prior to the granting of an MDL. Native title 
requirements must also be addressed prior to the granting of an MDL. The fourth permit 
required for mining development in Queensland is the Mining Lease, which provides a miner 
with a right to work and extract minerals from the land. In Queensland, a Mining Lease enables 
the holder to machine-mine for specified minerals and conduct other activities associated with 
mining or promoting the activity of mining. Environmental authorities and native title 
requirements must be addressed before a mining lease is granted. Queensland’s Boundary 
Identification Practice Manual outlines the marking out requirements: “If you are required to 
mark out the boundary of the authority, you will require either a current authority or landowner 
consent to enter the land to undertake this activity” (The State of Queensland 2018d).  
 
After obtaining a Mining Lease, the corporation applies for a Water Monitoring Authority, the 
fifth and final permit, which allows the holder to access water bores. In Queensland, having a 
mining lease or mining development licence comes with the obligation to make good to any 
damage caused to surrounding water bores. It is possible to apply for a water monitoring 
authority over land outside the area of the lease or licence in order to comply with these 
obligations (The State of Queensland 2017c).  
 
Chapter Three discussed Adani’s success in obtaining these permits, despite litigation from 
environmental organisations and the Wangan and Jagalingou People. Adani’s success is partly 
due to the structure of the five-step mining permit process. The process allows for the 
possibility of allowing state actors to define some of the consequences of mining as legal 
harms. Having such an open-for-interpretation process has also allowed for the current 
decision-makers to prioritise investment over safe environmental practices – in line with Adani. 
The final chapters of this thesis will present ecocide legislation as containing provisions that 
prevent interpretation of economic growth as an unquestioned good in determining potential 
environmentally harmful projects. 
 
State agreements with mining corporations 
 
State agreements are the negotiated rights and obligations of the state government and a 
developer throughout the duration of a development project. The developer must prove that the 
proposed project is economically feasible and also address any environmental and indigenous 
‘issues’ in order to be granted an agreement. State agreements cover all aspects of the project, 
including the development of infrastructure such as ports and the plan for royalty payments. 
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Once the terms are negotiated by both the state and the developer, the agreement is ratified by 
Parliament, which guarantees the terms of the agreement would override any inconsistent 
conditions in any other law. After the ratification by Parliament, a development proposal is 
drafted and submitted to the relevant Minister for final approval. Development proposals 
include the arrangements for: 
 
(a) The mining and recovery of minerals; 
(b) Any beneficiation or further processing of minerals; 
(c) Mineral transportation (usually by rail and/or shipping); 
(d) Accommodation and ancillary facilities for the mine workforce; 
(e) Utilities supply; 
(f) Use of local labour, professional services, manufacturers and suppliers; 
(g) Residue disposal; 
(h) The basis upon which the miner will finance a project; and 
(i) Such applications for further mining leases as are required to be granted to it for the 
purposes of its proposed operations (Chambers 2013: 19). 
 
In the early 1900s in Queensland, state agreements were mostly used to validate arrangements 
between the Queensland Government and railway companies (Fitzgerald 2010: 41). The 
Milsom Petroleum Agreement Ratification Act 1923 (Qld) was the first state agreement 
regarding resource development. Soon afterward, between 1929 and 1930, the Queensland 
government ratified four agreements to grant developers exclusive rights to prospect for 
minerals across areas ranging from 573 to 100,000 acres and to apply for and take up mineral 
leases over the specified lands: Mining Trust Limited Agreement Ratification Act 1929 (Qld), 
Commonwealth Mines Preliminary Syndicate Limited Agreement Ratification Act 1930 (Qld), 
Palmer Development Coy Limited Agreement Ratification Act 1930 (Qld), and Alexander 
Macdonald Mining Agreement Ratification Act 1930 (Qld) (Fitzgerald 2010: 42). Queensland’s 
first agreement relating to the coal deposits of the Bowen Basin, which supplies more than half 
of Australia’s coal exports and is 200 kilometres to the east of the proposed Carmichael Mine, 
was the Electric Supply Corporation (Overseas) Limited Agreement Act 1947 (Qld). The 
agreement was said to be the beginning of “a new era in the industrial life of the state,” as the 
English company proposed to extract 3.5 million tons of coal per year, expanding the 
production from the existing mines in the area, and to transport it to the coast for shipment 
overseas (Fitzgerald 2010: 42). Although this project was never fully executed, it served as the 
foundation for state agreements regarding the Bowen Basin with Thiess Peabody in 1965 and 
Central Queensland Coal Associates in 1985. 
State agreements are written to be mutually beneficial for the economic interests of the state 
and the corporation. All phases of the project are included under the ‘umbrella contract’ of the 
state agreement, which can only be changed by mutual agreement in writing by both parties. 
Entering a state agreement demonstrates clear government support for a project and provides 
the prospective mining company with a powerful ‘message of support’ that it can use to procure 
financial support from banks or other lending institutions.  
State agreements can be beneficial to mining companies for several reasons. First, state 
agreements represent a formal allocation of the responsibilities between a corporation and the 
state in advance of implementation of the agreement. This can ensure that the mining project 
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can go ahead without impediments. Second, a state agreement cannot be changed by the state 
once it is granted, as amendments require the approval of all parties, including the mining 
company. This is unlike other Acts of Parliament, which allow states to make unilateral 
changes without the mutual agreement of the other parties involved (Chambers 2013). Once in 
place, state agreements obligate the state to grant tenure and mining rights under the state’s 
relevant legislation. This further grants certainty and security to the mining company. State 
agreements also cover zoning and taxation, thus potentially granting specific benefits to mining 
companies that cannot be amended once agreed upon. Lastly, the state would have to obtain 
the consent of the mining company if it wants to acquire or use any of the lands within the state 
agreement. This finalises the transfer of public lands from the state to the private corporation. 
State agreements can also benefit the state. Commodification of public land and resources may 
result in economic development and infrastructure for the signing state. The Carmichael Project 
was able to navigate this process through the collusion between Adani and the Queensland and 
Australian federal governments.  
State-Corporate Collusion 
Collusion is generally defined as an agreement for two or more parties to work together to 
achieve some questionable, deviant or illegal end goal. The Australian Government’s 
Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC 2017) defines collusion as ‘any incident of suspected 
fraud allegedly committed by an employee or contractor of the entity in collaboration or 
association with a person external to the entity’, where fraud is ‘dishonestly obtaining a benefit, 
or causing a loss, by deception or other means’. In the case of the Carmichael Project, there are 
three separate instances that fit this definition of collusion: the collusion between the state and 
corporation in denying the harms of the Carmichael Project; collusion to manipulate 
environmental regulation for Adani to proceed with the Carmichael Project; and collusion in 
building and funding the Project through the NAIF. Each of these moments of collusion 
between state and corporation have involved using dishonesty and deception in order to achieve 
the approvals necessary to build the Carmichael Mine and Rail. 
Collusion by denial of harms 
	
In part, the Adani Carmichael Project stands out as a case of state-corporate crime because of 
the extent it involves consciously planned and executed campaigns aimed at deceiving the 
public about the actual harms and risks posed by the mining of the Galilee Basin. As the 
discussion of the Australian state’s and Adani corporation’s techniques of neutralisation and 
denial of harm (Chapter Six) has shown, conflicting information has been presented by these 
stakeholders on the harms versus ‘benefits’ of the Carmichael Project. One example of a 
deceitful statement – a lie – made by Adani corporation and the Australian state to the public 
involved the Carmichael’s job figures; i.e. the stakeholders’ ‘economic argument’ for the 
Project’s approval. Both Adani and the government have claimed that the Carmichael Mine 
would create 10,000 jobs for local Queenslanders but when forced to speak truthfully in court, 
Adani stated that the actual job number would be closer to 1,200 (Adani Mining Pty Ltd v Land 
Services of Coast and Country Inc & Ors [2015] QLC 48). Despite this admission, the script 
of ‘10,000 jobs for Queensland’ was continued by both corporate and government actors.  
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The manipulation of the public’s perception of the Carmichael Project through the deliberate 
spreading of propaganda disguised as truth helped the government and Adani in a few ways. 
The lies, presented as facts, became the basis for Adani and the Carmichael Project to receive 
the necessary approvals for operation in Queensland and Australia. The lies (e.g. regarding 
economic benefit; mitigation of harms to endangered species and the Great Barrier Reef; 
statements made claiming Indigenous groups are in support of the Project) became the facts 
used by Adani in court that allowed them to win legal challenges brought forth by 
environmental and Indigenous groups. The campaigns aimed at deceiving the public also 
allowed the Carmichael Project to be seen (by those in the pro-Adani, pro-mining camp) as 
simply another example of ‘greenies against industry’. As Holcomb (2008: 205) states, ‘when 
conflicting information regarding environmental practices is so readily available’ the result is 
the public may ‘become discouraged by inconsistent reports.’ While discouraging the public 
from thinking about the Carmichael Project as anything more than government/pro-jobs versus 
greenies, the misinformation campaigns were able to control the conversation surrounding the 
debate. Debate around the severity of the environmental harms that would result from the 
Carmichael Project – not just as another mine but as one of the largest coal mines in the world 
– was stifled. 
Adani, as a corporation, used various techniques of neutralisation and denial of harm to help 
them achieve and maintain a status of authority on mining matters; and to be portrayed as a 
foreign company that can be trusted with helping Australia by creating jobs and developing the 
Galilee Basin. The Australian Government, on the other hand, did not need to use these 
techniques to gain trust. Instead, the state, which naturally enjoys a level of trust from its 
citizens, used its position of trust to deceive those same citizens. Both parties knew that the 
Carmichael Project would be ecologically harmful, yet both sought to suppress this information 
and provided the public with misinformation suggesting the opposite. This could not have been 
done without the collaboration – or collusion – between state and corporation. Without the 
state, the corporation would be viewed more sceptically; as a profit-making entity. With the 
state’s endorsement, however, the corporation gains credibility. Techniques of neutralisation 
and denial of harm was used to help Adani remain beyond the scope of the law. This is one key 
reason the Carmichael Project’s application was able to proceed despite scientific evidence of 
climate change and other environmental harms the endeavour would produce. The state, 
through its institutions and people within those institutions (Ministers for the Environment, 
who continually went on record in favour of the Project – see Chapter Six – for example) 
neglected its neutral position in favour of the lobbyist’s, Adani’s, position of supporting the 
Project.   
Thus, the state and corporation colluded through the denial of harms. As Chapter Four 
demonstrated, the harms that would arise from the operation of the Carmichael Project are 
significant, as measured and defined by the scientific community. The denial of these harms – 
where ‘denial’ is the act of selective ignoring of information and refusing to acknowledge the 
reality of the situation – and the presenting of false information (i.e. job figures, support for the 
mine, benefits of the Project) is evidence of collusion by the Adani corporation and Australian 
Government. 
Collusion by manipulation of environmental regulations 
	
Adani was also able to escape the reach of the law through its manipulation of Australian 
environmental regulations. ‘Making the law disappear’ (Snider 2000) was made possible with 
the assistance of the Queensland state and Australian federal governments. For example, in 
Queensland, it is mandatory for a company to have an Environmental Authority in order to 
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conduct business such as mining. Yet in August 2010, one week before incorporating in 
Australia, Adani was able to purchase its Environmental Authority from another company (see 
Chapter Three). Adani was thus able to evade the standard government assessment procedure 
by purchasing its Environmental Authority – and this was legal done according to Queensland 
legislation. Having bought its Environmental Authority allowed further manipulation of the 
law to the corporation’s benefit. In 2013, the Environmental Protection Act was amended to 
require companies to register as suitable operators unless the company already possessed an 
existing environmental authority, in which case the company would be automatically registered 
as a suitable operator. This stipulation allowed Adani to avoid needing to disclose its 
environmental record and the requirement for a government investigation into its suitability to 
operate in Australia since it had the purchased environmental authority from 2010. These are 
just two examples of Adani’s manipulation of environmental regulation. Previous chapters 
have described numerous other instances. The state – at a federal level – is also complicit in 
these manipulations of law. By allowing exceptions such as the one described in the 
amendment to the EPA, the Australian Government has created legislation that benefits those 
who exploit the country’s natural resources.  
The Chambers Law document (discussed in Chapter Seven) described how Australian federal 
mining legislation is perceived to be ideal for foreign mining investment by corporations that 
wish to do so. Adani’s manipulation of this environmental legislation has not only been 
facilitated through the loopholes in the mining assessment process described above, but also 
through the text of the legislation meant to protect the environment.  The aim of the 
Environmental Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (EPBC Act) is to protect the 
environment (EPBC Act 1999). Yet Adani and the Minister for the Environment used this Act 
to justify the approval of the Carmichael Project in court. As Chapter Three describes, for 
example, the Minister for the Environment referred to Section 527E of the EPBC Act, which 
defines an event or circumstance as an ‘impact’ of an action ‘if the event or circumstance is a 
direct consequence of the action; or for an event or circumstance that is an indirect consequence 
of the action—subject to subsection 2, the action is a substantial cause of that event or 
circumstance’, to argue that in the Carmichael case, the ‘physical effects’ associated with 
climate change (increased ocean temperature and acidification) are not a direct impact of the 
proposed action (EPBC Act 1999; Australian Conservation Foundation Incorporated v 
Minister for the Environment [2016] FCA 1042, emphasis added).  The debate surrounding 
‘direct consequence’ dealt with Scope 1, 2 and 3 emissions as well as ‘net emissions’ and made 
it possible for Adani to submit that determining ‘actual net emissions’ was ‘speculative’.  
 
The federal government’s environmental legislation, which has allowed Adani to side-step 
proper assessments before gaining approval of its mine and rail project, has also had another 
impact: the sustained political fight against alternative energy. In 2016 the Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) was faced with a budget cut of $115 
million. Approximately 275 staff had been identified for redundancy, including Dr. John 
Church, the world’s leading expert on global sea rise (Turney 2016). The budget cut thus affects 
Australia’s ability to properly study and respond to the effects of climate change. Also in 2016, 
the Australian Renewable Energy Agency (ARENA) received funding cut of a half a billion 
dollars (Hopkin 2016). ARENA’s focus was heavily concentrated on research into the 
introduction of renewable energy into the electricity system. These budget cuts demonstrate 
the government’s refusal to prioritise the transition to alternative energy from coal.  
 
In addition to slashing budgets related to energy renewal, the Australian federal government 
has attempted to alter environmental regulations that have allowed environmental groups to 
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litigate against the Carmichael Project. Chapter Three described Attorney-General George 
Brandis’ call to change Section 487 of the EPBC Act in order to prevent ‘vigilante litigation’ 
and ‘lawfare by radical green groups’ (Clark 2015).  In 2016, then-Prime Minister Malcolm 
Turnbull received a bid by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott to abolish Section 487 
completely (Hepburn 2016). Ultimately this did not happen. However, the threat of of 
eliminating Section 487 remains a poignant example of a state responding to environmental 
activists’ challenges to environmentally harmful decisions with a public proposal to move to a 
less democratic process of allowing industrial projects to go ahead without the opportunity to 
be checked by the judicial branch. 
 
Collusion in building and funding the Carmichael Project  
 
In 2016 Adani sought a $1 billion AUD loan from the Australian federal government for the 
financing of the railway line to the site of the proposed Carmichael Coal Mine through the 
Northern Australia Infrastructure Facility (NAIF) (Viellaris 2016). The NAIF was created as a 
part of a larger plan for developing Northern Australia; a White Paper released on 18 June 
2015, titled ‘Our North, Our Future’. ‘Our North, Our Future’. The White Paper describes the 
government’s 20-year vision for Northern Australia, a land mass that covers 40% of the 
country, including all of the Northern Territory and the parts of Western Australia and 
Queensland above the Tropic of Capricorn, as pictured below: 
 
Figure 8.1 Northern Australia 
 
Northern Australia includes the Galilee Basin, the proposed site of the Carmichael Project. The 
200-page document begins with a Forward that introduces the theme of the paper, i.e. the role 
that the state should have in developing Northern Australia: 
Governments alone cannot develop Northern Australia, they can only set the right 
environment for businesses to profitably invest and communities to flourish. The 
north will only truly achieve its potential with the participation of all the people 
who live there, including Indigenous Australians (Commonwealth of Australia 
2015d: IV). 
Similarly, the ‘vision statement’ states that governments’ role is to ‘create successful business 
environments…through prudent economic policies’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2015d: 2).  
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This ‘government-facilitated rather than government-led’ growth is argued to be necessary 
since ‘business is far better placed to understand the risks and rewards from northern economic 
development [than government]’ (Commonwealth of Australia 2015d: 3). ‘Our North, Our 
Future’ details the North’s ‘need’ for large-scale mineral extraction projects, and contains 
provisions for the handling of any Indigenous and environmental issues that may arise from 
such projects.  
An analysis of NAIF and ‘Our North, Our Future’ situates the Carmichael Project as arising 
out of the Australian state’s desire to develop its north through resource extraction by 
partnering with interested corporations. In other words, the political climate of Australia – from 
the time of the Carmichael Project’s first application to the Queensland election – was one that 
was amicable to a state-corporate partnership for resource extraction projects, particularly those 
that, through fulfilment of NAIF criteria, would provide economic benefits to a number of 
stakeholders. The language used in the White Paper presents the role of the state as one of 
industry enabler; one that would facilitate large-scale industrial project’s such as Adani’s in 
order to ‘develop’ the North, despite environmental warnings. 
The White Paper was signed by former Prime Minister of Australia, the Honourable Tony 
Abbott MP; former Deputy Prime Minister for Infrastructure, the Honourable Warren Truss 
MP; and former Minister for Trade and Investment, the Honourable Andrew Robbie AO MP; 
with specific acknowledgement to the contributions from the former chair of the Joint Select 
Committee, the Honourable Warren Entsch MP; Senator the Honourable Ian Macdonald; and 
the Honourable Shane Stone and his Northern Australia Advisory Group. Investigating the 
authors of the White Paper identifies what the stakes are – and whether or not there are conflicts 
of interest in promoting the development of the North through industrial projects as the ‘future’ 
for the citizens of Northern Australia. 
The authors of the White Paper 
	
On 10 June 2014 the former Deputy Prime Minister and former Minister for Infrastructure and 
Regional Development, the Hon. Warren Truss MP, issued a media release that announced the 
Australian Government’s vision for ‘opening northern Australia to development’ began with 
the release of the Green Paper on Developing Northern Australia (Truss 2014). The 
Government’s Green Paper contained six policy directions to further develop northern 
Australia: delivering economic infrastructure; improving land use and access; improving water 
access and management; promoting trade and investment, and strengthening the business 
environment; fostering education, research and innovation; and enhancing governance. Truss’s 
media release also announced the members of the Northern Australia Advisory Group, which 
would ‘provide expert advice on developing northern Australia to the members of the Strategic 
Partnership – the Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, the Premiers of Queensland and 
Western Australia and the Chief Minister of the Northern Territory’ (Truss 2014). The 
members of the Advisory Group would contribute their suggestions to shape the Australian 
Government’s policy directions, which would be outlined in the White Paper on Developing 
Northern Australia that was published later that year. Truss (2014) states: 
All members [of the Advisory Group] have a deep understanding of, and 
commitment to, the prosperity of the north and are well-placed to provide expert 
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advice on its economic development. They represent the diverse community, 
Indigenous and business interests of northern Australia. 
Upon investigation, however, it was found that most of the members were involved or had 
stakes in the mining industry during their their time serving on the Advisory Group.  
The Hon. Shane Stone AC QC chaired the Advisory Group. Stone was the former Chief 
minister of the Northern Territory and Federal President of the Liberal Party and also a member 
of the Thiess Advisory Board (Truss 2014). Thiess, a subsidiary of Leighton Holdings – 
Australia’s largest construction company – is the world’s largest mining services provider, 
covering all stages of the mining lifecycle, including development; extraction; processing; and 
remediation (Thiess, n.d. a). Their mission states: Our mission is to generate sustainable returns 
for shareholders by delivering projects for our clients while providing safe, rewarding and 
fulfilling careers for our people (Thiess, n.d. b). In April 2016, while Stone sat on Thiess’s 
Advisory Board, foreign bribery experts called for a national corruption watchdog to 
investigate the growing evidence of the company’s questionable payments for a coal deal in 
2010. 
Syam Reddy, a property developer contracted by Thiess Indian venture, helped secure the 
company a $6 billion coal mine deal in 2010. An internal investigation report concluded that 
Reddy made some form of payment or promise of benefit to a high ranking Indian government 
official in respect of this bid (McGrath 2016). Two years later, a whistleblower raised the 
investigation with Leighton's CEO and Dr. Kirstin Ferguson, who chaired Leighton's ethics 
committee and Thiess' advisory board at the time. The whistleblower was dismissed but no 
further action was taken. The whistleblower lodged a case in 2014 against Leighton at the Fair 
Work Commission which settled shortly afterwards.  Dr. Ferguson is now an ABC board 
member (McKenzie et al. 2016). Comments made by Thiess staff in an interview to 
Investigators Deloitte suggest that the corrupt behaviour was common practice in the 
workplace. Mr. Reddy would make numerous claims about payments he agreed to make. In 
this particular case, he paid the Indian government official approximately $16 million to 
influence the awarding of the contract (McGrath 2016). Bruno Munro, former Thiess chief 
executive also admitted to investigators that he had some knowledge that Mr. Reddy was 
making payments on the side but did not know the extent or form the payments took – “whether 
that be a holiday in Singapore of $1 million, I’m not sure” (McGrath 2016). Unlike the 
whistleblower who also realized what Mr. Reddy was doing, Mr. Munro was able to retain his 
job as CEO until he left in May 2015. 
According to Truss’s media release, Stone is also ‘a director of public and private companies 
in Australia and the UK’. The statement did not name the companies. However, Stone’s profile 
on the National Board of The Duke of Edinburgh’s International Award - Australia (DEIAA) 
website reveals some of them: Anne Street Partners Limited (diverse publishing interests in 
UK and USA), UK owned Mayfair Limited in Australia (Anne Street Partners Financial 
Services and QNV Constructions), and the International Electrotechnical Commission (iEC). 
Stone is also Deputy Chairman of UK AIM listed Impellam Plc (top 20 labour hire companies 
in Europe) and Chairman of Impellam subsidiaries in Australia (Medacs and Commensura). In 
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addition to Thiess Australia, Stone was also PT Thiess Indonesia, Chairman of Energex 
Limited (QLD Government owned power distributor) and owner and Executive Chairman of 
the APAC Group of companies (DEIAA n.d.). 
Another member of the Northern Australia Advisory Group is Wayne Bergmann. Truss’ media 
release revealed that Bergmann had served as the Executive Director of the Kimberley 
Aboriginal Law and Cultural Centre Chief Executive Officer of the Kimberley Land Council 
(KLC) and Chief Executive Officer of KRED Enterprises (Truss 2014). His roles in these 
positions have also been marked by corruption. 
The KLC was brought under national spotlight in 2011 on the issue of gas processing at James 
Price Point (50 kilometres north of Broome; on Aboriginal land), what would be Australia’s 
biggest LNG refinery (Collins 2011). The first named native title claimant for James Price 
Point when the site was selected for LNG processing had been Joseph Roe. However, once 
negotiations began and Roe was identified as ‘anti-gas’ and accordingly, in a position to block 
the $30-billion-dollar project, he was replaced as the first named claimant by ‘pro-gas’ 
Anthony Watson (Collins 2011). This process, like most native title processes in Kimberly, 
was facilitated by the KLC, which was set up for ‘the benefit of all Kimberly Aboriginal people 
and works with about 25 native title groups to get native title recognition, protect and enhance 
the high biodiversity values of the region, pursue cultural enterprise development and work to 
improve our socioeconomic circumstances’ (KLC 2019). At the time, Watson was a director 
on the board of the KLC.  
Bergmann resigned as the CEO of the KLC in March 2011 to take up the position as the CEO 
of the new KLC owned development company, KRED Enterprises. He was appointed to the 
position by the KLC board (Collins 2011). Bergmann said that KRED would not be involved 
in any projects around James Price Point in order to avoid being accused of ‘feathering his own 
nest’ (Prior 2011). However, the Chairman of KRED was Anthony Watson, KLC director and 
first named claimant for James Price Point. Despite resigning as KLC CEO, Bergmann retained 
his role as Chief Negotiator for the Goolarbooloo Jabirr Jabirr traditional owners who gave 
consent for the taking of land at James Price Point in May 2011 (Collins 2011). The plans to 
operate a gas plant at James Price Point were not successful in the end but Bergmann’s stakes 
in the project were clear. 
The third member of the Advisory Group is Jack Burton, managing director of Yeeda Pastoral 
Company with over 60,000 cattle, three pastoral leases in the Goldfields and a farming business 
in Geraldton at the time of Truss’s statement (Truss 2014). In October 2016 Burton sold more 
than 400,000 hectares of his pastoral land to the Chinese real estate conglomerate Shanghai 
CRED for $2 million. Shanghai CRED is also a part of Gina Rinehart’s $365 million joint bid 
for the Kidman cattle estate (Varischetti and Prendergast 2016). 
Dr. Ken Chapman is the fourth member of the Advisory Group and Executive Director of the 
Chapman Group (Truss 2014). The Chapmans are one of the richest families in Queensland, 
with a net worth of $259 million in 2014. They are most known for their Skyrail Cableway 
near the World Heritage-listed rainforest in Cairns (Dalton and Passmore 2014). During a 
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Business Advisory Council meeting in Townsville in May 2017, Chapman demanded that the 
Queensland government intervene to reduce power costs, claiming that they may soon be 
forced to build a solar farm to remain competitive in the international fish market (Townsville 
Bulletin 2017). 
Stone, Reddy, Bergmann, Burton and Chapman, are all members of the Advisory Group that 
instructed the White Paper on Developing Northern Australia and they are all invested in 
energy development. The influence of energy sector businessmen in developing the federal 
government’s policy directions, which includes future energy projects, demonstrates 
Miliband’s (1969: 69) instrumentalist model of the capitalist state (described in the previous 
chapter): The authors of the White Paper, which sets out the state’s plans to develop the north, 
are or have been stakeholders of organisations or corporations that would benefit from the state 
following the plan they wrote. The state is thus functioning to serve capitalist interests, as 
Miliband (1969) argued (see previous chapter). 
The self-interpretation of NAIF criteria 
	
Senator Matt Canavan created the North Australia Infrastructure Facility during his term as the 
Minister for Northern Australia (from 18 February to 19 July 2016). The NAIF was passed by 
Parliament on 3 May 2016 and established in Cairns on 1 July 2016 as the ‘Northern Australia 
Infrastructure Facility Act 2016’.  
 
According to the Australian Department of Industry, Innovation and Science, the NAIF is 
supported by the Export Finance and Insurance Corporation (Efic), Australia’s export credit 
agency Efic partners with Australian banks in order ‘to provide financial solutions for: small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) that are exporters; Australian companies in an export supply 
chain; Australian companies looking to expand their business operations overseas to better 
service their clients; and Australian companies operating in emerging and frontier markets’ 
(The Australian Government, n.d. a; The Australian Government n.d. b) The NAIF was 
designed to provide up to $5 billion over 5 years in ‘concessional finance’ to encourage and 
complement private sector investment, including developments in energy, ports, rail and water, 
in infrastructure that may benefit Northern Australia. There are several mandatory criteria for 
NAIF finance and preference is given to projects which also meet one or both of the non-
mandatory criteria.  
Canavan is a vocal supporter of Adani’s Carmichael Project, a project that he and other 
members of the Australian government argue as meeting all of the NAIF’s criteria. Although 
the NAIF is described as a legally independent body, it is also a government policy and thus 
subject to the state’s interpretations of terms in the criteria, as written by Canavan. In the same 
way that a state’s harmful act does not constitute a crime unless it is written in the legal code 
of the state, by coding the terms of the criteria necessary to receive funding under the NAIF, 
the state has created a legal avenue for investors to seek public funds for projects, from which 
certain members of the state may also financially benefit. The NAIF’s criteria and arguments 
for the Carmichael Project made by Adani and the Australian state illustrate this point. There 
are seven “Mandatory Eligibility Criteria” and two “Non-Mandatory Eligibility Criteria” that 
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a Project is expected to have established in order to receive funding under the NAIF (The 
Australian Government n.d. c). 
The first Mandatory Eligibility Criteria for a project to receive NAIF funding is: ‘The project 
involves the construction or enhancement of economic infrastructure’. 
Through this criterion, the state is able to make the claim that in order for a project to qualify 
for public funding through the NAIF, it must include infrastructure – an important asset for the 
future economic development of Northern Australia, as stated in the White Paper on 
Developing Northern Australia. The key element of this criterion is the use of the word 
‘infrastructure.’ Identifying the type of infrastructure as ‘economic’ broadens the criteria to 
include any facility that makes any business activity possible. The Carmichael Project’s 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was used to show that it successfully meets this 
criterion. According to the EIS (Adani Mining Pty Ltd 2012a: 2), the Project comprises of two 
major components: 
The Project (Mine): a greenfield coal mine over EPC1690 and the eastern portion 
of EPC1080, which includes both open cut and underground mining, on mine 
infrastructure and associated coal processing facilities (the Mine) and the Mine 
(offsite) infrastructure including: 
- A workers’ accommodation village and associated facilities (including: industrial 
area and rail siding) 
- A permanent airport site 
- Water supply infrastructure 
The Project (Rail): greenfield rail lines connecting the Mine to the existing 
Goonyella and Newlands rail systems; including: 
- Rail (west): a 120 km dual gauge portion from the Mine site running west to east 
to a junction with proposed lines running south-east to the Goonyella rail system 
and north-east to the Newlands rail system 
- Rail (east): a 69 km narrow gauge portion connecting to the Goonyella rail system 
south of Moranbah to provide for export of coal via the Port of Hay Point (Dudgeon 
Point expansion)”. 
It is obvious from the definition of the Carmichael Project that it is a proposal for 
‘infrastructure’ to be built. However, whether or not there will be any economic benefits from 
this infrastructure being built has been contested in state and federal court (see Chapter Three). 
At the time of its application for the NAIF loan, Adani had not completed its royalties package, 
making the financial benefit to Australia uncertain. The number of jobs that would result from 
the Carmichael Project has also been challenged and found in court to be approximately ten 
times less than Adani’s original figure of 10,000. There is also the question of whether the 
potential economic benefits outweigh the potential resulting harms. Yet because of the 
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government’s denial of these harms (as discussed in Chapter Six), the government is able to 
maintain that the Project meets this first criteria. 
The second Mandatory Eligibility Criteria is: ‘The project will be of public benefit’ (The 
Australian Government n.d. c). 
‘Benefit,’ synonymous with ‘advantage’ or ‘value,’ can be claimed in various ways. It has been 
argued by Adani and Australian government officials at the state and federal level that the 
Carmichael Project will benefit Australian and Indian citizens, economically and morally. 
Adani Australia Chief Executive, Jeyakumar Janakaraj, for example, has stated: 
This is a significant commitment by Adani to regional Queensland where the 
Carmichael mine and associated projects will generate 10,000 jobs directly and 
indirectly, and I am pleased that each of the regional centres will benefit from the 
Carmichael projects (Schliebs 2016). 
Minister for the Environment and Energy, Josh Frydenberg, has also supported the script 
that the Carmichael Project will be of public benefit: 
Most importantly of all [the Carmichael Project] will help lift hundreds of millions 
of people out of energy poverty, not just in India but right across the world (Kelly 
2015). 
Once again, the criteria of the NAIF can be argued as being ‘met’ or ‘unmet’ depending on 
stakeholder interests. In this case, since government officials have previously gone on record 
publically declaring that the Carmichael Project will be beneficial to the Australian (and Indian) 
public, government officials can later state that the Project meets this criterion and is thus 
eligible for public funding. By creating a sustained campaign of disinformation regarding the 
Project’s benefits, the statements made by Adani officials – who have clear interests in seeing 
the Project approved – are endorsed by state representatives. This results in the ‘official’ script 
regarding the Carmichael Project to be one that offers the public immense benefits and thus 
should be eligible for public funding through the NAIF. 
The third Mandatory Eligibility Criteria for NAIF funding is: ‘The project is unlikely to 
proceed, or only at a much later date, or with limited scope, without NAIF financial assistance’ 
(The Australian Government n.d. c). 
The question that should be asked in assessing whether a project meets this criterion is, “why 
would the project otherwise be unlikely to proceed?” Given that the purpose of the NAIF is to 
fund infrastructure developments in energy, ports, rail and water, the applicants for a loan 
through the NAIF would always be a corporation with enough capital to self finance or receive 
a loan through another lending institution, such as a bank. This assumption is corroborated by 
the fifth mandatory eligibility criterion, which states that the NAIF cannot be the primary 
source of funding, eliminating the ability for start-ups or other small businesses to apply for 
the NAIF loan if they would rely on the loan to finance their project. Adani itself had sought 
financing with Australian and international banks before seeking assistance through the NAIF. 
Once NAIF funding was ruled out for the Carmichael Project, Adani announced it would self-
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finance a smaller version of the original plans for the Project (see Chapter Three). So if the 
answer to the question of ‘why would the project otherwise be unlikely to proceed’ is ‘due to 
rejection of other lenders’ loans’, the third criterion can be justified as being met. This rationale, 
however, begs the question of why other financial institutions would choose not to fund the 
project in question. In the Carmichael case, the four major banks in Australia, as well as 
international banks, decided not to lend Adani money because of pressure they faced from 
activist protests citing the environmental destruction the Project would produce.  
Also given that the purpose of NAIF is to fund infrastructure developments in energy, ports, 
rail and water and that such projects must meet the criteria and gain approval under various 
state and federal legislation in order to be permitted to proceed, it is possible that a project 
would be unlikely to proceed due to another issue, unrelated to finances. For example, it could 
be argued that the Carmichael Project would be unlikely to proceed because of the UNESCO 
World Heritage Committee’s report which listed climate change as “the most significant 
overall threat” to the reef and encouraged Australia to accelerate its efforts to improve water 
quality (Wahlquist 2017). Australia, as a member of the World Heritage Convention, has a 
responsibility to protect and conserve world heritage sites. Since the Carmichael Project has 
shown to be of detriment to the health of the Great Barrier Reef through its negative effects on 
climate change, this could be one reason why the Project would be “unlikely to proceed.” 
Granting funding through NAIF, especially for those projects that would otherwise be unlikely 
to proceed, is therefore a conflict in the democratic process. This criterion allows the 
government to side-step previous recommendations regarding a project if the recommendation 
is not in agreement with the views of the state.  
The fourth mandatory criteria is: ‘The project is located in, or will have a significant benefit 
for northern Australia’ (The Australian Government n.d. c). 
While it is undisputable that the project is located in northern Australia, the second half of this 
criterion is open for debate. Northern Australia refers to all of the Northern Territory and those 
parts of Western Australia and Queensland above the Tropic of Capricorn. The Carmichael 
Project, which would involve the mining of coal reserves in the Galilee Basin and 
transportation of the coal via railway to Abbot Point, would operate above the Tropic of 
Capricorn. This successfully meets criterion four of the NAIF scheme since “having a 
significant benefit for northern Australia” must only be proven if the project is not located in 
northern Australia.   
The fifth mandatory criterion is: ‘NAIF’s loan is not the majority source of debt funding’ (The 
Australian Government n.d. c). 
The sources of funding for the Carmichael Project remain unclear. Multiple banks have stated 
that they will not fund the Project (Robertson 2017a). Adani has also not been able to secure 
any loans from international lenders. This suggests that Adani may have to rely solely on NAIF 
for the operation of the Carmichael. It is thus uncertain how the Carmichael Project could have 
met this criterion, as it only suggested self-financing the mine after rejection of a NAIF loan. 
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The sixth criterion is: ‘The loan will be able to be repaid or refinanced’ (The Australian 
Government n.d. c). 
It is assumed that as a multinational corporation, Adani would be able to repay or refinance the 
NAIF loan. However, the Left and the Right factions of the Palaszczuk cabinet has disagreed 
on the royalties for the Adani mine. Premier Annastacia Palaszczuk and Treasurer Curtis Pitt 
have led negotiations for a “royalties holiday” for the Carmichael Project. Adani had postponed 
its final investment decision while it sought a royalties agreement that involved a “sliding 
scale” which would allow it to pay the royalties in an agreed schedule (Aston 2017). The 
Australian Institute claimed the royalties holiday “would effectively give Adani free coal for 
five years and discounted coal for another four,” costing Queensland nearly $1.2 billion in 
revenue (Willacy 2017). Adani’s comments cited the state government’s use of royalty 
agreements across all political spectrums and reminded the public that while the Carmichael 
project will pay billions in royalties and corporate taxes, “importantly” it will also generate 
10,000 “direct and indirect jobs in regional Queensland” (Willacy 2017). This debate lasted 
five days, from 20-25 May 2017 before it was settled that the Palaszczuk government would 
not give Adani a royalties holiday and that it would require the full payment of royalties from 
the mine (Caldwell 2017). The controversy, although it does not involve the NAIF, illustrates 
Adani’s willingness to pressure the government in matters that may lead to some financial 
benefit. The repayment or refinancing of NAIF funding involves a potential $1 billion in 
financial benefit for the company, depending on the terms of the agreement. Therefore, since 
Adani would have $1 billion “to lose” if it does not attempt a negotiation of repayment terms 
in its favour, there is a chance that this loan would not be paid out as intended by the 
government. This criterion can be seen as unfulfilled, yet the government – in charge of 
determining whether the criterion is fulfilled (and also with interests in the operation of the 
Carmichael Project) – has claimed otherwise. 
The last mandatory criterion is: ‘Indigenous engagement strategy’ (The Australian 
Government n.d. c). 
The ambiguity surrounding the term “engagement” benefits the Carmichael Project here. The 
Wangan and Jagalingou People, who officially have the rights to the Galilee Basin region since 
having their native title claim recognised in 2004, have been involved in legal proceedings over 
Adani applying for mining leases on their land since the company first applied for them in 
October 2014. In April 2015, the National Native Title Tribunal granted Adani two mining 
leases despite Adrian Burragubba, one of the traditional owners, being opposed to the land 
being used for mining (Medhora 2017). He brought a legal challenge against the mine, which 
was dismissed in August 2016. However, a Federal Court ruling in Western Australia known 
as the McGlade decision found that a land use agreement is invalid if it is not signed by all 
native title claimants. Mr. Burragubba used this case as his basis for appeal against the mining 
licenses. The government responded by proposing a bill that would change the Native Title Act 
in order to ensure the Carmichael Project would proceed. Attorney General Brandis 
unsuccessfully attempted to rush through the debate on the bill in April 2017. The Labor Party 
was divided over the Project – Opposition Leader Bill Shorten promised Adani that the party 
would support the native title changes while at least three backbenchers have spoken against 
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the mine (Medhora 2017). Meanwhile, Adani has included in its proposal for the Project an 
“Indigenous and Non-Indigenous Cultural Heritage” assessment, written by CDM Smith 
Associates. The assessment details some potential impacts and mitigation measures, stating 
that “While avoidance of cultural heritage and leaving material on country is the highest 
priority, the nature of Mine construction and operations means that this is not always practical” 
(CDM Smith n.d.). With regard to the Native Title, the document states the four areas of the 
Project that involve Indigenous Land Use Agreements: 
1. The Project (Mine) and first 17 km of the Project (Rail) are located within the external 
boundaries of the Wangan and Jagalingou People registered native title claim 
(QUD85/04, QC04/6); 
2. Approximately 145 of the Project (Rail) is located within the external boundaries of the 
Jangga People registered native title claim (QUD6230/98, QC98/10); 
3. Approximately 17 km of the Project (Rail) is located within the external boundaries of 
the Barada Barna Kabalbara and Yetimarla People #4 (BBKY #4) former registered 
native title claim (QUD6023/01, QC01/25); and 
4. Approximately 3 km of the Project (Rail) is located within the external boundaries of 
the Barada Barna People registered native title claim (QUD380/08, QC08/11) (CDM 
Smith n.d.: 5-10). 
The section concludes with a declaration of progress over these native title negotiations. Due 
to the ambiguity of the meaning of “Indigenous engagement strategy,” simply the listing of 
native title negotiations may be enough to satisfy the last of the mandatory eligibility criteria, 
just as ordering research plan (without undertaking the research) on the Great Artesian Basin 
Springs and the Formation connectivity before commencing excavation of the first box cut was 
enough for the court to approve the Project (see Chapter Three). 
The first of the Non-Mandatory Eligibility Criteria is: ‘The project is seeking finance from 
NAIF for an amount of at least $50 million’. 
This is met; the Carmichael Project is seeking $1 billion from NAIF. However, this raises the 
question of why Adani would need one billion taxpayer dollars if the mine is financially viable. 
The second criterion is: ‘There is an identified need for the project’. 
Once again, this criterion has been described as being met by the state and corporation and 
unmet by the scientific community and environmental activists. The justifications are similar 
to those for the second mandatory criterion of whether the project is of public benefit. If it is 
argued that the project would in fact contribute some benefit to the public, then it can also be 
argued there is an “identified need” for the project (i.e. in terms of jobs or economic 
infrastructure, for example). The criteria for receiving public funding through NAIF serves as 
a legal checkbox that can be ticked once the state decides that it wants a project to proceed. 
Creating publically available criteria allows for the appearance of government transparency 
regarding the use of public funds. The script provided by the criteria is one that claims the 
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government won’t just fund just any project – the project must meet these specific 
requirements. Yet, as the Carmichael Project demonstrates, the language of the criteria can be 
manipulated in order to claim a project’s compatibility with the funding scheme.  
It is ultimately the NAIF Board that decides whether or not public funds can be given to private 
corporations for an infrastructure project. This is problematic because conflicts of interest 
involving NAIF, as supported by Efic, were uncovered by Environmental Justice Australia. 
Two board members were found to have connections to mining companies that would benefit 
from the approval of the Adani mine: Annabelle Chaplain was a board member of Efic and 
also a director of Downer EDI, which has a $2 billion commercial agreement with Adani for 
the drilling, blasting, and coal haulage at the Carmichael Mine. Karla Way-McPhail was a 
NAIF board member and chief executive of two companies that are involved with the mining 
industry; Undamine Industries, which hires out labour and machinery for mining operations, 
and Coal Train Australia, a mining company based in central Queensland. (Willacy and 
Blucher 2017) Efic and NAIF both released statements that said its directors are aware of their 
obligations regarding disclosure of conflicts of interest but did not comment on whether or not 
Chaplain or Way-McPhail would recuse themselves from decisions regarding Adani. NAIF 
rejected ABC’s Freedom of Information request for the dates and locations of its board 
meetings, with the chief executive claiming that the release of this information would adversely 
affect NAIF’s operations by creating media attention and protest activity (Willacy and Blucher 
2017). Efic board secretary, John Hopkins, stated that no Efic directors had any need to recuse 
themselves from Efic’s discussions concerning NAIF since the Efic Board “was not required 
to have, nor does it have, any actual knowledge of the projects NAIF is considering” (Robertson 
2017c). Hopkins’ claim that Efic is a “service provider,” not the “decision maker” on “specific 
transactions” made by the NAIF board (Robertson 2017c). 
This system of self-interpreting criteria in order to self-allocate money that will eventually be 
self-beneficial exemplifies Miliband’s (1969: 69) theory of how the state functions to serve 
capitalist interests: 
[I]t is easy to understand why governments should wish to help business in every 
possible way, yet do not at all feel that this entails any degree of bias towards 
particular classes, interests and groups. For if the national interest is in fact 
inextricably bound up with the fortunes of capitalist enterprise, apparent partiality 
towards it is not really partiality at all. On the contrary, in serving the interests of 
business and in helping capitalist enterprise to thrive, governments are really 
fulfilling their exalted role as guardians of the good. 
Greens MP Larissa Waters has criticised the NAIF, stating that it was ‘not about encouraging 
investment in Northern Australia [but] creating a slush fund to prop up the dying coal industry’ 
(Robertson 2017d). The businessmen have colluded with statesmen to justify the use of public 
funds for the Carmichael Project, despite scientific reports on the Project’s harms and despite 
the majority of the citizens’ desires to stop Adani from building in Queensland. The next 




This chapter described the Australian mining legislation and mining legislation in Queensland, 
and the collusion between the state and corporation for the Carmichael Project approval. The 
collusion began with Adani and the state’s lies, denying the public the truth about the threat 
that the Carmichael Project has on the environment, endangered animal species and climate 
change. By denying the harms, two opposing narratives regarding the Project were forged: the 
truth, as told by the scientific community, and the untruth, or the story invented by those who 
stand to benefit from the Project’s operation. This latter narrative was then used to gain the 
necessary approvals for the Carmichael Project. Since the stakeholders, who stand to benefit 
from the operation of the Project, are situated in positions of power within the state, 
environmental legislation has been able to be engineered to make exceptions for the Carmichael 
Project. One example of this was Adani’s evasion of standard procedure for the environmental 
authority needed to mine in Queensland. Further collusion has been discovered in the conflicts 
of interest of the authors of the legislation that would have given Adani $1 billion of public 
money for the mine, the North Australian Infrastructure Facility, or NAIF.  
The NAIF appears to have been established out of a political priority.  The Australia Institute 
(2017) has pointed out: “NAIF does not have internal policies and procedures for application 
and assessment. The Minister says that there is ‘not really a formal submission or application 
process’ but ‘discussions that occur’”. The absence of formal procedure creates a high-risk 
environment. Projects that may not be viable are able to be considered due to the members of 
the Board’s conflicts of interests and links to the mining industry.  
The Carmichael Project can be understood as a state-corporate crime because of the 
government and Adani’s collusion – incidents of fraud, or dishonestly [seeking to] obtain a 
benefit by deception – as the Australian Government defines it. The collusion involved 
greenwashing and denial of the harms of the Project; the manipulation of environmental 
regulations; and the government’s role as an enabler for industry despite its duty to act as the 
keeper of public spaces and the environment.  
From an organisational perspective, the chapter demonstrates that there are both instrumental 
and structural forces at play in the constitution of state-corporate crime. For instance, the state 
is instrumentally engaged in facilitating capitalist development in the form of appointments of 
officials who are intrinsically linked to the capitalist enterprise in some way (ideologically 
and/or via employment history). However, the actions of the state in this regard can also be 
explained as due to structural factors such as the need for legitimacy in circumstances where 
particular regions of Queensland are suffering disproportionately high levels of unemployment. 
These structural pressures provide the context within which governments – as strategic 
economic actors – may find political purchase in backing particular business developments 
regardless of poor environmental outcomes.  
The next chapter describes explains why this particular instance of state-corporate crime can 




THE CRIME OF ECOCIDE 
 
 
The threats to man’s existence from nuclear warfare can be avoided right up until the moment 
someone pushes the button; but the threat to man’s survival which derives from our 
interventions in our natural environment is of a different nature. Here each of us has his finger 
on the button, and this responsibility requires us to act now to avoid dangers which will not 
materialize until the next generation or beyond – but still within the lifetime of our own children 
or grandchildren – and will be beyond remedy by the time they are perceived as imminent 
threats. To deal with issues which involve cause and effect relationships so far removed from 
more immediate and pressing priorities will require a degree of enlightened political will on 
the part of the peoples and nations of the world that is without precedent in human history 
(Strong 1971). 
 
‘Man has consciously and unconsciously inflicted irreparable damage to the environment in 





The destruction of the environment in ways that adversely affect humans, non-human species 
and ecosystems can be conceptualized as a specific type of crime: ecocide. Ecocide describes 
an attempt to criminalise human activities that destroy and diminish the wellbeing and health 
of ecosystems and species within these (Higgins 2012; Higgins et al. 2013). Where this occurs 
because of human agency, then it is purported that a crime of international significance has 
occurred.  
 
This chapter follows a discussion of the key players in the debate over the approval and 
operation of the Carmichael Project; its environmental harms; and the justifications and denials 
of these harms that are perpetrated as a result of state-corporate collusion. The purpose of the 
chapter is to first explore the development of ecocide as a concept and then as a crime that 
affects humans, non-human animals, plant life, ecosystems, and abiotic elements of the 
biosphere such as rivers and mountains. This chapter also discusses a proposed possible 
Ecocide Act (2010), as authored by UK lawyer, Polly Higgins, that would constitute the 5th 
International Law Against Peace. Elements of this proposed Ecocide Act are discussed in light 
of the Carmichael Project. The chapter will show how an international law against ecocide 
would have first prevented the Carmichael Project’s approval but also would bring 
accountability to those decision-makers who approved its operation, if the operation resulted 
in ecocidal harms to the environment.  
 
A History of Ecocide  
 
The term ‘ecocide’ emerged during the time of the Vietnam War. Historically during wartime, 
‘the other side’ is accused of committing atrocities that violate the principle of jus in bello or 
justice in war. Citizens and activists who opposed the Vietnam War were faced with the same 
question: namely, how to convey to others that the war – and the environmental catastrophes 
resulting from the herbicidal warfare program (i.e. the use of Agent Orange in Operation Ranch 
Hand) – was illegal. To challenge American intervention in Vietnam required an articulation 
of particular actions as uniquely illegal and that could thereby also be used in tackling the 
legitimacy of the war as a whole.  
 
Accordingly, a group of American scientists coined the term ‘ecocide’. At the 1970 Conference 
on War and National Responsibility in Washington, Professor Arthur W. Galston proposed a 
new international agreement to ban ecocide (Gauger et al. 2012). Ecocide presented one of the 
many varieties of the idea that aspects of the Vietnam War violated international law. The 
scientists’ critique was one of a kind in two ways: first, the accusation was made against their 
own government – not the ‘other side’; and second, this particular movement against ecocide 
was foundational in the later establishment of US national policy that renounced the use of 
herbicides in future wars (Zierler 2011).  
 
The term ‘ecocide’ became more popular during the opening speech of the 1972 United 
Nation’s Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment, when the prime minister of 
Sweden at the time, Olaf Palme, explicitly referred to the Vietnam War as an instance of 
ecocide (Gauger et al. 2012). The Stockholm Conference was the first international meeting 
that focused on environmental issues, including trans-boundary pollution (Gauger et al. 2012). 
It “highlighted the fact that pollution does not recognise political or geographical boundaries, 
but affects territories, countries, regions, and people beyond its point of origin” (Gauger et al. 
2012: 5).  Although the conference did not include the term in any of its official documents 
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(Malhotra 2017), it was an important milestone in environmental governance as the Conference 
established the UN’s Environmental Programme (UNEP). 
 
Although ecocide was not yet legally defined, scholars at this time were debating what would 
constitute the crime. The element of intent to commit destruction of ecosystems was 
particularly important. For example, Professor Richard A. Falk (1973), an expert on 
international law of war crimes, wrote, ‘man has consciously and unconsciously inflicted 
irreparable damage to the environment in times of war and peace’. Meanwhile, Dr. Arthur H. 
Westing, a biologist, stated that ‘intent may not only be impossible to establish without 
admission but, I believe, it is essentially irrelevant.’ (Westing 1974). 
 
The increased debate around the concept of ecocide along with an increase in environmental 
awareness during the 1970s led to a pressure on governments to address the issue (Higgins et 
al. 2013; Gauger et al. 2012). The UN led an inquiry into how the 1948 Convention on 
Genocide could be improved, including criminalising ecocide alongside genocide (Mehta and 
Merz 2015). The International Law Commission (ILC) considered adding an environmental 
crime to the Draft Code of Crimes against Peace and Security of Mankind (‘the Code’), which 
later became the Rome Statute – the foundation for the International Criminal Court (Malhotra 
2017). The ILC included in Article 26 of the Code that ‘an individual who wilfully causes or 
orders the causing of widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment 
shall, on conviction thereof, be sentenced…’ (Gauger et al. 2012: 9). The governments of 
Australia, Belgium, Austria and Uruguay, however, openly criticized the use of word 
‘wilfully’, which presupposes intent. These governments argued that ecocide during peace-
time is often a crime without intent as it occurs as a by-product of industrial and other activity 
and successfully led the ILC to remove Article 26 from the Code (Gauger et al. 2012).  
 
The version of the Code adopted by the ILC mentions the intentional creation of ‘widespread, 
long-term and severe damage to the natural environment’ during a war under Article 8 of the 
Rome Statute (UN General Assembly 1998): 
 
Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause 
incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or 
widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would 
be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage 
anticipated. 
 
As it stands, the Rome Statute’s Article 8 is the only stipulation in international criminal law 
that can hold a person responsible for environmental destruction. However, Article 8 limits the 
crime to wartime and situations of intentional damage; conditions of applicability that are 
difficult to meet (Freeland 2015).  
 
A 2016 Cambodian case involving land grabbing and forced evictions, however, led to the 
widening of the ICC mandate. The Office of the Prosecutor announced that it will ‘give 
particular consideration to prosecuting Rome Statute crimes that are committed by means of, 
or that result in, inter alia, the destruction of the environment, the illegal exploitation of natural 
resources or the illegal dispossession of land’ (Vidal and Bowcott 2016). Considering a case 
involving environmental destruction during peacetime suggests a shift within the ICC to 
recognise violence committed against nature (Lay 2016). Global Diligence LLP, a London-
based human rights law firm stated this decision will allow the ICC to consider environmental 
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crimes and that company executives or politicians could now be held responsible under 
international law for illegal land deals (Arsenault 2016).  
 
Nevertheless, the International Criminal Court statement does not expand Article 8 to include 
environmental crimes during ‘peace-time’ nor does it address the issues surrounding intent. It 
thus remains to be seen how the Prosecutor’s statement will be interpreted into action. While 
the ICC has limited power in enforcement, especially for states such as the USA that are not 
signatories to the Rome Statute, the ICC’s statement nonetheless has the potential to shift 
corporate culture. The prospect of imprisonment under criminal law changes the relationship 
with the precautionary principle; the prospect of an international criminal court hearing may 
well affect corporate behaviour (Lay 2016). The ICC’s statement appears to be a step forward 
for an expanded international law against ecocide. 
 
In addition to the Code, The ILC also drafted international articles on state responsibility, 
adopting a provision linking state responsibility and damage to the environment in 1976. This 
provision, Article 19 of the International Crimes and International Delict, states:  
 
3 [A]n international crime may result, inter alia, from: (d) a serious breach of an 
international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive 
pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas.’ (Gauger et al 2012). 
 
Another draft article prepared by the ILC dealt with international liability for transboundary 
harm ‘carried out in the territory or otherwise under the jurisdiction or control of a State’; 
injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited by international law (Gauger et al. 
2012: 11). A provision of this article defines environmental damage as an international crime: 
‘a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for the safeguarding and 
preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the 
atmosphere or of the seas’ (Yearbook of the ILC 1980, Vol. II, Part 2, p.32, as cited in Gauger 
et al. 2012: 12). However, state liability for transboundary harm was later reviewed and 
changed to refer to damage done to the environment by events such as ‘the pollution of the air, 
sea or rivers, consequences of nuclear pollution, or oil spills’ (Gauger et al 2012: 13). 
 
Ecocide as a Crime 
 
Although the UN did not recognise ecocide as a crime, several states adopted the draft Crimes 
Against Peace into their own penal codes. Table 9.1 describes when each country did so and 
how ecocide was defined. 
 
Table 9.1 Existing Crimes of Ecocide  
 
Year Country Crime of Ecocide 
1990 Vietnam Article 278 of the Penal Code: “‘Ecocide, destroying the natural 
environment,’ whether committed in time of peace or war, 
constitutes a crime against humanity” 
1996 Russian 
Federation 
Article 358 of the Criminal Code:  “massive destruction of the 
fauna and flora, contamination of the atmosphere or water resources, 
as well as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, 
constitutes a crime against the peace and security of mankind” 
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1997 Kazakhstan Article 161 in the Penal Code: “mass destruction of the fauna or 
flora, pollution of the atmosphere, agricultural or water resources, as 
well as other acts which have caused or are capable of causing an 
ecological catastrophe, constitutes a crime against the peace and 
security of mankind” 
1997 Kyrgyzstan  Article 374 of the Criminal Code: “mass destruction of the flora 
and fauna, poisoning of the atmosphere or water resources, as well 
as other acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, is 
punishable by deprivation of liberty”.  
1998 Tajikistan Article 400 of the Criminal Code: “mass extermination of flora or 
fauna, poisoning the atmosphere or water resources, as well as other 
acts capable of causing an ecological catastrophe, constitutes a crime 
against the peace and security of mankind”. 
1999 Georgia Article 409 of the Criminal Code: “Contamination of atmosphere, 
land and water resources, mass destruction of flora and fauna or any 
other action that could have caused ecological disaster – shall be 
punishable by imprisonment extending from eight to twenty years in 
length” 
1999 Belarus Article 131 of the Criminal Code: “mass destruction of the fauna 
and flora, pollution of the atmosphere and water resources as well as 
any other act liable to cause an ecological disaster”  
2001 Ukraine Article 441 of the Criminal Code: “Mass destruction of flora and 
fauna, poisoning of air or water resources, and also any other actions 
that may cause an environmental disaster, – shall be punishable by 
imprisonment for a term of eight to fifteen years”  
2002 Republic of 
Moldova 
Article 136 of the Penal Code: “the deliberate and massive 
destruction of the fauna and flora, the pollution of the atmosphere or 
poisoning of water resources, as well as other acts capable of causing 
an ecological catastrophe, is punishable by deprivation of liberty” 
2003 Republic of 
Armenia 
Article 394 of the Criminal Code: “Mass destruction of flora or 
fauna, poisoning the environment, the soils or water resources, as 
well as implementation of other actions causing an ecological 
catastrophe, is punished with imprisonment for the term of 10 to 15 
years” 
Source: adapted from Higgins 2010 
 
Interestingly, each of these countries has a communist history and adapted the ecocide 
provisions into their transition to various forms of capitalism, borrowing the wording of Article 
26 of the ILC, which refers to ‘intentionally’ causing harm. None of the countries have 
prescribed a procedure to measure intention, however. The effectiveness of these provisions 
would depend on factors such as the procedures for enforcement, an independent judiciary and 
respect for rule of law. Transparency International ranks many of these countries highly for 
corruption and low for respect of the rule of law (Transparency International 2019). 
 
Discussions with the UN over developing the Law of Ecocide have lasted over a decade. Much 
of the background work is already in place and, based on the term’s history and debate as well 
as the adoption of ecocide into the criminal/penal codes of states around the world, it can be 
concluded that a part of the international community approves of the legal concept. There are, 




Ecocide as a criminal offence can be conceptualised by distinguishing between perspectives 
that privilege humans and human wellbeing in its definitions of harm, with those that include 
the non-human in its conceptualisations. Doing wrong and harming others is 
anthropocentrically framed and its basic considerations stem from and reflect the human rights 
paradigm (MacCarrick 2016). Ecocide in this sense complements the existing approach of the 
Rome Statute that deals with crimes against humanity and crimes against peace. Protection of 
human rights is paramount and this includes protections pertaining to one’s living environment. 
Thus, the demise of environmental amenity and security is considered a derogation of the duty 
to protect and enhance human rights, including the right to ecosystem services upon which 
human populations rely (MacCarrick 2016). 
 
Other conceptions of the crime of ecocide, however, see it as premised on the idea of Earth 
stewardship.  Ecocide in this instance is closely aligned with the concept of ecocentrism that 
views the environment as having value for its own sake, apart from any instrumental or 
utilitarian value to humans (Berry 1999; Williams 2013). Ecocentrism views non-human 
animals, plants and rivers as rights holders and/or as objects warranting a duty of care on the 
part of humans (Schlosberg 2007; Fisher 2010).  
 
Establishing the crime of ecocide is motivated by the need to respond to a singularly important 
trend: the existing planetary environment is rapidly being destroyed. Fundamentally, this stems 
from the systemic extraction and contamination of natural resources. One consequence is the 
diminishment of ecosystem services. As the global temperature steadily increases, the rampant 
plunder of resources and widespread pollution results in the whole planet inexorably moving 
toward a radically altered ecological state. The victims are biotic (living creatures and plants) 
and abiotic (living landscapes), and include humans as well as non-human environmental 
entities (such as animals and rivers).  
 
While no one and nothing can escape the violent impact of the transgressions presently 
impinging upon the biosphere, ecocide does not affect everyone and everything equally. 
Violence to the environment, for example, begets further violence within human communities. 
Diminished human security stems from the bio-physical and socio-economic consequences of 
various sources of threat and damage to the environment, including climate change (South 
2012). Shortages of food, water and non-renewable energy sources can trigger criminal 
activities involving organised criminal networks, transnational corporations, and governments 
at varying political levels (White 2014b).  
 
Ecocide is not socially (or ecologically and species) neutral. There are winners and losers in 
the contestations over natural resources. It is the poor, the marginalised, the dispossessed and 
the vulnerable that bear the brunt of environmental destruction. In this, the victims are human 
and non-human, living and non-living, as human rights are ignored and landscapes devastated. 
For example, Indigenous people reliant upon clean water and arable lands for their livelihoods 
suffer greatly when large industrial projects – such as the Alberta Tar Sands project in Canada 
– impact their forests, rivers and soils (Short 2016). Children are more likely than adults to be 
seriously affected by air pollution and water contamination stemming from activities that harm 
the environment (Stephens 1996).  
 
It is the rich, the corporate, the elite and the powerful who stand to gain most from the suffering 
of others and the demolition of formally intact and sustainable ecosystems. In pursuit of the 
ownership and control over natural resources, and to exploit these for particular purposes, 
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governments and companies have singularly and in conjunction with each other worked to 
break laws, bend rules and undermine participatory decision-making processes. Sometimes this 
takes the form of direct state-corporate collusion (state-corporate crime); in other instances, it 
involves manoeuvring by government officials or company executives to evade the normal 
operating rules of planning, development, and environmental impact assessment (White 
2017a). The appropriation of resources in specific bio-social locations is leading to a 
proliferation of ownership contests (e.g., disputed islands involving China, Vietnam, the 
Philippines, and Japan; re-drawing of boundaries in the Arctic among border states such as 
Russia, Canada, Norway and the United States) (Brisman 2013). The violence of war lurks 
behind the efforts of powerful interest groups to control natural resources.  
 
Those who are central in causing the problem are also those least likely (at least initially) to 
suffer the consequences of their actions. Yet, a consequence of the actions and omissions of 
the few is that violence and crime will pervade the lives of the less powerful and vulnerable 
people of the world. For the perpetrators of the harm, however, justice is rarely applied nor the 
crimes officially recognised as ‘crimes’. 
 
The 5th International Crime Against Peace  
 
In April 2010, Polly Higgins, a Scottish advocate and leading expert in ecocide, submitted a 
draft law of Ecocide to the United Nations Law Commission (Higgins 2010). The draft Ecocide 
Act 2010 proposed Ecocide as the 5th International Crime Against Peace, with ‘Ecocide’ 
defined as: 
 
The extensive loss or damage or destruction of ecosystem(s) of a given territory, 
whether by human agency or by other causes, to such an extent that: (1) peaceful 
enjoyment by the inhabitants of has been or will be severely diminished; and or (2) 
peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants of another territory has been severely 
diminished (Higgins 2012: 159).  
 
This definition contains several concepts that require further explanation. The Prohibition of 
Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD), an 
international treaty which aims to prohibit the use of environmental modification techniques 
(for example, weather modification), defines ‘widespread’, ‘long-lasting’ and ‘severe’ in the 
context of environmental damage: ‘Widespread’ involves an area of several hundred 
kilometres; ‘long-lasting’ encompasses a season or period of a couple of months; and ‘severe’ 
involves ‘grave disorder or maltreatment to economic and natural resources, human life, and 
other resources (Gauger et al. 2012: 9). 
 
‘Peaceful enjoyment’ is a legal term that originates from civil law. The legal definition is ‘a 
covenant that promises that the grantee or tenant of an estate in real property will be able to 
possess the premises in peace, without disturbance by hostile claimants’. Peaceful enjoyment 
in light of Higgins’ (2010) definition of ecocide means ‘peace, health and cultural integrity’. 
 
Higgins (2010) defines ‘territory(ies)’ as ‘one or more of the following habitats, unrestricted 
by State or jurisdictional boundaries: (i) terrestrial, (ii) fresh-water, marine or high seas, (iii) 
atmosphere, (iv) other natural habitats’ and understands ‘inhabitants’ to include humans; 
animals, fish, birds or insects; plant species; and other living organisms. 
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Ecocide can be understood as a crime against peace due to the potential consequences that arise 
from the damage to, destruction of or loss of these territory(ies) and ecosystem(s), which 
includes:  
 
1. loss of life, injury to life and severe diminution of enjoyment of life to human and non-
human beings; 
2. the heightened risk of conflict arising from impact upon human and non-human life 
which has occurred as a result of the above; 
3. adverse impact upon future generations and their ability to survive; 
4. the diminution of health and well-being of inhabitants of a given territory and those 
who live further afield; and or 
5. loss of cultural heritage or life (Higgins 2012: 157). 
 
Higgins (2012) argues that the aim of establishing the crime of Ecocide is to prevent war; loss 
and injury to life; dangerous industrial activity; pollution to all beings; and loss of traditional 
cultures, hunting grounds and food. The Law of Ecocide would create an international and 
trans-boundary duty of care; one that imposes an obligation and pre-emptive legal duty of care 
upon all ‘persons of superior responsibility’ to prevent the risk of damage to or loss of any 
ecosystems.  
 
The law of Ecocide’s three functions (prevention of risk of destruction of ecosystems; 
prohibition of decisions that would result in the destruction of ecosystems; and pre-empting 
decision-making that may lead to significant harm) would affect the Carmichael Project, both 
in terms of the scope of the operation; for its stakeholders and for repairing the environmental 
destruction the Project would cause.  
 
Ecocide and the Carmichael Project 
 
The previous two chapters have shown that, fundamentally, states have a responsibility for 
ensuring the safety and wellbeing of its citizens. This duty suggests that states have a 
responsibility to exercise extreme caution before embarking on any project which is likely to 
have the possibility of adverse effects upon the ecosystems concerned. The failure by states to 
prevent (or take responsibility for) dangerous industrial activities thus becomes the failure of 
the state to ensure the welfare of the people and the planet. Collusion with corporations that 
engage in dangerous industrial activities plays a significant role in a states’ failure to prevent 
environmentally harmful projects. The Carmichael Project’s harms, according to the scientific 
community (see Chapter Four), will affect both human and non-human victims, immediately 
and long-term, nationally in Australia and internationally. Due to these characteristics and the 
grave scope of the harms, they can be understood as potentially ecocidal. In order to prevent 
the Carmichael Project, an international law against ecocide would have to contain certain 
elements that would prevent states from colluding with corporations whose actions would 
destroy or cause harm to the environment as well as hold those state and corporate officials 
responsible for the harm.  
 
The ecocidal harms of the Carmichael Project 
 
Since ecocide can be understood as ‘the extensive damage to, destruction of or loss of 
ecosystem(s) of a given territory to such an extent that peaceful enjoyment by the inhabitants 
of that territory has been or will be severely diminished’ (Higgins 2010), studying a resource 
extraction project such as the Carmichael Project as a crime of potential future ecocide requires 
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a broader view of crime than what is prescribed by the state. For green criminology, an eco-
justice perspective sees harm as informed by notions of egalitarian rights for human and non-
human species and the environment (White 2008). This conceptualisation of harm sees the 
health and wellbeing of the environment and the human and non-human animals and plants as 
affected by the collusion of state and corporation. Chapter Four presented the harms of the 
Carmichael Project. These harms are summarised in Table 9.1 below: 
 
Table 9.2 The Ecocidal Harms of the Carmichael Project 
 
Harm to: Action Impact 
Land Carmichael Rail passes 
through 1,334 hectares of 
‘Good Quality 
Agricultural Land’  
• Fragmentation and 
intrusion of 21 local 
agricultural properties 
• Sterilisation of 
agricultural land in 
Galilee Basin 
Land Carmichael Rail passes 
through 155 hectares of 
‘Strategic Cropping Land’ 
• Sterilisation of land in 
Avon Downs and 
Lambing Lagoon 
• Loss or fragmentation of 
agricultural land in the 
Mackay-Whitsunday-
Isaac region 
Land Carmichael Rail crosses 
88 major and minor 
waterways 
• Alters overland water 
flow 
• Increases height and 
duration of floods 
• Flooding would erode 
soil, 
• Endanger native species 
of plants, and   
• Degrade farmland and 
grazing land 
Water Carmichael Mine requires 
approx. 12,000ML of 
groundwater for 
dewatering underground 
open cut pits 
• Groundwater reserves 
needed for pastoral use, 
domestic and town water 
supply and ecosystems 
would be threatened 
• Permanent changes to 





Water Carmichael Mine requires 
use of groundwater that 
may be sourced from the 
Rewan Formation 






• Loss of vegetation 
including species of 
conservation significance 
Air Cumulative emissions of 
Carmichael Mine would 
be approx. 77,000,000 
tonnes of carbon dioxide 
in its 60-year lifespan 
• The carbon budget 
remaining to stay below 2 
degrees Celsius of global 
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The harms that would result from the Carmichael Project are permanent and serious. The 
mining project does not only affect the immediate land and water in the greater Galilee Basin 
region, but its carbon emissions would also affect the entire world for generations to come and 
destroy the Great Barrier Reef ecosystem. The Project would also cause harms to human 
victims. The Wangan and Jagalingou People whose land the Carmichael Mine would be built 
upon have opposed the Project, citing destruction of their cultural land and heritage. As seen 
in Chapter Three, the Native Title process that is in place at a federal level has not been properly 
utilised; Indigenous men and women were not consulted or considered as they legally should 
have been according to this legislation. Instead, Adani tried to bribe them, silence them with 
lawsuits and fines, and used loopholes to gain their environmental approvals. The farmers 
whose land the Carmichael Rail would pass through have also voiced their opposition for the 
Project. Local towns that rely on the groundwater for every day use as well as farming have 
opposed giving Adani an unlimited water license, as the Queensland government has sought to 
do for the Carmichael Mine. The ‘Stop Adani’ movement has been the largest environmental 
protest in Australia’s history (Beresford 2018) and yet the Carmichael Project has been 
consistently supported by the state.  
 
One of the reasons the Carmichael Project has been so widely debated in Australia is due to 
the way the project has been framed. Chapter Six discussed the techniques of neutralisation 
and denial that the Australian Federal and Queensland State Governments used to justify the 
Carmichael Project. These scripts allowed for the Carmichael Project to be presented to the 
public as necessary; not harmful; and beneficial. Framing the Project in this manner was 
required in order for the state to publicly consider and support it, despite climate change 
science; despite Australia being a signatory to the Paris Agreement; and despite the public’s 
disapproval of the Project.  
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Ecocide legislation is one way to stop Adani, stop the Carmichael Project and hold states 
accountable for their collusion with ecocidal corporations on potentially ecocidal resource 
extraction projects. In order to be effective in preventing the Carmichael Project, ecocide 
legislation would have to directly address two of the most common scripts used to justify the 
Carmichael Project (and other similarly harmful projects): denial of responsibility and denial 
of injury. A Law of Ecocide at the international level, if modelled after Higgins’ Ecocide Act 
2010, uses two legal concepts, superior responsibility and strict liability, that could potentially 
eliminate the reliance of these narratives that are continually used to rationalise 
environmentally harmful activities. 
 
Denial of responsibility versus superior responsibility 
	
Denial of responsibility has been a script that persons in position of power use to present the 
harm as a bi-product of following orders. The corporate structure is well suited for the denial 
of responsibility due to the chain of command and the corporate veil. Therefore, in order to 
address the denial of responsibility for grave environmental destruction by persons of power, 
ecocide legislation would have to contain a clause that establishes responsibility to persons of 
power within their respective organisations or territories.  
 
The legal concept of ‘superior responsibility’ presents a direct counter to the denial of 
responsibility defence that states and corporations use to rid themselves of responsibility for 
environmentally harmful activities. Superior responsibility is also referred to as ‘command 
responsibility’ or the ‘Yamashita’ or ‘Medina’ standard, the legal doctrine of hierarchical 
accountability for war crimes (Isenberg 2013). This legal concept has been established by The 
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907; applied by the United States Supreme Court for 
atrocities committed by troops under the command of Japanese General Yamashita during 
WWII; and atrocities committed by troops under the command of U.S. Army Captain Medina 
in the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War (Hendin 2003). At its core, the legal concept 
of superior responsibility refers to a superior’s duty to supervise subordinates and grants 
liability for the supervisor’s failure to do so (Bantekas 1999). 
 
In most cases, “reasonable person standard” is considered when determining whether a 
subordinate committed a wrongful act by following orders (Tobia 2018). The reasonable person 
standard is meant to be objective – to determine whether a defendant is liable for negligently 
causing harm, for example, a jury might be asked to evaluate whether the defendant acted with 
“reasonable care” or the care of a reasonable person (Tobia 2018; Dietrich and Field 2017). 
However, reasonableness can be understood differently. In Australia, reasonable care is judged 
by both “reference to the foreseeability... of the risks that have eventuated and the calculus of 
negligence,” which considers the following factors: 
 
• The probability that the harm would occur if care was not taken. 
• The likely seriousness of the harm. 
• The burden of taking precautions to avoid the harm. 
• The social utility of the risk-creating activity in which the person was engaged (Dietrich 
and Field 2017). 
 
These recommendations have been criticized as unhelpful in describing what is meant by 
applying an equal standard of care and process of reasoning (Dietrich and Field 2017). 
Applying the principle of superior responsibility to legislation against ecocide would mean that 
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all Heads of State, Ministers, CEOs, directors and any other person who has rights over a given 
territory, regardless of knowledge or intent, would have a clear responsibility for any activity 
or offence that can be attributed to them as a consequence of their authority. Superior 
responsibility also extends to any person in a position of superior responsibility within any 
company or corporation (Bantekas 1999). This would codify the reasonable person standard in 
a way that is uniform for every case by attaching an unconditional duty of care to the most 
powerful. Higgins’ model law of ecocide, for example, places responsibility for offenses 
committed by members of staff on those with a position of superior responsibility: ‘[A] superior 
is responsible for offences committed by staff under his effective authority, as a result of his 
failure to take all necessary measures within his power to prevent or repress their commission 
or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation’ (Higgins 2018).  
 
Accordingly, those persons with superior responsibility are liable to prosecution if a member 
of staff under their authority commits an offense that leads to the commission of the crime of 
Ecocide. This principle emphasises the importance of prevention and precaution – someone 
who holds a position of superior responsibility must ensure all necessary measures within their 
power to prevent or stop any activities that lead to the commission of the crime of Ecocide or 
they will be held strictly liable under the act, regardless of whether they have any knowledge 
of the activities that lead to the commission of the crime. 
 
The principle of superior responsibility thus provides a legal counter to the denial of 
responsibility that has often been cited by politicians or members of corporations after large 
scale destruction of the environment has been committed by their company or jurisdiction. The 
principle of superior responsibility would ensure that natural persons cannot hide behind non-
natural persons such as corporations and are instead held accountable for the ecocidal actions 
made at a corporate or government level (Higgins 2010), effectively lifting the corporate veil. 
In addition, the principle of superior responsibility could extend to third parties (such as 
agencies or lobbyists). Agencies that lobby on behalf of persons with superior responsibility 
are ‘regarded as aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of the offence’ of 
Ecocide (Higgins 2018). 
 
In the case of the Carmichael Project, for example, a principle of superior responsibility in 
ecocide legislation would extend responsibility for the resultant harms (as described in Chapter 
Four) to those organisations and individuals involved in financing the project. If an Australian 
bank such as one of the Big Four (Commonwealth Bank, Westpac, ANZ, and NAB) lent Adani 
the funds necessary to build and operate the Carmichael Mine and Rail, it could be argued that 
the chief executive of the bank was aiding the commission of the offence of Ecocide. Similarly, 
if Adani were to receive funding from banks in other countries, such as the China Construction 
Bank, the executives would be found to have superior responsibility and therefore potentially 
be guilty of Ecocide. 
 
The principle of superior responsibility has the potential to close, or at least sabotage, the 
revolving door between industry and politics. In the case of the Carmichael Project, this is 
perhaps most evident in the debate over whether the North Australian Infrastructure Facility 
(NAIF) would provide the $2.4 billion for Adani’s endeavour. As Chapters Three and Eight 
discussed, NAIF was created by Senator Matt Canavan, a vocal Adani supporter, to fund 
infrastructure projects in North Australia. Some of NAIF’s board members – who are 
responsible for reading and approving loan applications – would personally benefit from the 
operation of the Carmichael Project because of their positions in companies involved with the 
mining industry. One board member, for example, was simultaneously the chief executive of a 
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company that hires out labour and machinery for mining operations and in charge of deciding 
whether a mining operation should receive NAIF funds in order to become operational. Under 
the proposed Ecocide Act 2010, this person would have superior responsibility for the potential  
ecocidal consequences of the Carmichael Project for her role in ‘procuring the commission of 
the offence’. It would thus be in the government’s best interest if agencies such as the Expert 
Finance and Insurance Corporation, which supports NAIF, did not have members with conflicts 
of interest serving on their board.   
 
However, since a corporation is considered to be a ‘non-natural legal entity’, it cannot be found 
to have mens rea and thus it cannot legally be held responsible for actions it did not commit. 
People working for these corporations enjoy legal immunity since culpability is left with their 
organisation, which cannot be held responsible for the consequences of actions made on its 
behalf. Corporate actors have been able to evade legal responsibility for their actions because 
of this problem of separate corporate identity. Ecocide legislation should address this problem 
by stating that employees that act ‘on behalf of’ a company can face imprisonment for 
committing crimes of ecocide, through the principle of superior responsibility, as Higgins’ 
proposed Ecocide Act 2010 states: 
 
Where a person of superior responsibility is convicted of an offence under this Act 
by reason of his position as CEO, director, manager, secretary or a person who was 
purporting to act in any such capacity for a company, organisation, partnership, or 
any other legal entity, as a consequence of the conviction the company shall be held 
jointly responsible for the actions of its servant. 
 
This not only removes the corporate veil, i.e. the legal loophole that states a corporation cannot 
be of criminal mind, safeguarding the environment from any person that acts on behalf of a 
corporation but also allows for a corporation to be held responsible for the actions of its 
employees.  
 
If ecocide legislation with a superior responsibility clause were to have been enacted in 2010, 
the Carmichael Project would potentially not have been able to be proposed by Adani in the 
first place. As Chapter Three has outlined, the Adani corporation has a history of environmental 
destruction around the globe. As early as 2010, the Indian Ministry of Environment and Forests 
found that Adani’s Mundra Port caused large-scale destruction of mangroves and natural 
seawater flow, among other environmental violations. Multiple government agencies in India 
have investigated the Adani corporation for damage to the environment as a result of its 
industrial activities by. Adani’s business ventures have also been found to have polluted a 
major river in Zambia. Along with the destruction of a number of ecosystems caused by non-
compliance with and disregard for environmental legislation are accounts of Adani’s bribery, 
price gauging and intimidation of local populations affected by the corporation’s activities.  By 
lifting the corporate veil, superior responsibility in an ecocide law could have been used to try 
Adani – both the persons of superior responsibility and the company itself – for the crime of 
Ecocide at the company’s first recorded offence in India in 2010. A guilty verdict could have 
seen the company dissolved, preventing the bid for the Carmichael Project several years later. 
 
Simply put, the principle of superior responsibility brings accountability to people in positions 
of power by making explicit that with authority comes responsibility. The Carmichael Project 
has demonstrated that when a person of authority (due to the power vested in the position of 
authority) is able to evade responsibility, environmental destruction is not prevented and can 
be approved to occur without legal or proper consequence. By not excluding agencies or 
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lobbyists who are – once again, as the Carmichael Project has demonstrated – present, 
influential and at times benefit from such environmentally destructive projects, the principle of 
superior responsibility’s broad terms of authority and responsibility complement the Ecocide 
law’s belief: that dangerous industrial activities and climate disasters are the ultimate 
responsibility of the people who have the power to prevent such harm at a state and corporate 
level (Higgins 2018). 
 
Denial of injury versus strict liability 
 
Another script that has been repeated by multiple members of the Australian Federal and 
Queensland State Governments and Adani is the denial of injury of the Carmichael Project. 
Whether it was through the net emissions or offsets arguments or the more ‘direct’ climate 
change denial, the Carmichael Project’s projected greenhouse gas emissions; threat to 
endangered species; threat to local lands and water resources; and threat to Indigenous culture, 
have been publicly denied by people in positions of power despite the scientific evidence 
against their claims. 
 
As Chapter Six discussed, the image of state representatives on public television and other 
media outlets rejecting climate change and other environmental harms has culminated in the 
‘Post-Truth Era’, when statements that correspond with an individual’s agenda are presented 
as fact while opposing statements are dismissed as propaganda or lies. This agenda of 
misinformation, blurring the lines between fact and fiction, weakens climate science’s position 
as unbiased and legitimate. When the individual doing the denying (of climate change, for 
example) is in a position of power, the effects of a large-scale industrial project like the 
Carmichael Mine – which are unquestionably harmful to the environment (see Chapter Four) 
– become a politicized debate.  
 
Ecocide legislation must provide a solution to this problem (i.e. that indisputable harms are 
able to be denied). Higgins’s conceptualisation of a crime of Ecocide suggests that for the 
purposes of that definition, ‘the Paris Agreement of 4 November 2016 shall be considered to 
be established premise for prior knowledge by State, corporate or any other entity’s senior 
person, or any other person of superior responsibility’ (Higgins 2018).  
 
Using the Paris Agreement as a premise for knowledge by persons of superior responsibility 
strengthens the Ecocide Act’s notion of strict liability. Strict liability is liability for harm set 
upon a defendant without the need to prove either negligence or fault as long (as it can be 
proven that it was the defendant caused the harm). The legal concept of strict liability, which 
imputes liability to a person regardless of their culpability, is able to remove the mental element 
of the offense and hold a company (the corporate person) liable for its crimes. The Australian 
Law Reform Commission has argued that strict liability overcomes ‘a knowledge of law 
problem and may be appropriate to ensure the integrity of a financial or corporate regulatory 
regime’ (ALRC 2018).   
 
Legal recognition – through ecocide legislation such as Higgins’ Ecocide Act – that knowingly 
emitting greenhouse gases is an act of ecocide allows for the prevention and punishment for 
such damages. While there is currently no legal mechanism to hold anyone accountable for 
greenhouse gas emissions, the Paris Agreement was a step forward. 184 Parties have ratified 
the Paris Agreement, whose central aim is ‘to strengthen the global response to the threat of 
climate change by keeping a global temperature rise this century well below 2 degrees Celsius 
	 188 
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase even further 
to 1.5 degrees Celsius’ (UN 2018). 
 
As a signatory to the treaty, Australia publicly acknowledges that it is required to strengthen 
its efforts against global warming and report their ‘nationally determined contributions’ of 
greenhouse gas emissions every five years (UN 2018). By signing the Paris Agreement, the 
countries also admit to concepts such as human made global warming. However, despite 
signing the Agreement, the Australian Government has supported Adani’s bid to build one of 
the world’s largest coal mines in Queensland. These actions are contradictory, but due to the 
‘soft-law’ nature of the Paris Agreement and the lack of a crime of ecocide under International 
Criminal Law, the Carmichael Project has been able to legally reach the pre-development stage. 
An Ecocide Act, if passed at an international level, could use Australia’s signing of the Paris 
Agreement – as well as the contents of the document which acknowledge the ‘injury’ caused 
by greenhouse gas emissions – to support the claim that the government has committed ecocide.  
 
Furthermore, the ‘net emissions’ argument would not be able to be used if an ecocide law of 
strict liability existed. Australia’s Environment Minister argued in the Federal Court of 
Brisbane that in order to prove that emissions from the Carmichael Project would result in 
higher global greenhouse gas levels, it must be proven that the emissions from the mine would 
not be offset by carbon-reducing initiatives elsewhere in the world. By using the Paris 
Agreement (or any future international agreement on climate change) as ‘proof of knowledge’ 
of the need and the duty to reduce carbon emissions, ecocide legislation could effectively 
counter the net emissions argument. The Paris Agreement mandates states to reduce their 
GHGs. The Minister’s justification for opening the mine on the basis that GHG-reducing 
initiatives will be taken up elsewhere is illogical, as Australia had also signed to reduce their 
emissions. 
 
The environmental harm that state and corporate officials have denied in order to justify their 
positions of support for the Carmichael Project are the same as those acknowledged (as real, 
problematic, and in need of managing) by Australian state by signing the Paris Agreement. In 
other words, through ecocide legislation, Australia’s simultaneous signature and commitment 
to the Paris Agreement while approving the Carmichael Project would implicate these persons 
with superior responsibility as guilty of ecocide. 
 
Sentencing and reparative justice 
 
It can be said that there are two ‘types’ of ecocide: human induced or ‘ascertainable ecocide’ 
and ecocide by ‘other causes’ or ‘non-ascertainable ecocide’ (Short 2016). Ascertainable 
ecocide is ecocide caused by human agency, where an individual responsible for the activity 
can be identified. Corporate-induced ecocide, such as the ecological disaster that resulted from 
resource extraction in the Alberta tar sands is an example. Non-ascertainable ecocide occurs 
when an individual responsible for the activity cannot be identified. Catastrophic events such 
as flooding or earthquakes are examples of ecocide that cannot be stopped. However, as Short 
(2016: 2014) states, ‘when human-induced ecocides, which destroy carbon sinks and create 
escalating carbon emissions, are prevented, it is possible that this could reduce the frequency 
of climatic extremes and mitigate the negative impacts of naturally occurring ecocides….’. 
 
This distinction allows for a legal framework to be created for pre-empting, preventing, and 
prohibiting ecocide. Naturally occurring ecocide (as a result of a natural disaster, for example) 
becomes a responsibility of governments. Human-caused ecocide, on the other hand, becomes 
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a responsibility of governments and corporations, which would be legally bound to ensure that 
any business practice that causes extensive damage or destruction of an ecosystem is put to an 
end (Higgins et al. 2013). Higgins’ proposal thus creates a legal duty of care for the Earth. In 
binding nations to act before the destruction of an ecosystem occurs, naturally occurring 
ecocide and human-caused ecocide can be pre-empted. In binding nations to act after the 
destruction of an ecosystem occurs, naturally occurring ecocide and human-caused ecocide can 
be remedied. 
 
The Carmichael Project’s environmental destruction would potentially be ecocidal and 
therefore ecocide legislation may have prevented its approval. However, if Adani and the 
Australian Government were to approve the Project and it began operating before being 
prosecuted for the crime of Ecocide, a method of ‘repairing’ the harm done must also be 
available. Reparative justice can impose ‘repairing harm’ upon offenders ‘without necessarily 
involving consensual agreement and/or conferencing methods of negotiation’ (White 2017b: 
130). Reparative justice is useful in cases of crimes of the powerful since changes to company 
practices, especially those involving profit margins, requires sanctions that respond to scale of 
the activities of the corporation. Ecocide legislation should grant courts power to assure that 
the guilty party restores the affected territories to their pre-ecocide state (Higgins 2018). White 
(2017b: 130) suggests the reparative justice approach can provide ‘greater deterrent effect than 
the usual deterrence-based approaches precisely because of what it demands of offenders by 
way of public exposure, enforceable undertakings, and substantial commitments of time and 
resources to environmental remediation.’ Reparative justice, as a method of remedy, can also 
benefit the victims of environmental incidents, including Indigenous Communities. The 2007 
case Garrett v Williams, demonstrates how reparative justice can also benefit the victims of 
environmental incidents, including Indigenous Communities, in particular instances such as 
when the mining company is from the local community. In that case, Pinnacle Mines Pty Ltd 
was charged with several offenses, including causing damage to a protected Aboriginal place. 
Under the direction of a facilitator, the sole director of the mining company paid a monetary 
penalty fee but also was able to talk to a representative of the Aboriginal Land Council about 
the connection of traditional owners to the land, which left him feeling ‘foolish’ and 
‘remorseful’ (White 2015: 47). 
 
Lastly, an ecocide law must discuss jurisdiction. This is a pertinent issue in the Carmichael 
case for a number of reasons. Most obviously, Adani is an Indian multinational corporation 
seeking to conduct its business outside of its national boundaries, operating a coal mine and 
rail in Queensland, Australia. The components of the project, i.e. the mine and rail, are 
physically in Queensland and would therefore be destructive to the immediate surrounding 
environment and plant and animal species in Australia. The coal from the mine would, 
however, be burned in India, which caused legal questions regarding origin of greenhouse gas 
emissions in court cases. The Australian state has been able to legally evade responsibility for 
these emissions through its classification system (Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions – see chapters 
Four and Six). Therefore, an Ecocide Act should be multi-jurisdictional. Wherever a crime of 
Ecocide is committed, the offender would be liable to persecution at an international level. As 
their name suggests, multinational corporations operate all over the world. A 
multijurisdictional Ecocide Act would close the loophole that many corporations (e.g. Union 
Carbide in Bhopal, India or Adani in Queensland, Australia) have utilised in the past when 






This chapter discussed the history of the concept of ecocide, the destruction of the environment, 
from its origins in the Vietnam War to its more recent criminological conceptualisation and 
Higgins’ draft Ecocide Act. The chapter then summarised the harms of the proposed 
Carmichael Project. The Queensland and Federal governments have placed thousands of 
hectares of farmland in threat of permanent sterilisation by allowing Adani’s proposed rail line 
to pass through high quality agricultural land. The Carmichael Mine would also use significant 
volumes of water in order to dewater underground mines and open cut pits, resulting in 
permanent changes to groundwater levels and affecting drainage into rivers and wetlands. In 
addition, the cumulative CO2 emissions related to the Carmichael Mine would be the highest 
in the Southern Hemisphere and among the highest in the world for an individual project. Yet 
we already know that climate changes that affect the Great Barrier Reef include rising sea and 
air temperatures, ocean acidification, nutrient enrichment, altered light levels, more extreme 
weather events, changes to ocean circulation, and sea-level rise (Morrison and Hughes 2016).  
 
Placed within the larger global context of climate change, the scale and impact of this project 
fits neatly with the concept of ecocide. The role of the federal and state governments is crucial 
to the project, and in propelling it forward regardless of manifest negative environmental 
consequences. In other words, the potential ecocidal consequences of the Carmichael Project 
stem directly from the nexus between business and government. 
 
Use of the term ecocide should be seen as a political intervention, one that attempts to allocate 
blame and assign the label of wrongdoing to particular actors and specific kinds of acts and 
omissions. In this sense, it is a framing device that provides a useful short-hand conceptual tool 
to describe gross harms stemming from real-world activities. Those who contribute the most 
to global warming and wide spread environmental destruction are amongst those perpetrators 
firmly in the sights of those who view ecocide as the most important – and perhaps the most 
violent – crime of the 21st century.  
 
A legal framework for the crime of ecocide could prevent, prohibit and pre-empt such 
environmental destruction. This chapter highlighted the main legal concepts that should be 
present in such an act, such as the principle of superior responsibility and strict liability, that 
would bring accountability to actions that contribute to the destruction of an ecosystem. A 
proper law of ecocide would also be one of strict liability. Limiting a law of ecocide to a crime 
of intent would be akin to limiting a law of ecocide to periods of war. History has shown that 
during war, states or corporations may set out to destroy the environment of the opposing side 
(or, commit ecocide). Intent is more easily proven during war since the connection between 
destroying the opponent’s environment and military benefit can be easily drawn. A state or 
corporation’s techniques of neutralising and denying harm, such as that regarding the 
Carmichael Project, make it difficult to prove that intent during peacetime, especially if the 
ecocide is or would be committed ‘at home’. Put another way, ecocide can be understood as 
environmental warfare even in the absence of an official war. As a type of environmental crime 
that is inherently perpetuated by the powerful, ecocide occurs when the destruction of the 
environment is the cost of states and corporations engaging in ‘business as usual’.  
 
This thesis opened by describing the players – those with ‘superior responsibility’ and decision-
making powers over ecosystems. The Carmichael Project was then introduced; the 
consequences it would have on the environment and its contribution to climate change detailed. 
The justifications and denials of these harms were presented and the collusion between state 
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and corporation was detailed. This chapter presented the concept and crime of Ecocide as a 
potential solution to some of what the previous chapters discussed. However, Ecocide is not 
the only solution and passing a law against it at an international level has unsurprisingly been 
met with resistance by the states who commit ecocide themselves. The next and last chapter 
describes some changes Australia can implement nationally in order to prevent future industrial 










“The carbon budget is clear and compelling. To stay within the 2°C limit, the trend of 
increasing global emissions must be slowed and halted in the next few years and emissions 
must be trending downwards by 2020 at the latest. Investments in and installations of renewable 
energy must therefore increase rapidly. And, critically, most of the known fossil fuel reserves 
must remain in the ground” (The Commonwealth of Australia 2013b: 87). 
 
“I’ve studied every industry in Australia and I’ve never seen collusion between governments 
and industry in the way I’ve seen in coal mining. It’s the revolving door of government and 








Transparency International released its 2017 Corruption Perceptions Index in February 2018. 
Australia, ranked 13th, was one of the countries listed in decline – that is, becoming ‘more 
corrupt’. The state’s score in 2017 (77) continued the downward trend from its 2012 high score 
of 85; a number historically awarded to mostly Nordic countries (Transparency International 
2017). Transparency International cited a wide range of factors that have contributed to 
Australia’s score, including “inappropriate industry lobbying in large-scale projects such as 
mining” and “revolving doors and a culture of mateship” (Lucas 2018).  
 
As this thesis has demonstrated, the Carmichael Coal Mine and Rail Project has been approved 
by the Queensland State and Australian Federal Governments due to some of the same factors 
that Transparency International cites as evidence that Australia has become a more corrupt 
state. From the board of directors on NAIF, a potential source of funding for the Project, to the 
Environment Ministers, who consistently approved the Project despite their duty to protect the 
environment, those who have previously worked for the mining industry are often later in 
positions of power to make decisions to approve future mines.  Media outlets such as television, 
radio, and written news articles have been used to cast shadows of doubt about the Project’s 
environmental harms using clever slogans and inspiring statistics that promise economic 
benefits. Climate science has been denied and activists have been ‘othered’ and portrayed as 
anti-jobs. Combined, these tactics have almost led to one of the world’s largest coalmines being 
built in the wake of the Paris Agreement and the IPCC Reports on climate change and despite 
the majority of Australians rejecting Adani’s proposal in lieu of meaningful climate policy.  
 
Collusion between states and the mining industry threatens democracy. The Carmichael Project 
serves as a poignant example of this fact. Although the state will always be a site of 
contestation, a democratic state thrives when citizens of a state elect leaders to represent their 
interests and fails when those leaders’ positions are influenced through corporate donations 
and lobbying. The setting for the story of the Carmichael Project is a democracy weakened by 
state corporate crime. 
 
In this final chapter of my thesis, I highlight some of the ‘spaces’ of Australian policies and 
processes dealing with mining approvals that are susceptible to corruption, as demonstrated by 
my case study of the Carmichael Project.  I also make some suggestions for how these spaces 
can be improved to prevent them from being used in the future. These small but significant 
changes have the potential to strengthen Australia’s democracy and, along with an international 
law of Ecocide, can safeguard our environment from further degradation from industrial 
projects. 
 
Democracy, collusion, and mining 
 
Throughout my study of the Carmichael Project, I wanted to find the spaces in the Australian 
approvals process that are vulnerable to corruption by and with the mining industry. A starting 
point for the thesis was to investigate the people – from the namesake of the Adani corporation 
to the less obvious stakeholders involved in PR firms behind the public campaigns to the NAIF 
board of directors wanting to finance the Mine. By finding out who they are, who they work 
for and work with, I was able to discover who benefitted from the mining approval decisions. 
The very fact that I could answer this question with a list of names (as opposed to reaching the 
conclusion that ‘the Australian (or global) public’ would benefit) was the first indication of 
corruption and, by extension, a weakened democracy. 
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Like any other infrastructure project or decision made by state representatives on behalf of its 
citizens, mining approvals must prioritise public interest. Decision-makers should not 
personally benefit from their decision to approve a mine and potential conflicts of interest must 
be declared and controlled. In Australia, however, politicians and government officials are not 
legally obligated to declare their assets or interests in mining companies (Transparency 
International 2017). As a result, the public is unable to know who owns and profits from the 
companies that are seeking to obtain a mining license. The Panama Papers revealed the scale 
of corporations that hold offshore bank accounts in countries such as Panama in order to 
conceal their wealth and pay negligible (if any) amount of tax, and the Adani family were 
among those named (ICIJ 2019). 
 
The Carmichael case also highlighted the danger of close relationships between senior 
politicians and the fossil fuel industry. For example, during the Queensland election campaign 
in 2017 it was revealed that Cameron Milner, the former Queensland secretary of the ALP and 
chief of staff to Federal Opposition Leader Bill Shorten was the head of the lobbying firm Next 
Level. Next Level was hired by Adani to provide lobbying serves in Queensland in February 
2015 and made 33 lobbying contacts for Adani – more than double the contact reported by any 
lobbyist on behalf of any other client (Long 2017). Milner wasn’t the only conflict of interest, 
as this thesis demonstrated. Conflicts of interest involved the NAIF board and Senator Matt 
Canavan, among others that are detailed in Chapter Eight. These links between government 
and the coal industry can be said to have formed when climate change emerged as a public 
issue in the 1990s and multinational mining corporations operating in Australia formed 
partnerships with the media and prominent think tanks to gather political support for the 
promotion of coal (Beresford 2018). The earliest evidence of these links emerged in June 2004, 
with the Howard government’s white paper, ‘Securing Australia’s Energy Future’, which 
named coal as Australia’s key future source of energy. This was in line with the Australian 
Coal Association’s (ACA) position. It was later discovered that the ACA lobbied Howard and 
the white paper ‘was exactly what the industry asked for’ (Baker 2015). 
 
One potential solution for Queensland would be to imitate the ‘integrity system’ developed by 
the Department of Mines and Petroleum in Western Australia. The integrity system has been 
shown to help ‘prevent and mitigate the risk of public servants and politicians putting private 
sector interests before public interest’ (Langley 2017: 17). A similar system in Queensland 
could establish codes of conduct; whistle-blower protections; and accountability through 
auditors, ombudsmen, and law enforcement authorities for the investigation and prosecution of 
corruption (Transparency International 2017: 28). 
 
In short, any potential conflicts of interest that could result in decisions (made on behalf of the 
public by decision-makers) made to personally benefit the decision-maker should be disclosed. 
Another potential solution, according to Transparency International (2017) would be to create 
a public register of decision-makers’ assets and interests in the mining industry. However, 
‘conflicts of interest’ do not necessarily have to take the form of lobbyists. Conflicts of interest 
can also occur when policy-makers prioritise the interests of the private sector over those of 
the public. The Carmichael case involved a number of people in positions of power within the 
state who were focused on securing investment in mining at the expense of environmental, 
social, or even other economic interests. One example was the Queensland Coordinator 
General’s role in approving the Project. 
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In Queensland, the role of the Coordinator-General is to promote investment and economic 
development in the state and to facilitate the approvals process for infrastructure projects and 
“significant” mines. These competing responsibilities have been criticised as potentially 
influencing a Coordinator-General’s decision-making power over the environmental approvals 
process – ‘a risk that is exacerbated by the lack of guiding decision-making criteria in the 
legislation’ (McGrath 2003). The Coordinator-General had given the Carmichael Project some 
of the first ‘green lights’ despite its environmental impacts. Someone who is responsible for 
investment and infrastructure projects of a state should not have be in a position to grant 
environmental approvals – this conflict of interest has resulted in biased decisions that favour 
the mining industry and put environmental concerns secondary to economic development. 
 
Corporations seeking to mine in Australia should also be held accountable for the 
environmental and social impacts of their projects. This has not been the case for Australia’s 
environmental authorities. For example, the Land Court case cited in Chapter Three revealed 
that Adani had overstated the number of jobs that would be created by the Carmichael Mine. 
According to expert advice, Adani’s claim of 10,000 full-time jobs was inaccurate and only 
about 1,200 jobs would be produced. Despite this finding, Adani continued to cite the 10,000 
figure publicly as a justification for the Project and testament to its economic value. 
Transparency International’s 2017 research indicated that most government authorities lacked 
the capacity to verify the contents of a company’s environmental and social impact assessments 
and that this increases the risk that deliberately misleading statements or omissions are 
provided. Adani also misled the Australian Government by not disclosing the company’s 
environmental transgressions in Zambia, when Adani Australia CEO oversaw the mining 
project that resulted in the destruction of the Kafue River. A solution to companies’ misleading 
impact statements might lie with the state establishing the capacity needed to verify 
environmental and social impact statements using clear and transparent criteria (Transparency 
International 2017). 
 
Finally, a strong democracy requires mining approvals to be negotiated with genuine 
consultation with communities. There are a number of ways Australia can improve its 
community consultation process. First, binding requirements for consultations must be set out, 
so that mining companies have a legal duty to do so. This would prevent consultations from 
being bypassed; conducted superficially as a formality; or for community recommendations to 
be ignored. Second, community leaders must represent community interests. In the Carmichael 
case, some members of the Wangan and Jagalingou traditional owners were given a monetary 
award in exchange for their approval of Adani’s land use for the mine, despite others opposing 
– and later litigating against – the project (see Chapter Three). Timing is another important 
factor in a consultation’s legitimacy. Community engagement should not take place during the 
final stages of the mining approval process as there is a risk of the project (and its conditions) 
to be taken as a given, allowing project proponents to view consultations as a formality 
(Transparency International 2017: 76). Consultations with the Wangan and Jagalingou People 
for the land use of the Galilee Basin in the Carmichael Mine case took place after several 
environmental approvals were already granted to Adani. This late-stage community 
engagement may have contributed to the neglect of the Traditional Owners’ concerns regarding 
the Carmichael Project’s environmental destruction, which resulted in several further 
litigations against Adani. 
 
Transparency International (2017: 9) found ‘countries with robust approvals regimes can attract 
higher quality investments from major players who avoid corruption-prone jurisdictions, 
improve economic returns to their citizens and reduce rates of social conflict around mining 
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projects…The social licence of the mining sector depends first and foremost on a transparent 
and accountable approvals regime that effectively controls corruption risks.’ While Australia 
does not currently have a clear, legally binding process and standards providing guidance on 
what constitutes appropriate consultation, various global institutions have developed best 
practice standards, such as the ICMM’s Good Practice Guidance on Indigenous Peoples and 
Mining (2015) and the OECD’s Due Diligence Guidance for Meaningful Stakeholder 
Engagement in the Extractive Sector (2017). These guidelines are, however, voluntary, 




The Carmichael Mine and Rail Project is an example of a potential future ecocide perpetuated 
by the Australian state and Adani corporation. Its approval is the result of state collusion with 
a corporation to exploit public land and natural resources for private profit. Its resulting harms 
to the environment and to the Indigenous owners of the land have been denied or externalised 
and climate change science has been ignored. Environmental impact statements that have been 
found by NGOs; activists; or journalists to contain false or incomplete information have been 
presented as factual to the Australian and international public in order to justify the 
government’s decisions about the use of and harms to land, air, water, and energy.  
 
At the time of my writing, it has been over nine years since Adani first purchased the coal 
tenement in the Galilee Basin for Australia’s newest and largest mining project, and the 
Carmichael Mine and Rail Project has not begun operating. The activist movement against 
Adani continues to be the largest environmental movement in Australian history, with NGOs 
and individual citizens around the world continuing to organise against, protest and legally 
challenge environmentally harmful industrial activities. Most recently, a “#Stop Adani” 
convoy, led by former Greens politician and environmental activist Bob Brown has travelled 
from Hobart to the Adani mining site in Queensland, gathering supporters along the way.  
 
Together with these civil movements, an international ecocide law would hold states and 
corporations accountable for the destruction of the environment. Ecocide law is an important 
legal component that can assist in the prevention and prosecution of massive environmental 
damage and destruction. It would move environmental law away from its current ‘soft-law’ 
state by addressing the gaps in accountability and governance of current international 
environmental agreements. In the meantime, judgements such as that given by Judge Brian 
Preston in the New South Wales Land and Environment Court earlier in 2019, striking down 
the building of a coal mine approximately half of the size of the proposed Carmichael Mine, 
highlights the importance of leaving coal in the ground (Gloucester Resources Limited v 
Minister for Planning [2019] NSWLEC 7): 
 
In short, an open cut coal mine in this part of the Gloucester Valley would be in the 
wrong place at the wrong time. Wrong place because an open cut coal mine in this 
scenic and cultural landscape, proximate to many people’s homes and farms, will 
cause significant planning, amenity, visual and social impacts. Wrong time because 
the GHG emissions of the coal mine and its coal product will increase global total 
concentrations of GHGs at a time when what is now urgently needed, in order to 
meet generally agreed climate targets, is a rapid and deep decrease in GHG 




Informed decision making around air, water, land and energy requires the close consideration 
of climate change and must be on the side of precaution. Those who pretend climate change is 
not happening and climate policy should not take precedence over immediate economic gain 
are risking the wellbeing of our planet for their own specific sectoral interests. Recent 
environmental movements have demonstrated that these ‘carbon criminals’, as White (2014a) 
refers to them, are in the minority. 
 
The Stop Adani movement has brought attention to the link between environmental issues and 
democracy. When the environment is at risk, democracy is at risk.  This thesis has demonstrated 
that both risks are real. In demonstrating this, I have drawn upon concepts such as 
environmental harm, state-corporate crime and ecocide. Fundamentally, the Carmichael Mine 
and Rail Project provides an exemplar of crimes of the powerful as a process and practice. 
Research and analysis of this nature is important for exposing wrongdoing and providing the 
impetus for reform and social action. As 16-year-old climate activist and leader of the School 
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